tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2546602206734889307.post4320717568982982982..comments2024-03-18T11:12:51.114+00:00Comments on mainly macro: Central Bank Independence and MMTMainly Macrohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09984575852247982901noreply@blogger.comBlogger116125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2546602206734889307.post-75795260886499978702016-08-07T13:48:34.799+00:002016-08-07T13:48:34.799+00:00"The immediate problem with Greek banks was a..."The immediate problem with Greek banks was a run created by the Troika's negotiating stance. Central banks should always provide cash in the case of a bank run. The fact that the ECB, as part of the Troika, can first create a run, and then refuse to provide cash, means that it acted in a highly political way."<br /><br />It looks like you're contradicting your own argument here Simon. The quote suggests that you acknowledge that CBI is a means to promote the politics of TINA; institutional misdirection to mask the real instruments of government action. I think the broader issue within the larger Keynesian community is scepticism over the effectiveness of monetary policy. There are a range of views but there is a broad desire for an institutional framework that is more favourable to fiscal policy.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2546602206734889307.post-68271875013953015892015-09-24T16:30:31.795+00:002015-09-24T16:30:31.795+00:00"1. If all government debt was converted to m..."1. If all government debt was converted to money when we are not at the ZLB, interest rates would fall and inflation would rise.'<br /><br />This is not true in a system that can pay interest on excess reserves, is it? Surely you could just convert the entire debt stock to interest-paying reserves, and use term-deposits at the Fed to construct a yield curve out to whatever level of maturity one desires? Rohan Greyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09366830168875142167noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2546602206734889307.post-22325617881605352992015-09-24T16:13:32.119+00:002015-09-24T16:13:32.119+00:00"Central banks should always provide cash in ..."Central banks should always provide cash in the case of a bank run. "<br />Then why should they not do the same to governments?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2546602206734889307.post-41887638240738437042015-09-22T17:35:02.577+00:002015-09-22T17:35:02.577+00:00Is MMT suddenly a dogma? You cannot just choose to...Is MMT suddenly a dogma? You cannot just choose to categorise the CB as u please, or conflate normative and positive statements. If the ECB is a 'department' or 'subsidiary' of government you are inhabiting another planet.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13473661280678620614noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2546602206734889307.post-7746694675990381892015-09-21T22:10:52.148+00:002015-09-21T22:10:52.148+00:00Simon, what the hell does this have to do with thi...Simon, what the hell does this have to do with this? Wren Lewis, master of the strawman.<br />If NICE was doing a terrible job and had control over NHS policies generally, with a NHS Governor that embedded a certain philosophy of bleeding patients, then hell yes.<br />Come up with an actual argument rather than sophistry.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2546602206734889307.post-85278776864715779532015-09-21T22:05:53.181+00:002015-09-21T22:05:53.181+00:00"This should worry anyone who wants to suppor..."This should worry anyone who wants to support democracy. As a completely unelected body, it has the power to hold any individual EZ country to ransom,"<br />God what a load of total arrogant tosh.<br />Greece can exit the euro at any time it wants and chose to enter voluntary. What a load of nonsense. They signed up and knew at a the time it was a "completely unelected body."Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2546602206734889307.post-78409225979426393172015-09-21T22:01:53.441+00:002015-09-21T22:01:53.441+00:00The ECB declared Greek banks solvent on one hand, ...The ECB declared Greek banks solvent on one hand, but refused liquidity.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2546602206734889307.post-45384315435753231122015-09-21T20:45:22.553+00:002015-09-21T20:45:22.553+00:00«The government delegates decisions about what dru...«The government delegates decisions about what drugs to provide on the NHS to NICE»<br /><br />This under the assumption that what matters with the CBI idea is that the BoE can choose the merely-technical means to reach the wage-inflation target.<br /><br />But what really matters with CBI is that increases in target inflation rate have to be announced in public and well before the BoE make up their mind on how to reach that target. The main effect is that governments are effectively prevented from shafting low-rate long-term debt holders with a sudden increase in inflation; they have to use a sudden devaluation instead :-).