Faux meritocracy

When Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau was asked why his new cabinet had as many women as men, he replied “because it’s 2015”. But as Owen Jones notes, when it comes to the UK and educational background, many people still presume that our leaders should come from the elite universities.

In an ideal world these would be different issues. In a truly meritocratic society those going to elite universities would be doing so on the basis of their abilities rather than who their parents were. In the UK and I suspect elsewhere we are some way from that ideal. Although I am pretty sure the reasons for this largely occur before 18, I also agree that Oxbridge could improve matters greatly if they stopped selecting students on the basis of interviews. It is one of many reasons why Oxbridge interviews reduce social welfare.

Here is a more minor observation which I think is quite revealing. As Owen says a big part of the problem with Oxbridge is that those from many backgrounds are put off from applying because they think it is only for toffs. It isn’t, but sometimes Oxbridge seems to pretend otherwise. For example there is the ludicrous Oxford tradition of making every student dress up in gowns and worse when they take exams. It means that just at the time that prospective students come for open days they are sure to see a large number of students walking around wearing funny clothes. If I was thinking about coming to Oxford it would put me off. It is rather sad that Oxford students keep voting to continue this tradition, but perhaps it tells you something about the wisdom of elites.

Which brings me to what I think is the crucial point: why is there this presumption that we should be governed by a meritocratic elite? Ability in a particular subject does not seem to be critical. No one suggests the Chancellor should have an economics degree rather than a 2.1 in modern history. (In the past even numeracy seemed not to be required.) The idea that politicians are having to deploy skills that you can only develop at university is a little naive. Most do not have the time to think very deeply about anything, and when issues that involve any knowledge arise they take advice. This is why I have no problem with the kind of delegation you get with central banks or infrastructure commissions. The main difference in those cases is that the public get to hear about what the advice is.

People in universities talk a lot about non-subject specific skills, like developing critical faculties, but arguably some of the crucial critical faculties for a politician are better learnt by leaving university and doing a job. Good judgement does not come from intellectual ability: Chris Dillow argues there is little correlation between high IQ and career success. Now I’m not going to pretend that, other things being equal, I would be indifferent to whether my MP had an economics degree or an NVQ in catering. But other things are not equal. We have a representative democracy, and one way to make sure it works well is if the people chosen to represent us are to some degree representative of the population as a whole.

Of course compatibility between democracy and meritocracy, and the merits of a meritocracy itself, are big issues. It is telling that the book that coined the term meritocracy, by the great Michael Young, had difficulty finding a publisher and was not reviewed by any scholarly publication. But I suspect what is going on here, at least in some quarters, is far simpler, and is a reflection of Trudeau’s remark. It is 2015, so it is no longer acceptable in public to argue that we should be governed by people from a particular class or background. For people who would still like to make that argument, the next best thing is to talk about which university (if any) a politician has been to.        

Privatisations: why we need a fiscal watchdog

When the government sold its shares in Eurostar (the London to Paris train service) around a year ago, its primary motive according to a recently published national audit office (NAO) report was to reduce the level of government debt. [1] As the NAO says “Some asset sales are justified by government on the basis that the sale will result in improved efficiency for the business but this was not the case with Eurostar.”

The key point with privatisations is that reducing current debt may harm the health of the public finances. Any normal investor would only sell an asset if they thought they could get a price that exceeded what the asset was really worth. Although selling the asset would reduce the government’s net borrowing today, it would increase their net borrowing in the future because the government would not get the dividends the shares paid out.

The fact that the government had the wrong motives is an unfortunate by-product of debt or deficit targets. By necessity these targets have to be ‘realisable’ (to use a term from my paper with Jonathan Portes) - they have to be targets that are within the lifetime of a parliament. But that gives any government an incentive to effectively cheat: to sell off assets (like Eurostar) that help meet targets in the short term, but make managing the public finances beyond this more difficult. (This post discusses the point in more detail.)

So how do we judge if selling Eurostar was a good or bad decision? Reports that there was a general belief that the value of the shares would rise are worrying. To be honest I do not know the answer to this question, but in essence that is my point. Given the clear danger that the government will sell assets just to meet its short term targets, we need some independent institution to assess whether the government is being sensible or is cheating. (In some other cases, like selling off the student loan book, the cheating is pretty clear.)

The NAO had a remit which did not address these issues, although it tries in its report to at least raise them. [2] The obvious body to analyse and publicly report on issues of this kind is the OBR, but this is also not in the OBR’s remit, and at present it can at best only drop hints. With a large privatisation programme over the next five years, the government was never going to extend the OBR’s remit in this way, and (coincidentally?) the Ramsden review does not seem to have addressed this issue directly. The OBR needs to become not just a producer of forecasts, but more of a fiscal watchdog.

