Economics is often called the dismal science, and the Scottish referendum showed why this description has stuck. The Yes side appeared full of hope and optimism about what could happen once the constraints of Westminster rule had been cast off, while the No campaign kept on going on about one problem or other, which usually involved economics.
The general meme is that this negativity was a tactical mistake by the No side, but it was a quite understandable mistake, because the economic problems were large and self evident. It is no surprise that the vast majority of economists thought Scotland would be worse off under independence (see here, or here, or here). They had looked at the numbers and issues, or looked at institutions they respected that had done so, and thought this does not look good. Even for some of those economists who are in favour of independence, like Joe Stiglitz for example, it is clear that the attraction is despite, rather than because, of the basic macro and fiscal numbers. (See also Adam Posen’s response.)
This is of course not new. Politicians on the right like to believe that tax cuts will pay for themselves, and it is boring economists who (mostly) point out this is not true. Politicians of all shades thought that austerity would not have much impact on output and growth, while the vast majority of economists knew better. One of the reasons for deficit bias is that politicians believe that their policies will galvanize the economy and raise the tax base, and most of the time the macroeconomy stubbornly refuses to be impressed.
Now it is tempting to say, given this evidence, that politicians will believe anything that suits them. But what the independence referendum showed us is that voters have similar problems. As the campaign progressed the stronger the Yes vote became, and there is some evidence that this reflected additional information they received. As I suggested here, the problem is that this information was superficially credible sounding stuff from either side, but often with no indication from those who might have known better of the quality of the analysis.
For me this has always been the major argument for establishing fiscal councils - independent institutions who are charged with, at a minimum, scrutinising fiscal projections. Although the OBR (the UK’s fiscal council) has a remit that is quite narrow, we also have the highly respected IFS. In Sweden the fiscal council itself has a much wider economic remit.
Whenever I make this point, someone puts forward the argument that this is anti-democratic, or that I want economists to dictate decisions. This is wrong on at least two levels. First, my general argument is not specific to economics, but involves any area that involves technical expertise. Indeed, the case I make here is partly to avoid politicians using the views of a small minority of economists as cover. Second, the problem with democratic accountability as normally defined is that it is very weak: voters make one decision every five years that involves a whole basket of issues. I would suggest that charging an institution with a small set of tasks, where there is effective democratic oversight over the performance of that institution, can make that institution more accountable to the electorate than any politician doing the same.
In the case of Scottish independence, although we did not have a direct assessment of fiscal prospects from the OBR, that organisation’s oil revenue forecasts were used by the equally respected and independent IFS to point out the problematic outlook that an independent Scotland would face. Although the Yes side attempted to suggest that the OBR was part of the very Westminster elite that it wanted a divorce from, I suspect many voters saw this as independent analysis and were concerned by it. In a world where politicians can always find some experts to back their view, I suspect it is only through singular institutions like the OBR and IFS that the views of the majority of economists get to have some influence, and the economics of wishful thinking gets exposed.