The answer in principle is of course not. In practice, not so clear.
This is something I talked
about back in October 2013, and there are no signs that things are
getting better. Alex Marsh makes
the same point in the context of the latest budget. This antagonism
to ‘unhelpful’ evidence is out there in plain sight for all to
see in the UK government’s current attempt to deny academics in
receipt of public funding the ability to talk about the policy
implications of their work. I talked
about this in terms of the misuse of the term ‘public money’ a
few weeks ago, but it is also a pretty direct attempt to suppress
unhelpful advice. (Note that ministers have the power under this
proposed legislation to revoke this ban in individual cases,
presumably when evidence is ‘helpful’ - to them.)
Of course we are not talking about a hostility to evidence based
policy by everyone on the right on all occasions. In a THE article
by Ben Goldacre, where he also highlights the dangers of the
government’s proposed legislation, he details the extent to
which he is talking to ministers about evidence based policy. But
that interest does not seem to extend to big macro decisions. I was
reminded in reading this
about what I regard
as a triumph of evidence based policy making in my own area: the UK
Treasury analysis of Euro entry in 2003. (Disclaimer: my little
contribution is the fourth one down in the picture of the reports.)
Why didn’t this government do something similar for both the
Scottish referendum and the EU referendum?
Everytime I mention the 2003 exercise someone responds that it was
just a smokescreen for a power play between Brown and Blair. I think
this is an overly cynical view, a view that evidence never changes
anyone’s mind. Ramsden’s own view is that the civil service,
using the evidence, “ultimately persuaded both the Chancellor and
in particular the Prime Minister that it wasn't right to join."
It was also the right decision. With both recent referendums we have
seen proponents of change putting out documents suggesting that
change will not be economically damaging, when most evidence shows
pretty clearly that it will be. With the EU referendum in particular,
would it not have been better if the government had asked the
Treasury to do a similar exercise to 2003, using outside experts
where appropriate to provide or validate the technical analysis?
Ben Goldacre’s piece reminded me of my own recent place on John
McDonnell’s Economic Advisory Council (EAC). From Ben’s tweets I
knew that he was not the greatest fan of this government, and in
particular their current treatment of junior doctors, so I asked him
whether he had received any negative comments from doctors or others
about him giving advice to the government. I was not surprised to
hear he had not. Who could object to him taking the opportunity to
argue for better use of data and trials in medicine and elsewhere
with people who just might do something about it?
It is a shame that some people did not take the same view when I
agreed
to be on the EAC. I would lose credibility as a macroeconomist, I was
told.
When McDonnell did his U-turn about supporting the fiscal charter,
some suggested this reflected badly on me, even though he had turned
in the direction I thought was correct! One charge in particular was
levelled at the time. We were being used to make the leadership look
respectable, but our advice would in practice be ignored. A couple of
weeks ago Labour adopted
a fiscal rule which is based on my own work
with Jonathan Portes, and in particular by a presentation I made to
the group. Mariana Mazzucato’s own work
has also featured strongly in Labour party speeches, with good
reason.
At the end of the day, policy makers need to look at evidence. If
they do not we need strong mechanisms that allow them to be
confronted by this evidence. Policy makers that make space for
evidence and take decisions based on it need to be congratulated for
this, rather than being told their efforts were just a smokescreen.
They should be congratulated because letting evidence in often
involves a risk: not just to the policy maker’s priors or
preferences but also for scrutiny of past actions. Equally we should
regard policymakers who knowingly ignore evidence with great
suspicion, and those that try to deliberately keep evidence out of
the public domain should be condemned.