Without some independent oversight of this kind, we will have the irony of government ministers arguing that privatisations are needed because we must reduce government debt for the sake of future generations, when in reality they may be increasing the burden on future generations. We need a fiscal watchdog to protect future generations from shortsighted governments.

[1] Although the headline level of public debt is often described as net, it in fact only nets off liquid financial assets.

[2] The key technical issue is discounting, and how you handle uncertainty. Even if the government gets the current market price, that price may be low because the private sector discounts future returns heavily. That heavy discounting may reflect vulnerability in the face of uncertainty, whereas the public sector has much less vulnerability.  

Bernanke on austerity and the fiscal charter

When I and others say that the intellectual debate on the wisdom of embarking on fiscal austerity as we recovered from the Great Depression is over, some think I am indulging in exaggerated bluster. I'm not. Central bankers are notorious for their conservatism and their aversion to budget deficits, so you would expect the man who until recently ran probably the most important central bank in the world to be at best equivocal on this subject.

Here is an extract from an interview with Ben Bernanke by George Eaton in the New Statesman:

Though a depression was averted in 2008, the recovery in the US and the UK has been slow. Bernanke partly blames the imposition of fiscal austerity (spending cuts and tax rises), which limited the effectiveness of monetary stimulus. “All the major industrial countries – US, UK, eurozone – ran too quickly to budget-cutting, given the severity of the recession and the level of unemployment.”

Partly thanks to Bernanke’s leadership (and knowledge), the Great Recession was not as bad as the Great Depression of the 1930s. Monetary policy reacted much more quickly, and financial institutions were (nearly all) bailed out. In 2009 we also enacted fiscal stimulus, but in 2010 we reverted to the policies of the early 1930s with fiscal austerity. That mistake was partly the result of panic following events in the Eurozone (see the IMF analysis discussed here), but it also reflected political opportunism on the right.

In the UK that opportunism continues with the new fiscal charter. Here is more from the Bernanke interview:

He criticises George Osborne’s new budget surplus law, which prohibits government borrowing when the economy is growing by more than 1 per cent. “I would be very cautious about putting in rules that would prevent a timely fiscal response to a slowing economy, particularly in a world of very low interest rates.” He adds that “a period of excess labour supply and low interest rates is not only a good time to invest, from the perspective of the recovery, it also makes sense from a long-term productivity perspective”.

Bernanke is again reflecting the consensus among economists: I have not found a single one who supports this charter. Alas winning the intellectual argument does not mean immediately winning the political argument. But even though I am scathing about what I call mediamacro, surely our political commentariat must notice at some stage that the rationale George Osborne gives for cutting tax credits and yet more departmental spending is built on sand.

Public investment: has George started listening to economists?

I have in the past wondered just how large the majority among academic economists would be for additional public investment right now. The economic case for investing when the cost of borrowing is so cheap (particularly when the government can issue 30 year fixed interest debt) is overwhelming. I had guessed the majority would be pretty large just by personal observation. Economists who are not known for their anti-austerity views, like Ken Rogoff, tend to support additional public investment.

Thanks to a piece by Mark Thoma I now have some evidence. His article is actually about ideological bias in economics, and is well worth reading on that account, but it uses results from the ChicagoBooth survey of leading US economists. I have used this survey’s results on the impact of fiscal policy before, but they have asked a similar question about public investment. It is

“Because the US has underspent on new projects, maintenance, or both, the federal government has an opportunity to increase average incomes by spending more on roads, railways, bridges and airports.”

Not one of the nearly 50 economists surveyed disagreed with this statement. What was interesting was that the economists were under no illusions that the political process in the US would be such that some bad projects would be undertaken as a result (see the follow-up question). Despite this, they still thought increasing investment would raise incomes.

The case for additional public investment is as strong in the UK (and Germany) [1] as it is in the US. Yet since 2010 it appeared the government thought otherwise. Public net investment, which was 3.2% of GDP in financial year 2009/10, has fallen to an expected 1.5% of GDP in 2015/6. We are about to have a spending review where non-exempted departments have been asked to look at cuts of at least 25%. One of those departments is the department of transport, which is responsible for almost a quarter of public investment.

However since the election George Osborne seems to have had a change of heart. First he has implemented Labour’s proposal of a national infrastructure commission, which was in turn one of the ideas of the LSE’s growth commission. If it works it should reduce the number of political white elephants that US economists worry about. Second, he has talked about spending £100bn on these projects before 2020. That is a huge sum: the total for annual gross public investment is currently around £70 billion.