<br /><br />Plus that in order to reach that target the BoE is implicitly constrained to consider even pretty extreme monetary policies, so that if the government is «fiscally conservative» (that is uses "austerity" to push down wage-inflation) then the BoE has to overdo the «looser monetary policy than would otherwise be the case» to boom asset prices so that spending funded by capital gains (a rather leaky transmission channel) compensates.<br /><br />The actual "independence" aspect of BCI is a red herring, even if likely the wise and fair philosopher-kings at the BoE are very happy indeed to enjoy less meddling from the mere civil servants at the Treasury. :-)<br />Blissexnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2546602206734889307.post-18273435234409712562015-09-21T20:08:55.444+00:002015-09-21T20:08:55.444+00:00«Central banks should always provide cash in the c...«Central banks should always provide cash in the case of a bank run.»<br /><br />Well, the well established Bagehot principles are that central banks should provide cash only to solvent banks, against good collateral and at punitive rates.<br /><br />None of these applied to greek banks, or the greek government that used them as a money-grabbing tool.<br /><br />Regardless of the Bagehot principles, lending to insolvent entities including banks is anyhow explicitly forbidden by the ECB treaties, bank run or not. it is after all a fiscal operation, and the fundamental principle of all EU activity is that fiscal operations can only be authorized by heads of government (not even their finance ministers), because of political accountability to their voters.<br /><br />Plus the Troika is merely a figleaf for the governments of the 18 euro countries. Using the "Troika" name and concept is misleading: the greek government negotiated with the other 18 euro governments as the discussions were about fiscal support, and none of those 18 governments wants to delegate authority for fiscal operations to unelected bodies,. or the to whim of the greek parliament alone.<br /><br />No taxation without representation!<br />Blissexnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2546602206734889307.post-79571656704003614922015-09-21T18:15:00.974+00:002015-09-21T18:15:00.974+00:00The immediate problem with Greek banks was a run c...The immediate problem with Greek banks was a run created by the Troika's negotiating stance. Central banks should always provide cash in the case of a bank run. The fact that the ECB, as part of the Troika, can first create a run, and then refuse to provide cash, means that it acted in a highly political way.<br /><br />This should worry anyone who wants to support democracy. As a completely unelected body, it has the power to hold any individual EZ country to ransom, and in the case of Greece used that power. I had previously been pretty critical of the ECB, but even I was shocked by that. Mainly Macrohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09984575852247982901noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2546602206734889307.post-75189866475128998632015-09-21T08:41:59.300+00:002015-09-21T08:41:59.300+00:00I wouldn't describe it as "universal"...I wouldn't describe it as "universal" but most MMTers suggests the effects of monetary policy are uncertain. In addition it seen as better to control bank lending directly - what they are lending for.<br />So they just recommend fiscal policy.<br />For example-<br />Neil Wilson:<br />"When the central bank puts interest rates up there is a short term boost to the economy - increasing demand.<br /><br />This is caused by savers getting more money from borrowers and increasing spending, whereas fixed rate borrowers don't change anything and variable rate borrowers fail to cut back as quickly (often taking eighteen months or so to scale back).<br /><br />And all this appears to be linked to the 'saving/borrowing' ratio. Where there is a lot of domestic saving the perverse effect can last for a lot longer."<br />See also:<br />http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=20011Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2546602206734889307.post-58240426400458339342015-09-20T14:22:53.808+00:002015-09-20T14:22:53.808+00:00The government delegates decisions about what drug...The government delegates decisions about what drugs to provide on the NHS to NICE. Do you think everyone of those decisions should be taken by politicians? Mainly Macrohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09984575852247982901noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2546602206734889307.post-44610402510697993792015-09-20T14:10:14.780+00:002015-09-20T14:10:14.780+00:00In the UK the Chancellor periodically appoints the...In the UK the Chancellor periodically appoints the Governor. External MPC members are appointed every 3 years. And I repeat, their job is to try and achieve a goal set by the Chancellor. Given that the MPC has far greater competence at how best to achieve this goal than any politician, I just do not see what would be gained by having the Chancellor sign off or not on every proposed interest rate change. Mainly Macrohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09984575852247982901noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2546602206734889307.post-17605606442500237152015-09-20T14:02:01.566+00:002015-09-20T14:02:01.566+00:00I would say 1. is actually the key difference. Is ...I would say 1. is actually the key difference. Is a belief that higher interest rates are as likely to increase rather than decrease aggregate demand universal among MMT followers?Mainly Macrohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09984575852247982901noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2546602206734889307.post-75235252010587645912015-09-20T12:06:50.178+00:002015-09-20T12:06:50.178+00:00«both theoretical justification and practical demo...