Despite what you
read, we have been here before. In the 2019 European Election, Farage
and his Brexit party won
over 30% of votes, with Labour on 14% and the
Conservatives 9%. That directly led to the Conservatives adopting
populism by electing Johnson as its leader. The Conservatives under
Johnson ticked most of the boxes that define right wing populism: an
all powerful leader, endemic lying, attacks on our pluralist
democracy (e.g. suspending parliament), sidelining expertise (the
second and third Covid waves), culture wars, corruption and so on.
The one box he didn’t tick was reducing immigration, which is one
reason the Conservatives lost big in 2024 and why Reform has now
taken their place. [1]
To some extent the
elections last week told us what we
already knew, which is that both the two main
traditional parties are very unpopular. It emphasised this
unpopularity, however, because both Labour and Conservatives
underperformed their current national polling as many of their voters
didn’t bother to turn up. As the Liberal Democrats and the Greens
also did very well, last week was about Labour and Conservative
unpopularity more than the popularity of Reform.
If last week’s
vote shares were repeated in a general election Ben
Ansell calculates that Reform might win an outright
majority, but with a bit of tactical voting a Labour/LibDem coalition
is more likely. But neither result is that surprising when you see
that the same calculations give the Conservatives just 10-20 seats.
The Conservatives are in annihilation territory, with Reform taking
their place.
Reform gets most of
its voters from the Conservatives, and Farage sees the future of
Reform as replacing them, so it is instructive to see why the
Conservatives have so far utterly failed to stem the Reform tide.
Under Sunak and Badenoch their line seems to have been: we agree with
Farage on the key socially conservative issues and their importance,
which is why you shouldn’t vote for him. It was Farage who first
popularised the issue of what he termed an ‘invasion’ of small
boats, and the Conservatives who invented a crackpot scheme to deal
with them.
By adopting largely
the same rhetoric of Farage on asylum and immigration, but failing to
change things, the Conservative government set themselves up to lose
large numbers of votes to Reform. Worse still, by adopting the
language of Farage they alienated those Conservative voters who were
economically right wing but socially liberal, and so in the General
Election they lost a large number of seats to the Liberal Democrats.
There seems little
chance that Badenoch will change this failed strategy, but equally
there seems little chance that the strategy will suddenly come good.
Put simply, their record on both immigration and asylum will over the
next few years weigh more heavily with voters than their Farage-like
rhetoric. So why would a voter who really cared about these issues
vote for the Conservatives rather than Reform?
On the other hand,
the success of the Liberal Democrats has a less secure foundation. If
the Conservative party moved away from trying to beat Farage on
socially conservative rhetoric and policies, and instead started to
sound a little more liberal and less populist, then there is the
potential to squeeze the LibDem vote in a general election. The
Conservatives' not unreasonable argument would be that voting LibDem
would keep Labour in power, because the Liberal Democrats are clearly
not against cooperating with a minority Labour government while
Reform could not.
To make that
transformation the Conservatives would need a new leader, and here
they have a problem. James Cleverly is the obvious alternative leader
to achieve such a switch, but while a ballot of MPs might put him
first, his main rival Robert Jenrick is far
more popular with Tory members. These members, who are
largely sympathetic to Farage and his agenda, have the final say in
choosing a leader and will not want to choose someone who sounds more
liberal.
The Conservatives
seem to be hoping that over the next few years Farage and Reform lose
some of their current appeal. That could occur if Reform makes a mess
of running some councils and that gets media coverage, but would that
coverage ever be extensive enough to influence predominantly low
information Reform voters? Is there any other reason why the media
might start subjecting Farage and Reform to proper scrutiny, when
they have largely avoided doing so until now. The right wing press is
increasingly acting as the media arm of Reform rather than the
Conservative party.
Equally it is quite
possible that, with more Reform politicians at the local level, we
will see more internal dissent within the party. But that has
happened
already, and it doesn’t seem to have done Reform any
harm at all. This is partly about media coverage, but it is also
about the nature of a populist party where the leader is king, and
unlike the Conservatives there is no means for the king to be
deposed.
It is therefore not
obvious why what happened to the Conservatives last week will not
continue to happen over the next few years, and they will be facing
wipe-out at the next general election. For this reason they will be
desperate to do some kind of deal with Reform, but equally there is
no obvious reason why Farage should cooperate. The final card
Conservative MPs have is to offer Farage a merger that included his
leadership of their party, which takes us back to those 2019 European
election results. Conservative MPs dealt with that existential crisis
by giving the leadership to their own right wing populist, when most
MPs knew full well that he would be a terrible Prime Minister.