So how do you square £100bn extra public investment with the government’s goal of achieving surplus by 2019/20? Is the £100bn a smoke and mirrors number? We will find out when the Autumn Statement is published. Ignore any numbers quoted by the Chancellor. Instead have a look at the OBR’s figures for net public investment as a percentage of GDP (you can find a time series in their databank here). In the June budget public investment was expected over the next 5 years to stay at or below the 1.5% of GDP figure. If the numbers in the Autumn Statement forecast are significantly above that, we will know that the Chancellor really has started listening to economists.

[1] Postscript. An IMF study on German infrastructure investment is here.

Tax cuts vs spending vs helicopters

Some people still seem unable, or maybe unwilling, to understand the basic New Keynesian (NK) model. Should it be surprising in this model that cutting taxes on wages at the Zero Lower Bound (i.e. when nominal interest rates are fixed) are contractionary? Of course not. The basic NK model contains an intertemporal consumption function that implies Ricardian Equivalence holds, so consumers save all of the extra income they get from a tax cut. But cutting taxes increases the incentive to work, thereby increasing labour supply, which through a Phillips curve decreases inflation. With a fixed nominal interest rate that implies higher real rates, which are contractionary. QED.

Now the main thing not to like here is the consumption function and Ricardian Equivalence. Empirical evidence points strongly to a significant income effect, with a marginal propensity to consume around a third rather than zero. There are good theoretical reasons why you might get this result, even with totally rational consumers. But the implication that cutting taxes will lead to some increase in labour supply seems reasonable, and that will put some downward pressure on inflation. This is why pushing ‘structural reforms’ that expand the supply side in a liquidity trap can be counterproductive in the short term. (Things are more complex when you have a fixed exchange rate.)

Now you may quite reasonably believe that in the real world a positive income effect from a tax cut will raise demand by more than any increase in supply, so inflation will rise and real rates will fall. But it remains the case that as a stimulus measure directly raising demand through higher government spending does not generate this supply side offset. That the NK model has this feature seems like a virtue to me. The only point I have to add is that because helicopter money, as traditionally envisaged, is a lump sum transfer (everyone gets an equal amount, so it is independent of wages), you do not get this offsetting supply side effect. So for that reason helicopter money is more effective as a stimulus instrument in a liquidity trap than cutting taxes on wages.

Politically impossible

An article in the Financial Times recently said of me: “He has opposed deficit reduction when the economy was weak and when it was strong.” Ah yes, this would be the same economist who has suggested the left aims to reduce the current deficit (all current spending less revenue) to zero, that pre-crisis fiscal policy in the Euro periphery should have been much more contractionary, and has championed fiscal councils as a way of eliminating deficit bias.

Should I have demanded a retraction? I didn’t: life is short, maybe it was a kind of joke, or even a misprint, and if not perhaps it said more about the writer than it did about me.

But I was reminded of it last week when I was discussing pre-crisis fiscal policy. As I noted in one of those earlier posts, I am repeatedly told that pre-crisis fiscal policy in Spain could not have been tighter. It was ‘politically impossible’, given the budget surpluses at the time. I heard a similar point made about Ireland last week. (While a big part of Ireland’s post-crisis fiscal problems were down to socialising its financial sector’s debts, a significant part was also due to relying too much before the crisis from receipts based on an unsustainable housing boom, as was the case in Spain.)

It occurred to me (and yes, I know it is obvious) that such complaints are just the mirror image of those who say we have to have austerity because running up higher government deficits is just ‘politically impossible’. The argument that governments cannot run very large surpluses because voters would demand that they be spent relies on the same logic which says that governments need to tighten their belts when the private sector is doing the same. In other words you cannot complain about austerity on the one hand and then say that it was politically impossible to run larger surpluses in a boom.

Equally it makes no sense obsessing about the need to reduce deficits in a recession and then turning a blind eye when surpluses are spent in a boom. Unfortunately just that kind of inconsistent thinking became hard-wired in the form of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), with its focus on a limit of 3% for deficits. Those who say that all that was wrong with the SGP is that it was not enforced have learnt nothing. This is why we need to move influence away from the Commission and towards independent national fiscal councils.               