«both theoretical justification and practical demonstration that CBI is genuinely beneficial to an economy, or polity, ceteris paribus.»<br /><br />That's ridiculous because there is no such thing as "polity", there are usually interest groups that fight over the pie quite hard. Never mind "ceteris paribus", which is a joke.<br /><br />But I'll try to describe one important angle of the consequences of CBI. CBI was designed to make long term interest rates lower and steadier by removing from the government the ability to make unannounced rapid changes in the wage-inflation rate, which has two consequences from both aspects of the means:<br /><br />#1 That the bank of England has to hit the target wage-inflation rate regardless of everything else can mean that monetary policy may have to be far more extreme than desirable to compensate for changes in that "everything else". But this of course is intended: to compensate for overtight fiscal policy monetary policy has to be extremely loose, generating huge asset price booms, as "trickle down" effects are weak.<br /><br />#2 That the target is expressed in terms of wage-inflation only (even if thinly disguised with an index with a different name) means that monetary (and fiscal) policy can be indeed free of constraints unless wage-inflation is involved, so the bank of England can either be indifferent or actively participate in policies that boost property inflation, for example.<br /><br />By having as fixed-target the wage-inflation rate thus CBI may result in greater instability in everything else. Indeed in recent years because of that medium-term wage-inflation rates have been allowed to significantly depart from the target for some years, under the excuse that what matters is the long term average.<br /><br />But overall since CBI and wage-inflation targeting has enabled huge swings in government policy in other areas, and in monetary and credit policy. As a result M King has remarked that the current setup may make the bank of England come to be perceived as an upward-redistributive tool of the rentier classes, but that's why the whole setup was designed like that.<br />Blissexnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2546602206734889307.post-56647883963435941712015-09-20T11:46:09.623+00:002015-09-20T11:46:09.623+00:00«Carney has chosen to go straight to a public atta...«Carney has chosen to go straight to a public attack on a newly elected opposition leader. Some independence!»<br /><br />* CBI happens within the bounds of the establishment consensus.<br />* The establishment consensus is of course "non-partisan" :-).<br />* Corbyn apparently is outside the establishment consensus, so fair game.<br /><br />USA readers: "establishment consensus" -> "Overton window". Even if not quite the same.<br />Blissexnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2546602206734889307.post-72258795142887012102015-09-20T11:39:13.917+00:002015-09-20T11:39:13.917+00:00«Draghi suspended ELA to blackmail Syriza»
That s...«Draghi suspended ELA to blackmail Syriza»<br /><br />That seems to be a wide misrepresentation, as ELA was not suspended, just the credit limit was not increased; existing lending was even rolled over.<br /><br />The Greek finance minister had repeatedly stated that the greek government and the greek banking system were bankrupt, and the ECB is forbidden by international treaties (that the greek government signed enthusiastically, even if fraudulently) from lending to bankrupt entities unless the lending is somehow likely to be repaid, for example by being endorsed by solvent entities.<br /><br />When SYRIZA refused the endorsement of the other 18 euro governments and broke off negotiations the ECB probably should have called in all that debt immediately instead of simply keeping it in place and rolling it over.<br /><br />Two members of the ECB board have resigned in protest at the extraordinarily generous lending that the ECB management has kept giving to Greece, at the expense of the other ECB members, even if technically it is still within the treaties under a very loose interpretation.<br />Blissexnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2546602206734889307.post-10692415146367443522015-09-20T11:29:56.622+00:002015-09-20T11:29:56.622+00:00«But if they say they will scrap CBI, that serious...«But if they say they will scrap CBI, that seriously diminishes the chances they will ever be in government, because most people will assume - not without reason - that this will mean higher inflation.»