The possible death
of the Conservative party is such a momentous milestone in UK
politics that you would think the other main traditional UK party,
Labour, would be doing everything they could not to make the same
mistakes. Yet incredibly Labour seem to have decided to follow much
the same strategy that failed the Conservative government so badly.
They too are employing rhetoric and making policy that says Farage is
right about small boats and immigration. This is alienating parts of
their core vote just as the Conservatives alienated its southern
heartlands.
The only way a
Labour government can avoid a similar fate to the previous
Conservative government is by having a really good (in the eyes of
social conservatives) record on immigration and asylum. A record that
was Farage proof. To see why that is very unlikely to happen, they
just need to remember Cameron’s immigration targets.
What Labour, the
Conservatives and Reform will not admit is that measures to directly
reduce immigration have clear economic costs. If you stop granting
visas during a period, like now, of low unemployment you create
labour shortages that will reduce output in the short term, and may
move jobs, output and therefore income overseas in the longer term. If you stop overseas students
going to UK universities you will bankrupt some (with big losses to
the local economy) and require government money to help others out. That is on top of the fact that cutting immigration makes the public finances worse. [2]
There was a reason
why Cameron didn’t try to hit his targets for immigration. But the
fact that he had targets which he missed played into Farage’s
hands, who blamed free movement under the EU. Is Labour really
prepared to reduce real incomes and growth to hit low levels of
immigration? Even if they did, small boat numbers are largely
governed by events overseas over which the UK government has almost
no control. By mimicking Farage on these issues they are laying the
ground for their failure in the eyes of voters.
Will Labour see
sense on this? The FT’s
George Parker writes: “Morgan McSweeney, Starmer’s
chief of staff, will pore over the results on Friday and is likely to
conclude that he is right to pursue a “Blue Labour” strategy to
address the populist threat — a policy which is already starting to
be deployed.” Parker is probably right, unfortunately, but hasn’t
this strategy already been deployed since Labour were elected, and
for some time before that as well? Are last week’s results more a
comment on the failure of that policy?
Or George
Eaton in the New Statesman: “expect an increasing
number of MPs to demand a “reset” – greater action to reduce
immigration (one of the defining issues in Runcorn) and an avoidance
of further austerity measures.” Except as any Labour MP should
know reducing
immigration will increase the need for austerity measures given
Labour's fiscal rules, or do these MPs believe the Reform party
politicians who falsely say the opposite?
And this,
suggesting Labour’s unpopularity is all the fault of Ed Miliband
and trying to save the planet! And this.
Many Labour ministers, MPs and advisors seemed to have learnt nothing from the demise of the Conservative party.
As I have argued before, it would be far better if Labour started
developing a more distinctive line on immigration issues, which
didn’t just parrot Farage. Crucially they need to start relating
immigration to the jobs immigrants do, and start talking about the
causes of high UK immigration at the same time as showing why crude
targets are either pointless or damaging. On asylum they need to talk
about international fairness and establish safe routes. As yet there
is no sign of any of those things happening. [3]
[1] Even earlier, right wing populism achieved its first majority win
in the UK with the Brexit referendum.
[2] Migrants
tend to be young, so pay taxes but put below average demand on public
services. In the short term it is what the OBR does that matters, and
here
is their analysis.
[3] Unfortunately
the Labour government is not just copying Conservative strategy on
immigration and Reform, it is in danger of effectively doing so on
growth and public services too. In the General Election the
Conservatives lost so badly not just (or even mainly) because of
immigration but because living standards were stagnant and public
services had been run into the ground. There is some
evidence that, in terms of losing voters to Reform in
Runcorn at least, these issues mattered more than immigration.
On growth and public
services Labour wants to do much better than the Conservatives, but
they have not as yet put the resources in place to do so. Joining the
EU’s customs union and harmonisation of standards would lead to
significantly higher growth quite quickly, but Labour are moving much
more slowly because they don’t want to upset social conservatives.
By pretending they can make Brexit work they are not using one of their strongest weapons against the man who championed it during the
referendum.
On public services
Labour have stopped the ridiculous additional cuts the Conservative
government had pencilled in, but they haven’t raised taxes enough
to significantly improve service provision compared to levels they
inherited. Hence their very unpopular decisions to end the winter
fuel allowance and cut disability benefits. As I
note here, planned total current public spending in
four years time is slightly below the level it was at the end of the
previous Conservative government.
Labour say that they
have taken unpopular decisions to enable improvements that will come
good over the next few years. If they believe that then they are in
serious danger of deluding themselves. The reality is that they have
taken unpopular decisions for very little money, so the big danger is
that voters will not see future benefits and will decide that a
Labour government is little better than a Conservative one, and vote for something different.