Inflation is rising because of Trump’s war with Iran, and the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of Bank of England is raising interest rates. But raising UK interest rates does nothing to end that war. The MPC is not trying to reduce domestic activity and domestically generated inflation to offset the impact of higher energy and food prices. My guess is that if they could be certain that this overseas price shock would have no impact on UK wage inflation and profit margins, then they would not be raising rates, allowing inflation to rise temporarily and then fall back again once the price shock had stopped influencing inflation. [1]
What the MPC is worried about is often called ‘second round effects’. In their latest Monetary Policy Report they have a large section (Box A) entitled “An update on evidence for second-round effects from the rise in energy prices”. The worry is that higher energy prices will lead to higher domestic wage inflation, which puts upward pressure on the price of domestically produced goods, and so higher inflation persists even when energy and food prices stop rising. (The same thing could happen if firms in the UK raise their profit margins following higher energy and food prices, but the main risk is via wages.)
The 2022/23 energy price shock caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine gives us a recent example of this. The chart below plots UK private sector earnings inflation (regular pay and total pay) against price inflation.
Part of the problem the MPC had at the time was that the wage inflation data was heavily distorted by the pandemic. However we can see the impact of higher energy and food prices on price inflation quite clearly. If we discount wage inflation in 2021 because of the pandemic, from 2022 until the end of 2023 wage inflation rises, seemingly in response to higher price inflation. After the shock winds down in 2023, inflation begins to fall, but it doesn’t fall as rapidly as it might because wage inflation is still around 6% until the beginning of 2025. This ‘second round effect’ of higher wage inflation meant that price inflation remained above the inflation for more than one or two years.
Was the increase in wage inflation from 2022 until 2025 just a response to higher price inflation? Almost certainly not. The recovery from the pandemic was very rapid, and that does seem to have led to an overheated labour market. Unemployment reached record lows, and vacancies hit almost 1.3 million in 2022. It is quite possible that a large amount of the increase in wage inflation was a response to the tight labour market rather than the increase in price inflation.
However it may be a mistake to just think about wages responding to a tight labour market or higher price inflation separately. There is some evidence that the two factors can interact. When the labour market is tight, workers find it easier to persuade employers to raise wages in response to higher price inflation. [2] In other words the impact on wage inflation of the combination of higher price inflation and a tight labour market is more than the sum of its parts.
In contrast the labour market in the UK today is more benign from an inflationary point of view. Vacancies are much lower than in 2022, and unemployment is higher. The OBR estimates that the economy as a whole has been around 1% below potential in 2026, and recent strong growth might put it close to potential. Of particular note is that average earnings in the private sector are running at just above 3%, which is quite compatible with the MPC’s inflation target now that productivity growth is running at around 1% per annum. In the absence of the Iran war, the MPC is very unlikely to be in the business of raising interest rates.
While that is good news, it means that the MPC has no information about any second round effects from the rise in inflation that the Iran war is causing. The Monetary Policy Report says clearly that there are currently no signs of any second round effects. That leaves the MPC with a problem. To quote from the report:
“Policymakers need to make a judgement on the outlook for second-round effects, ahead of their effects emerging clearly, since monetary policy works with a lag. But the timelier data that inform this judgement can be noisy. If timelier indicators are not currently signalling large second-round effects, policymakers need to decide whether this means that these effects will ultimately be small, or that they are delayed and stronger effects are still a possibility.”
Given the experience of 2022-3, it is not surprising that the MPC is taking cautious pre-emptive action to head off a potential increase in wage inflation. However this episode also means that the MPC should not be swayed by some urging more rapid increases in rates. The key point about this earlier episode is that an energy and food price shock led to only a temporary increase in both wage and price inflation. Inflation came back down again without the need for a significant increase in unemployment. We saw the same in other countries like the US.
The old fashioned way of thinking was that after second round effects inflation could only be reduced by a period where the economy was operating significantly below potential with high unemployment. In 2023 many argued that monetary policy had to engineer a severe economic slowdown to get inflation back on track. They were wrong because a more modern view of inflation dynamics seems to have also been more realistic. That modern view is that with credible central banks, who will always do what it takes to get inflation back to target, all that is required is for the economy to go back to its potential level in order for inflation to get back to target. Wage and price setters will expect inflation to return to target, and in the absence of excess demand or supply they will set wages and prices accordingly. [3]
This means that as long as the MPC sets interest rates at a level that maintains output at or close to its potential level, and unemployment close to its ‘natural rate’ (i.e. the level where the labour market is neither too tight or too loose), then inflation will eventually return to target. Interest rates had to rise a lot during 2022/3 because that wasn’t the case, but today it is. Unless the MPC is unusually impatient for inflation to come down, or unless demand in the economy surprisingly picks up [4], there will be less need to raise interest rates for this second energy and food price shock.
[1] This does not assume higher energy and food prices go back to their pre-war position. Even if these prices remain at current levels, their direct impact on inflation will dissipate after a year or so..
[2] Employers need persuading, because for given prices higher wages will cut profit margins, and after an energy or food price shock it is not the prices of most domestically produced output that are rising. However as firms set prices the impact on profit margins will be short-lived, as domestic firms raise their prices to compensate for higher labour costs. As labour market tightness tends to go alongside a strong goods market, firms will not be under much competitive pressure to keep prices low. This is why those advocating for high wage increases during this period to protect workers living standards were wrong: all it achieved was higher inflation.
[3] In other words, wage and price setters’ expectations are rational rather than backward looking.
[4] I noted a few months ago that the UK economy no longer seems to be lagging behind most G7 economies. Since then, growth in the third quarter has come in strong, with continuing strong growth in investment, some of which may be AI related. However some decline in the next few quarters might be expected as consumers are hit by falling real incomes due to higher food and energy prices.

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