Winner of the New Statesman SPERI Prize in Political Economy 2016


Showing posts with label Caballero. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Caballero. Show all posts

Thursday, 2 March 2017

A self-fulfilling expectations led recession?

The only two lectures on Oxford’s core undergraduate macro course that I still teach, and which I have just taught, are the last two on fiscal policy. I use the privilege of the last lecture to end on a reflective note. I acknowledge that macro rightly got a lot of stick by largely ignoring the role of finance, but I also point out that the poor recovery has involved a vindication of the core macro model: austerity is a bad idea at the ZLB, QE was not inflationary and interest rates on government debt did not rise but fell.

So far so familiar. But I end by showing them my this chart.

And I say that we really have no idea why there has been no recovery from the Great Recession, so there are plenty of mysteries left in macro. The puzzle is sharpest in the UK because the pre-crisis trend is so stable, but something similar has happened in most places. I think it is a suitable note of humility (and perhaps inspiration) on which to end the course. 

A mechanical way to explain what has happened is to bend the trend: to suggest that technical progress has been slowing down for some time. This inevitably means that the pre-crisis period is transformed into a boom. I have been highly skeptical about that story, but I have to admit part of my skepticism comes in part from traditional ideas about what inflation would do in a boom.

However another explanation that I have always wondered about and which others are beginning to explore is that perhaps we remain in an extended period of demand deficiency. Keynesian theory is very suggestive that such a possibility could occur. Suppose that firms and consumers came to believe that the output gap was currently zero when it is not, and that they erroneously believed that the recession caused a step change both in potential GDP but also possibly its growth rate. Suppose also that unemployed workers priced themselves into jobs by cutting their (real) wage or disappearing by no longer looking for work. The former could happen because firms could choose more labour intensive production techniques: scrapping the car wash machine for workers with hoses.

In that situation, how do we know that we are suffering from demand deficiency? The traditional answer in macroeconomics is nominal deflation: falling wages and prices. But because workers have already priced themselves into jobs, nothing more will come from the wages route. So why would firms cut prices?

If the pre-crisis trend still applies, it means that there are a large number of innovations waiting to be embodied in new investment. With this new more efficient capital in place, firms would either increase their profits on selling to their existing market or try to expand their market by undercutting competitors. We would get an investment led recovery, accompanied by rising productivity and perhaps falling prices.

But suppose the innovations are just not profitable enough to generate an increase in profits that would justify undertaking the investment, even though borrowing costs are low. Maybe a far more dependable motivator for embodied technical progress to take place is the need to satisfy an expanding market. The firm needs to install new capacity to satisfy growing demand for its product, and then it is obvious to investment in equipment that embodies new innovations. The accelerator remains a very successful empirical model of investment. (On both points, see this discussion by Caballero.) But if beliefs are such that the market is not going to expand that much, because firms believe the economy is ‘at trend’ and trend growth has now become pretty small, then the need to invest to meet an expanding market largely goes away.

This idea goes right back to Keynes and animal spirits of course. Others have more recently reformulated similar ideas, such as Roger Farmer. This is a little different from the idea of adding endogenous growth to a Keynesian model, as in this paper by Benigno and Fornaro for example. I’m assuming in this discussion that potential output has not been lost, because innovation has not slowed, but it is simply not being utilised.

It is this possibility which is the reason that I have always argued central banks and governments should have been much more ambitious about demand stimulation after the Great Recession. As I and others have pointed out, you do not have to attach a very high probability to the scenario that demand will create supply before it justifies a policy of ‘testing the water’ by letting the economy run hot. Every time I look at the data above, I ask whether we have brought this on ourselves by a combination of destructive austerity and timidity.




Saturday, 4 May 2013

Microfounded Social Welfare Functions


More on Beauty and Truth for economists


I have just been rereading Ricardo Caballero’s Journal of Economic Perspectives paper entitled “Macroeconomics after the Crisis: Time to Deal with the Pretense-of-Knowledge Syndrome”. I particularly like this quote:

The dynamic stochastic general equilibrium strategy is so attractive, and even plain addictive, because it allows one to generate impulse responses that can be fully described in terms of seemingly scientific statements. The model is an irresistible snake-charmer.


