As soon as the EU
decided, quite rightly, to support Ireland in rejecting any deal that
resulted in placing infrastructure at the Irish border, the idea of a
Free Trade Agreement between the EU and the UK was dead. It became
inevitable that the UK would stay in the Customs Union (CU) and the
Single Market (SM). The two possible alternatives, which is that the
UK would go ahead and impose a hard border and forsake any deal with
the EU, or that a border would be created in the Irish Sea, would not
be approved by a majority in parliament. If the UK had a strong
bargaining position, it could perhaps persuade the EU to compromise
over how much of the Single Market it needed to be part of (the
Jersey option), but according
to Sam Lowe who gave that option its name the “EU
will not contemplate the backstop applying to the whole UK”. The UK
gave up any bargaining strength it had when it triggered Article 50.
Yet
neither leader of our two main political parties allow themselves to
see this inevitable implication of the Irish border. Delusion is at
its most extreme in the case of Theresa May, who still thinks it is
possible to conclude a deal with the EU that would keep the Brexiters
in her party on board by appeasing them at every step. So we have the
ludicrous situation where the UK cabinet is at loggerheads over which
of two impossible plans they will put forward so they can be rejected
by the EU. This isn't rearranging deck chairs on the titantic. It is having a full blown row over how the deck chairs should be arranged as the ship sinks.
This
charade could be put out of its misery by parliament telling May that
the UK has to stay in the CU and the EEA. The former might happen,
but the Labour leadership, along perhaps with some
of its MPs (and not just the few Brexiters), still think that they
can negotiate a bespoke version of the Single Market that either
avoids rules on state aid or avoids free movement. There is no reason
why the EU need contemplate this, given that they know MPs will not
approve No Deal. The left or Lexiters can talk all they want about
uniting to guarantee that the EU cannot obstruct a future socialist
government, but the lesson of Greece is that if the EU has power it
will use it.
It
is easy to imagine where these delusions of power come from. After
all, despite what Brexiters say, the UK did have considerable
influence in the EU when it was a member. Ironically both the Single
Market and EU expansion owed a lot to UK pressure. The more
interesting question I think is why these delusions continue when the
reality of the UK’s powerlessness becomes obvious. Political
leaders have had a painful year to learn that in these negotiations
the EU calls the shots.
I
can think of two answers. The first is ideological blindness. This is
obvious in the case of the Brexiters, but I think you can also see it
elsewhere in various ways. But I also think there are specific dynamics created by
the referendum. Leave votes were in part predicated on an illusion of
power: the UK would not be worse off because the EU would be
desperate to accede to our demands. Once a politician agrees to go with the 'will of the people', they find it very hard to go back to
the 52% and say your beliefs were delusions. And no politician wants
to say in public that the UK has to do what the EU says. It is very hard for an elected
politician to confront English nationalism,
a nationalism largely exploited and distorted in my view by a deeply corrupt press.
The
UK is therefore in a trap of its own making. It is obvious what has
to happen in the end: the UK stays in the CU and SM either inside or
outside the EU. But the leadership and perhaps a majority of MPs in
the two main parties either cannot see that yet, or can see it but
dare not take the steps to get us there. If Brexit is to survive
despite always being a fantasy project it has to end with a whimper,
but it could take many wasted years and much economic harm to get to
that point. There is one way out that will spare politicians’
blushes and revitalise the economy, and that is to hold a referendum
on the final deal where the economic costs of the deal are clearly
spelt out.