<br /><br />More precisely (as I have been arguing in other comments):<br /><br />* "most people": lenders.<br />* "higher inflation": higher interest rates.<br /><br />Of course many voters in marginals in the South East are terrified of higher interest rates, as they are engaged in high leverage margin speculation, and they by now understand well that lenders will demand higher interest rates if wages rise, but not if asset prices rise, so they want lower or at least non-rising wages too.<br />Blissexnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2546602206734889307.post-49887569605143100582015-09-20T11:22:47.352+00:002015-09-20T11:22:47.352+00:00«Labour introduced CBI only to reassure the electo...«Labour introduced CBI only to reassure the electorate (and media presumably) of their economic competence»<br /><br />Don't believe all that you read in government press releases :-).<br /><br />The real constituency of the CBI was lenders and in particular long-bond lenders, a promise to them that the BoE would choke wage-inflation and thus keep nominal interest rates low, or they would be told in advance they would not.<br /><br />What lenders are scared of is sudden increases in nominal rates: raising rates from 2% to 4% would wipe out half of their investment. CBI in essence means that changes in wage-inflation targets have to be announced in public by the government well ahead of them being implemented by the BoE.<br /><br /><br />PS of course long-bond lenders have been screwed regardless, because the low long-term interest rate enabled by the promise to keep wage-inflation low in the long-term have been used to boom asset prices. So a long-term lender when they are paid back can buy with that money the same amount or more of wage-hours they could at the beginning, but a lot less real or financial assets, which is what lenders tend to do when they don't lend. But lenders still look at wage-inflation to set the interest rates they demand, rather than at asset-inflation, so clever governments screw them on the difference.<br />Blissexnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2546602206734889307.post-17221979980746523822015-09-20T10:49:19.957+00:002015-09-20T10:49:19.957+00:00«I listed one above: interest rates have redistrib...«I listed one above: interest rates have redistributive effects. Partisan politicians would set the interest rate for reasons over and above macroeconomic stability. As different parties come and go the net effect is unnecessary macroeconomic instability. It is not clear to me that the re-election constraint (dumb voters, malign media, etc) is sufficiently strong to rule out partisan or opportunistic policy by politicians»<br /><br />But course CBI is partisan, of course it was not designed to take out monetary policy out of the hands of the corrupt voters and the opportunistic politicians they elect and put it in the hands of of the wise and fair philosopher-kings at the bank of England: it was designed by G Brown as an element in a very partisan, very redistributive, very politically opportunistic approach.<br /><br />The political goal was to fund private (plus some public) spending via, directly or mostly indirectly via remortgages on ever rising property prices, cheap (low interest) debt, what C Crouch calls "private keynesianism". With booming cheap debt, not with rising private incomes for private spending; or increasing public tax receipts for public spending.<br /><br />The way to achieve this was to engineer low interests rates by pushing down wages, and to guarantee the "bond market vigilantes" that they would be alerted by "one of theirs", the bank of England, if the government of the day intended to step outside the establishment consensus and cause a collapse in bond prices.<br /><br />The "bond market vigilantes" were pacified by knowing that the bank of England, one of theirs, would do whatever it took to ensure that wage-inflation stayed below 2% no matter the cost to employment or would telegraph well in advance (triggering a bond sell-off) any increase in wage-inflation by getting the government to announce it publicly in a target setting letter.<br /><br />CBI is thus one of the building blocks of a bipartisan consensus policy to redistribute from wage-earners to property-owners by keeping nominal interest rates low by repressing wage-inflation, in order to push property prices higher.<br /><br />The usual telling quotes from G Osborne and D Cameron:<br /><br />«A credible fiscal plan allows you to have a looser monetary policy than would otherwise be the case. My approach is to be fiscally conservative but monetarily active.»<br /><br />«It is hard to overstate the fundamental importance of low interest rates for an economy as indebted as ours… …and the unthinkable damage that a sharp rise in interest rates would do.<br />When you’ve got a mountain of private sector debt, built up during the boom… …low interest rates mean indebted businesses and families don’t have to spend every spare pound just paying their interest bills. In this way, low interest rates mean more money to spare to invest for the future.