I thought of this when describing here (footnote [5]) Woodford’s derivation of social welfare functions from representative agent’s utility. Although it has now become a standard part of the DSGE toolkit, I remember when I had to really work through the maths for this paper. I recall how exciting it was, first to be able to say something about policy objectives that was more than ad hoc, and secondly to see how terms in second order Taylor expansions nicely cancelled out when first order conditions describing optimal individual behaviour were added.

This kind of exercise can tell us some things that are interesting. But can it provide us with a realistic (as opposed to model consistent) social welfare function that should guide many monetary and fiscal policy decisions? Absolutely not. As I noted in that recent post, these derived social welfare functions typically tell you that deviations of inflation from target are much more important than output gaps - ten or twenty times more important. If this was really the case, and given the uncertainties surrounding measurement of the output gap, it would be tempting to make central banks pure (not flexible) inflation targeters - what Mervyn King calls inflation nutters.


Where does this result come from? The inflation term in Woodford’s derivation of social welfare comes from relative price distortions when prices are sticky due to Calvo contracts. Let’s assume for the sake of argument that these costs are captured correctly. The output gap term comes from sticky prices leading to fluctuations in consumption and fluctuations in labour supply. Lucas famously argued [1] that the former are small. Again, for the sake of argument lets focus on fluctuations in labour supply.
Many DSGE models use sticky prices and not sticky wages, so labour markets clear. They tend, partly as a result, to assume labour supply is elastic. Gaps between the marginal product of labor and the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure become small. Canzoneri and coauthors show here how sticky wages and more inelastic labour supply will increase the cost of output fluctuations: agents are now working more or less as a result of fluctuations in labour demand, and inelasticity means that these fluctuations are more costly in terms of utility. Canzoneri et al argue that labour supply inelasticity is more consistent with micro evidence.

Just as important, I would suggest, is heterogeneity. The labour supply of many agents is largely unaffected by recessions, while others lose their jobs and become unemployed. Now this will matter in ways that models in principle can quantify. Large losses for a few are more costly than the same aggregate loss equally spread. Yet I believe even this would not come near to describing the unhappiness the unemployed actually feel (see Chris Dillow here). For many there is a psychological/social cost to unemployment that our standard models just do not capture. Other evidence tends to corroborate this happiness data.

So there are two general points here. First, simplifications made to ensure DSGE analysis remains tractable tend to diminish the importance of output gap fluctuations. Second, the simple microfoundations we use are not very good at capturing how people feel about being unemployed. What this implies is that conclusions about inflation/output trade-offs, or the cost of business cycles, derived from microfounded social welfare functions in DSGE models will be highly suspect, and almost certainly biased.

Now I do not want to use this as a stick to beat up DSGE models, because often there is a simple and straightforward solution. Just recalculate any results using an alternative social welfare function where the cost of output gaps is equal to the cost of inflation. For many questions addressed by these models results will be robust, which is worth knowing. If they are not, that is worth knowing too. So its a virtually costless thing to do, with clear benefits.

Yet it is rarely done. I suspect the reason why is that a referee would say ‘but that ad hoc (aka more realistic) social welfare function is inconsistent with the rest of your model. Your complete model becomes internally inconsistent, and therefore no longer properly microfounded.’ This is so wrong. It is modelling what we can microfound, rather than modelling what we can see. Let me quote Caballero again

“[This suggests a discipline that] has become so mesmerized with its own internal logic that it has begun to confuse the precision it has achieved about its own world with the precision that it has about the real one.”

As I have argued before (post here, article here), those using microfoundations should be pragmatic about the need to sometimes depart from those microfoundations when there are clear reasons for doing so. (For an example of this pragmatic approach to social welfare functions in the context of US monetary policy, see this paper by Chen, Kirsanova and Leith.) The microfoundation purist position is a snake charmer, and has to be faced down.

[1] Lucas, R. E., 2003, Macroeconomic Priorities, American Economic Review 93(1): 1-14.