The ECB as sovereign lender of last resort

Understandably the element of my talk at the Royal Irish Academy which generated most discussion was the role of the ECB. (Here is a media report, but ignore the last two paragraphs which are confused/wrong. Abstract for the talk is here. Paper will follow.) The proposition I put forward was that the ECB’s OMT programme should have been put in place in 2010, and if it had been countries outside Greece could have implemented a more efficient austerity programme (one that produced less unemployment) and might have retained market access (interest rates on government debt would have remained reasonable). [1]

There are two serious and related arguments against this view. The first is that it is unrealistic for the ECB to act as a sovereign lender of last resort because of the transfers between countries that this might lead to. (A sovereign lender of last resort is a central bank that is always willing to buy its government’s debt.) [2] The second is that in practice OMT is bound to be coupled with a requirement for austerity programmes that might have simply duplicated what was actually put into place by national governments. Both arguments speak to a real problem that remains unresolved within the Eurozone, but do not nullify the argument that things should have been done much better.

Government debt in advanced economies is regarded as a safe asset for two reasons. The first is that most governments that borrow in their own currency rarely default. The second is that an individual investor does not need to worry about market beliefs, because if the market panics and refuses to buy the government’s debt the central bank will step in (hence sovereign lender of last resort). If the central bank did not do this, the government might be forced to default because it cannot roll over its existing debt.

It makes sense for the central bank to act as a sovereign lender of last resort, because it avoids self-fulfilling market panics. Doubly so because such panics will be more likely to occur after a large recession when the social value of government borrowing is particularly high. The complication in the case of the ECB is the following. If the market panic is so great that the ECB was forced to actually buy a ‘distressed’ government’s debt (normally the threat to do so is enough), it is possible that this government might choose to default even with ECB support. If it did that, the ECB would make losses which would be born by the Eurozone as a whole (the transfer risk).

Partly for this reason, the ECB has to have the ability not to act as a sovereign lender of last resort, or withdraw support if circumstances change. If that ability exists (a point I will come back to), then the transfer risk associated with the ECB acting as a sovereign lender of last resort are tiny. It represents the kind of minimal risk that should always be offset by the trust and solidarity that comes with the territory of being in a monetary union. I suspect those that suggest otherwise are often trying to hide other motives.

A government that is receiving ECB support of this kind will naturally want to know what it has to do to maintain it, because the threat of its withdrawal is so great. It would be unreasonable to withhold that information. Does that in practice amount to nothing more than the kind of conditions that have in practice been imposed on Ireland and Portugal anyway? Absolutely not. Just as the market does not worry about the build up of debt in a recession in countries like the UK or Japan, a rational ECB would have no reason to impose fiscal consolidation at the time it would do most damage. The time a rational ECB might withdraw its support is once a recovery is complete and the government refuses to embark on fiscal consolidation.

So a sovereign lender of last resort in a monetary union must have the ability not to provide that support. In other words it has to sort Greece from Ireland. That decision is a huge one, because in effect it is a decision about whether the country will be forced to default. It is natural that the ECB wants to share that responsibility with member governments, but as we have seen with Greece member governments are hopeless at making that decision (particularly when their own banks may be compromised by any default). We have also seen that European central bankers are far from rational on issues involving government debt (compared with at least one of their anglo-saxon counterparts), so giving the decision to someone else other than the current ECB would seem like a good idea. However at present there is no institution that seems capable of doing this job.

In this post I suggested contracting out this task to the IMF, although that presumed a reduction in the political influence of European governments on that institution. I have also wondered about whether a body like the newly created network of European fiscal councils could play this role. Another possibility is to reform the ECB so that it is not subject to deficit phobia, and is more accountable. It seems to me that this is where current research and analysis should be going, rather than into schemes involving greater political union.

The existence of various alternatives here means that we should not take what has actually happened in the Eurozone as some kind of immutable political constraint beyond which economics cannot go. There is no intrinsic reason why the OMT that was introduced in September 2012 could not have been introduced in 2010. There is no intrinsic reason why any conditionality that went with that could not have been much more efficient in terms of unemployment costs. Beyond Greece, the Eurozone crisis happened because the ECB thought it could avoid undertaking one of the essential functions of a central bank. This was perhaps the most important of the many errors it has made.

[1] For a country within a monetary union which needs to reduce debt more rapidly than does the union as a whole, a gain in competitiveness relative to the rest of the union is required to offset the deflationary impact of fiscal consolidation. That ‘internal devaluation’ probably requires some increase in unemployment, but it is much more efficient to obtain that increase in competitiveness gradually.

[2] It could be argued that the Fed does not provide lender of last resort services to individual member states. But state debt is typically lower relative to GDP and income than for Eurozone governments. Before 2000, Eurozone governments were able to borrow more because they were backed by their central bank. That means that they are inevitably subject to a greater risk of suffering from a self-fulfilling market panic. The architects of the Eurozone might have initially believed that the SGP might avoid the need for a sovereign lender of last resort, but after the Great Recession they would have known otherwise.