<br />A sharp rise in interest rates – as has happened in other countries which lost the world’s confidence – would put all this at risk… …with more businesses going bust and more families losing their homes.»<br />Blissexnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2546602206734889307.post-55621899739453321092015-09-20T10:19:43.243+00:002015-09-20T10:19:43.243+00:00«Moreover politicians will indeed inevitably be pa...«Moreover politicians will indeed inevitably be partisan - not least because of redistribution between (rich) lenders to (poor) borrowers. For doves and hawks read left and right. Why should we pay a price in terms of adverse macroeconomic outcomes to indulge these preferences?»<br /><br />That's stunningly old-fashioned thinking. The biggest borrowers are rich (not necessarily *net* rich), like the City and the South East property owners. They are rich thanks to speculative trading on margin, where the government, of any party, makes them whole again if the collateral used for margin goes down.<br /><br />As someone above was noting, when there is a an "establishment" consensus, based in large part on what voters in South East marginals want, nominally independent entities like parties, government, bank of England, the City interests, all move together in much the same way.<br /><br />There has been for decades an "establishment" consensus (for example as described by SR Waldan: www.interfluidity.com/v2/213.html a bit euphemistically) that wage increases are "inflation", and boosted profits and capital gains are not "inflation". Indeed the "independent" bank is given a target that in practice is for keeping down wage increases, while the government of either party inflates asset prices and financial profits with great determination while the bank looks on "independently". Because the bank cannot be the opposition.<br /><br />In effect the central bank's "independence" boils down to this: the "establishment" has given them the option to sound the alarm and trigger the wrath of the bond market vigilantes if the government of the day steps out of the establishment consensus that wages are inflationary and profits and capital gains are not inflationary.<br /><br />As to the difference in technical competence between ministers and central bankers I would think it does not matter a lot because:<br /><br />* Ministers can always seek the advice and/or delegate to central bankers. But it is the treasury civil servants are not so eager to do that because they always know best. To some extent "independence" means that the bank of England is independent of the treasury civil servants rather than of the government.<br /><br />* Central bankers understand "mechanisms" well when they are trivial, and not at all when they are not trivial. The state of the art in understand the effect of economic policy is not that good, and when there are reasons to believe it to be good it is usually obsolete.<br /><br />* Anyhow a lot of the non-understanding of the "mechanisms" is due to the Upton Sinclair principle that "It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends on his not understanding it" in the sense that the understanding that goes against the "establishment" consensus leads to career termination. Thus all the central bankers who presumably understood well the inevitable effects of the debt-collateral spiral, and kept really quiet about it.<br />Blissexnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2546602206734889307.post-87290596714278372382015-09-20T05:47:25.028+00:002015-09-20T05:47:25.028+00:00"If fear of sovereign default drives austerit..."If fear of sovereign default drives austerity, then it does not come from mainstream macroeconomics."<br /><br />It does. Because MMT shows that there can be no 'sovereign default' and the state can engage whatever resources are available for sale in its currency. Functional Finance just adapts dynamically to any reduction in private spending and borrowing. <br /><br />If foreign suppliers decide they want to blow up their own economy by refusing to supply ours, then that is their choice. It can happen, has happened, and probably will again. You can't do anything about it other than move suppliers (because the foreign market is still *competitive* and they don't all act with one mind), making sure you have multiple suppliers, and otherwise adapting the economy to cope - by rationing import goods and services to needed supplies where necessary. NeilWhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11565959939525324309noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2546602206734889307.post-58713801435783964102015-09-20T05:41:30.709+00:002015-09-20T05:41:30.709+00:00"You could in principle make CBI advisory, or..."You could in principle make CBI advisory, or make OBR advice mandatory."<br /><br />You could. But why should the advice of these people be binding on a democratically elected chamber?