In my last post I
used the example of Brexit to show that politicians, even when their
ideas are seen as seriously harmful by most experts, will still find
policy entrepreneurs to give them enough information to sound
knowledgeable when they appear on the media. But this may be an
extreme example of a more general phenomenon, which I would describe
as the breakdown of the way expertise is utilised by government: a
breakdown of what I call the Knowledge Transmission Mechanism.
It is nothing new,
of course. The first example I ever had experience of was as an
economist at the Treasury when Mrs. Thatcher became Prime Minister.
As far as her new Treasury team were concerned, most Treasury civil
servants were not ‘one of us’, and they had little time for their
advice. When Treasury economists predicted a recession in 1980, they
were ignored. (There was a recession.) As the young Treasury
economist I was then, the contrast with the ever curious Denis Healey was quite
shocking.
Even back then,
Conservative ministers tended to seek advice from City economists
rather than academic economists, which may be one reason why the
record of Conservative Chancellors in running the economy from
Thatcher onward is so much worse
than the 13 years of Labour government. Part of the role of right
wing think tanks is to hide that fact, which they do very
successfully. It is why the 364 academic economists in 1981 who
attacked Conservative macro policy are generally thought to have been
wrong, when in reality they were broadly right. This was perhaps the
beginning of the Conservative party’s disdain of experts who
interfered with their ideological projects.
The use of partisan
think tanks and experts by the political right is now well
established in both the US and UK. In contrast the last Labour
government was much more open in its use of at least economic advice,
but its biggest mistake was in ignoring expert advice on Iraq. There
may be some on the left that would like to replicate the way the
political right works for Labour under its new leadership, by
suggesting for example that conventional economists are inherently
hostile to its policies.
But this is not how
the Knowledge Transmission Mechanism (KTM) is supposed to work. Good
ideas and good evidence do not have to come with a left, right or
centre political label attached. When I have advised political
parties or governments or economic institutions I have not given them
advice which is only appropriate if the recipient wears a particular
political colour. A good understanding of how the economy works does
not require a particular political allegiance.
I wonder how much
the trend towards the delegation of decisions to independent bodies,
and suggestions to do more of that, is a reaction to this growing
politicisation of expert advice. I was listening to an interesting
Resolution Foundation podcast
based on a new book
from Paul Tucker, which was all about the conditions for successful
delegation. One of the participants, Kate Barker, gave an example
where she thought proposals for delegation went too far: the LSE’s
Growth Commission.
I turned quickly to
the Growth Commission’s 2017 report
to see what Kate had in mind. I suspect it could be this.
“The ultimate objective is a long term industrial strategy that is isolated from political cycles. An independent body should strive to overcome fragmentation across different levels of government.”
Now there may be a
case for delegating the implementation of an industrial body
to an independent body, just as the implementation of monetary policy
is delegated to the Bank in the UK. Just as Chancellors may alter the
timing of interest rate changes for political ends, ministers may
also skew the distribution of industrial policy to favour some
constituencies over others. To a considerable extent this is what the
Growth Commission proposes. But I suspect saying that you want
industrial policy “isolated from political cycles” portrays an
underlying deep discontent with how the Knowledge Transmission
Mechanism has broken down.
This is not a post
about the merits or otherwise of delegation (on which Paul Tucker has
sensible things to say), but an attempt to describe one reason why
experts or civil servants may be increasingly inclined to suggest
delegation. Put simply, if politicians base policy on an ideology
that requires shutting expertise out, independent bodies that let
expertise back in become increasingly attractive.
BTW In your penultimate para I assume you mean "industrial strategy" not "industrial body".
ReplyDeleteIs it the KTM that has broken down or is it a combination of inability to agree such a strategy in the first place across political lines combined with a scepticism that it would work in the long term without political interference.
There is also the more fundamental issue of delegation ( for which there is a place) and the slippery slope away from democracy and towards crony capitalism. In the US the presence of lobbyists has gradually corrupted the political process to the extent where you might not call the present situation a democracy. How much of a step is it from independent adviser to outright lobbyist.
My point is that the distance between "shutting expertise out" and "independent bodies that let expertise back in" may not be as great as you think.
The problem is that monetary transmission mechanisms are fables, and experts are really just useful idiots that are cited in support of ideological policies that those in control of the Bank of England or the government want to push. The same experts are ignored if they don't support the ideology. Arbitrary ideology is the operating principle; neither monetary transmission nor your analogous knowledge transmission is actually mechanized despite all the stories you might tell.
ReplyDeleteTl;dr: experts are just pushing their own ideology, same as politicians. You're angry because their stories are more popular than your own tall tales.