Winner of the New Statesman SPERI Prize in Political Economy 2016


Tuesday 16 July 2024

Two myths about the future of the Conservative party

 

In my last post I berated those in the media who hyped the threat of right wing populism represented by the votes won by Farage’s Reform party when the main story was the defeat of a right wing populist Conservative government. In this short post I want to look at what I believe are two additional myths about politics on the right in the UK.


The first myth is that a consequence of the election is that the Conservative party will be forced to come to some kind of agreement with Farage. Perhaps some kind of merger of the two parties, or instead allowing Farage to become a Conservative party member with some shadow cabinet post and perhaps even to become leader. (In practice there is little difference between these two options, as Reform is just a company run by Farage.)


This is a myth because the success of Reform in the last election was largely due to the unpopularity of the Conservative government, and in particular their failure to stop small boats full of refugees crossing the Channel or to reduce overall immigration numbers. The only other time Farage obtained similar vote numbers in a general election was in 2015, again reflecting the failure of a Conservative government to reduce immigration. [1]


Since 1997 the Conservative party in opposition has championed socially conservative policies and has therefore captured most of those voting on these issues. The Conservative party will continue to focus on these issues in opposition. As a result past evidence suggests that Farage or any other right wing populist outside the Conservative party is unlikely to gain anything like the number of votes that Farage obtained in 2024 as long as the Conservative party is the main opposition party.


Could past evidence be a bad guide in this case? Is the fact that Farage has finally become an MP likely to make much difference? This seems unlikely. The mainstream media has in the past been obsessed with Farage, as his coverage during the recent election shows, so the fact that he is now an MP is unlikely to make much difference. If anything, the party in the media is likely to be more critical of Farage in the future if he is seen as a threat to Conservatives. 


Of course it is still possible that enough people in the Conservative party believe in this myth, or find it politically advantageous to pretend to believe in it, to attempt making some kind of deal with Farage. (Another possibility is some kind of implicit agreement to divide up some constituencies between the two parties, in much the same way as Labour and the LibDems did in the last election.) What seems most likely is that the main impact of Farage will continue to be his influence on the internal dynamics of the Conservative party.  


The second myth is that the forthcoming Conservative party leadership battle will be between the right wingers and so called moderates in the Conservative party. It is a myth if you take moderate to mean near the centre on economic and social policies. Instead the split is better seen as between those who are happy to embrace populism, and those who would prefer to farm out populism to the party in the media. (I describe what I mean by populism in last week’s post.) It is the division between Cameron/May style Conservatives and those who prefer the populism of Johnson or Sunak.


In economic terms, both right wingers and moderates embrace policies well to the right. Tax cuts are prioritised over public spending even when many areas of public spending are in crisis. Private water companies are free to exploit their natural monopoly even if that means polluting rivers and beaches. Energy companies enjoying record profits because of the invasion of Ukraine are made to pay additional tax with great reluctance, and with loopholes designed to increase global warning.


On social policies, pretty well all Conservative MPs now support Brexit, and all MPs supported the cruel and ludicrous Rwanda policy. If there is a division here, it is between right and far right. The division is instead about presentation rather than substance. By farming out populism, ‘one nation’ Tories can pretend to oppose the social divisions inherent in populism, yet happily adopt most of the policies advocated by right wing populists to gain votes. Another possible division between moderates and right wingers, once power is achieved, involves priorities. Moderates may not be prepared to significantly harm the economy by pursuing socially conservative policies, whereas right wingers are.


The idea that a defeat as large as the last election might lead a significant number of Conservative MPs to return to anything like a version of pre-Thatcher conservatism (i.e centre right on both the economic and social dimensions) is for the birds. I have discussed the reasons for this before. First, the party in the media will not support such a move. This is a symptom of a more general problem, which is that the party is increasingly set up to defend the interests and dominant ideology of a proportion of the top 0.1%. Second, the membership is likely to support leadership candidates that are to the right in both dimensions, and has the final say on who the leader is.


Counteracting these pressures is the difficulty that a party with policies nearer the extreme than the centre will find getting support from voters. However this is not viewed by Conservative MPs, newspaper owners or party members as a critical concern at the moment for three reasons. First, governments rather than oppositions tend to win or lose elections, and even good governments can become unpopular for reasons largely outside their control. Second, after a time voters tend to want change. Third, the media tends to focus on personalities rather than policies, and because of the dominant right wing press [2] right wing parties in particular are able to disguise how right wing their intentions actually are. For all these reasons a Conservative opposition will get elected to government at some point, even though their positions on most policies remain well to the right.   



[1] In 2017 and 2019 the UKIP/Brexit party/Reform vote was lower because the Conservative party stood on a platform to implement Brexit. The success of Farage in the 2019 Euro elections was because of a failure of May to enact Brexit.

[2] This is the key reason why the Labour party leaders generally feel they need to move to the centre to win power, while the Conservative party does not. The right wing press will highlight Labour policy positions if they think doing so will be harmful to Labour, and if the right wing press is being honest the mainstream media will follow their lead. 

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