<br /><br />There are 650 people in parliament. There are select committees and numerous stages to the decisions they make - all open and recorded. The idea of democracy is that together and taking on board the advice all of them can receive they collectively reach the optimal decision for society. <br /><br />Suggesting that a group of 'betters' should be able to override the choice of the 'commons' in financial matters is to return us to the state before the 1910 constitutional crisis which removed the House of Lords veto over financial matters and lead to the Parliament Act. All of which asserted the supremacy of the Commons. <br /><br />What you are suggesting is a new House of Lords that can bind the hands of parliament - but consisting of only half a dozen individuals.<br /><br />This is all about embedding the philosophy you believe in permanently in the system. And that is anti-democratic. <br />NeilWhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11565959939525324309noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2546602206734889307.post-74051839470922366502015-09-20T05:31:17.262+00:002015-09-20T05:31:17.262+00:00You can't argue successfully that there ever h...You can't argue successfully that there ever has been. Until the Central Bank successfully prevents a government decision to spend, bounces a cheque, or does some other action that shows that it has decided something against what the politicians wanted, then you just have a facsimile and an illusion. <br /><br />You would need a 1910 style constitutional crisis to show that there is any independence. <br /><br />The independence of the central bank is the same independence the department of Work and Pension has to determine who gets tax credits and who doesn't - which of course then increases government spending without budget limit.<br /><br />It's an elaborate political illusion. The standard political processes would take place in all cases to ensure that those running the bank were in lock step with the political philosophies of those running the currency area. NeilWhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11565959939525324309noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2546602206734889307.post-86776244043674977022015-09-20T05:25:42.977+00:002015-09-20T05:25:42.977+00:00None of that addresses the proposal. The proposal ...None of that addresses the proposal. The proposal brings the bank clearly within the political sphere - as it should be - so that the philosophy of the bank can be altered via the political process, and the people directing the bank changed under the political cycle as they should be. <br /><br />Ignoring advice is the penchant of anybody in charge. Mervyn King ignored a bunch of advice and a load of banks blew up. The difference is that when he screwed up it took ages before he was thrown out of a job.<br /><br />"Do you really think politicians have any competence in deciding what the output gap is? "<br /><br />Do you really think the current set of bankers do? They don't. That's why there is 23 million people unemployed across the EU. The total failure of central bankers to assess things correctly - because they are working with estimations and theories that just don't work. The political philosophy, and it is a *political* philosophy, to which they subscribe is a busted flush and needs discarding. <br /><br />The bank is part of the state apparatus, and the individuals that run the bank should operate according to the political cycle - precisely so that we the people can *change* the political philosophy that is directing the bank via democracy. <br /><br />And that requires the people running the bank to consist of a minister of government, or report directly to a minister of government to receive their instructions.<br /><br />Putting bankers and economists on pedestals as though they actually understand anything fundamental is wrong. They don't. They just have a political idea and a bunch of beliefs. There is lots of evidence and writing that shows how wrong they area. Just like Labour has lots of evidence and writing to show the Tories are wrong, and vice versa.<br /><br />Democracy is how we resolve which set of beliefs to go to.<br /><br />Carney, the other day, said that the Corbynomics proposals could cause inflation. Well they would only cause inflation if Carney & Co failed to do their job properly. The intentions have been 'signalled' pretty well ahead of any possible implementation date after all!<br /><br />So it is either a statement of incompetence from the current Governor, and he should be sacked now, or a statement of political philosophy because he doesn't believe it is his job to make space for the government investment programme by trimming back bank lending sufficiently. <br /><br />That's the ultimate problem. Bankers and economist are just as corrupt, just as subject to groupthink, just as subject to political viewpoints as any of the politicians. The difference is that we the people can get rid of the politicians.<br /><br />We can't, currently, get rid of the bankers and economists. They wander around as though they have the One Truth and they don't. NeilWhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11565959939525324309noreply@blogger.com