How China beat the Global Financial Crisis

If you were hoping for something on yesterday’s interest rate rise, I can only direct you to the leader in the FT today which says: “There is no compelling reason to increase the cost of borrowing in the UK, but there is definitely good cause to wait.” On why nine intelligent people could all make the same mistake, you have to question their mandate, and move to something that focuses on having the right environment for growth, as I do here.

I recently finished reading the latest book by Adam Tooze (of which much more in a subsequent post), and it reminded me of a story that was not told enough in the early days of austerity. Everyone knows about how quickly the Chinese economy has grown over the last few decades, and how strong exports have been an important part of that. In dollar terms the value of Chinese exports more than quadrupled between 2000 and 2007. By 2007 Chinese exports represented 35% of GDP.

An important characteristic of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) was how quickly world trade collapsed. If we compare the beginnings of Great Recession after the GFC with the start of the Great Depression, while world industrial production moved in a similar fashion, world trade collapsed by much more in the Great Recession than the Great Depression. Here is a chart from Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O'Rourke’s ‘A Tale of Two Depressions Redux’ VoxEU article.

Trade collapsed in the winter of 2008 around the globe, without exception. This was very bad news for China. Whereas exports had been around 35% of GDP in 2007, they fell to around 25% of GDP in 2009. That is a big hole to fill, and if it wasn’t filled, there was a chance that Chinese growth would collapse completely with damaging knock on (multiplier) effects to the rest of the economy. Above all else, China feared the political consequences of the unrest widespread unemployment would bring.

As Tooze recounts, China’s reaction was swift and bold. In November 2008 it announced a stimulus package of public spending worth 12.5% of GDP. (The Obama stimulus package, by comparison, was around 5% of GDP.) “Over the days that followed [the announcement], across China, provincial party meetings were hurriedly convened …” Within a year 50% of the stimulus projects were underway. Some of this stimulus paid for what Tooze describes as “perhaps the most spectacular infrastructure project of the last generation anywhere in the world”, the Chinese high speed rail network. Monetary policy was also relaxed.

In 2008 as a whole, before the stimulus and hardly touched by the collapse in world trade, Chinese GDP grew by 9.6%. In 2009, when GDP in the advanced countries fell by 3.4%, Chinese growth was 9.1%. The stimulus package had filled the whole left by collapsing Chinese exports. (Source)

Basic macroeconomic theory says that a negative shock to GDP, caused for example by falling exports, can be completely offset by a monetary and fiscal stimulus. China is a good example of that idea in action. What about all the naysayers who predicted financial disaster if this was done? Well there was a mini-crisis in China half a dozen years later, but it is hard to connect it back to stimulus spending and it had little impact on Chinese growth. What about the huge burden on future generations that such stimulus spending would create? Thanks to that programme, China now has a high speed rail network and is a global leader in railway construction.

Now of course people will say that China is not like an advanced democracy, and it was not part of the global banking network that caused the GFC. But the US and UK stimulus programmes could and should have been larger. Those close to the action tell me that the UK was running out of things to spend more money on in 2008/9, but I cannot help think this amounts to a failure of imagination: it is not as if UK infrastructure is great, there are no flood defence projects left to do etc. Above all else China’s example tells you what a huge mistake 2010 austerity was.

Its ideology, stupid

Wolfgang Münchau takes to task in today’s FT the latest example of German opposition, and in particular opposition from finance minister Schäuble, to ECB policies. However I think he ends up missing the obvious target. He discusses the particular problems negative rates pose for Germany’s financial sector, and in his last paragraph writes

“This episode is a reminder that the collective spirit that was so strongly present in the first years of the eurozone has gone. That — not the presence of imbalances or other technical problems — constitutes the single biggest danger to the long-term viability of Europe’s monetary union.”

I would suggest this has the causality wrong. Any collective spirit has gone because of these ‘technical problems’. The biggest technical problem is an obsession with inappropriate collective fiscal consolidation (austerity). In the Eurozone the ECB is being forced to try negative interest rates because it is having to undo the impact of fiscal consolidation. And the man most responsible for this obsession is Schäuble.  

Gavyn Davies nicely sums up my own view about negative interest rates. Without radical institutional and social changes (which may not be desirable), bank profitability puts a limit on how far central banks can go, and for that reason exploring these frontiers could be counterproductive. But the alternative of more QE, possibly directed at other assets besides government debt, is way down the list of effective and reliable instruments for managing aggregate demand right now. Helicopter money is a much better way of giving central banks more ammunition. But the focus right now should not be on any of this, if we are genuinely concerned about social welfare. As John Kay says, “we need less financial ingenuity and more common sense”.

What we should be talking about is why governments are not doing much more public investment. Yet in the US, Germany and the UK any dramatic increase in public investment seems out of the question. Barry Eichengreen, in an article entitled “Confronting the Fiscal Bogeyman”, writes of Germany:

“The ordoliberal emphasis on personal responsibility fostered an unreasoning hostility to the idea that actions that are individually responsible do not automatically produce desirable aggregate outcomes. In other words, it rendered Germans allergic to macroeconomics.”

In the US, antagonism to the Federal government rooted in the past has meant Republican leaders are  

“antagonistic to all exercise of federal power except for the enforcement of contracts and competition – a hostility that notably included countercyclical macroeconomic policy. Welcome to ordoliberalism, Dixie-style. Wolfgang Schäuble, meet Ted Cruz.”

He ends

“Ideological and political prejudices deeply rooted in history will have to be overcome to end the current stagnation. If an extended period of depressed growth following a crisis isn’t the right moment to challenge them, then when is?”

He does not mention the UK, where the antagonism to public investment seems to lack any deep historical explanation, and may just reflect stupidity or an ideology imported from the US.

When I talk about public investment people normally think about big projects, like HS2 in the UK. I like to point out that simpler and perhaps more boring things, like repairing roads, are at least as important, and can be done immediately. But if there is one area above all else where much more needs to be done right now it is investment in renewable energy.

The recent news on climate change is not good. It is foolish to read too much into one or two months figures, but this chart is nevertheless quite scary. It is scary because we know of various possible ‘tipping points’ (like the melting of all Arctic ice or the mass release of methane from permafros) which could accelerate global warming. Most climate models assume we will control carbon emissions in time to stop that happening, but we cannot be sure of that, because we are in uncharted territory.

We know we need a massive expansion of renewable energy, but one problem that has so far stopped that being a complete solution to climate change has been that sometimes the wind neither blows nor the sun shines. We need to be able to cheaply store electricity, but our current battery technology is not good enough. Battery technology is also crucial in making electric cars as attractive as petrol based cars. But technology could come to the rescue. Existing batteries could be made much more efficient, or completely new battery technologies could be made viable. Much more efficient transmission could also help. And if you look at all three links, you may notice one common factor. These potential breakthroughs have all come from research undertaken in the public sector. As Mariana Mazucato has argued, the state is “better able to attract top talent and pursue radical innovation”.   

China put over $80 billion into the renewable energy sector in 2014. That is nearly 1% of its GDP. It has committed to spend 25 times that amount over the next 15 years on clean energy. Both the US and Europe spent much smaller amounts ($38 and $58 billion respectively), even though their economies are much larger (the US figure is around 0.07% of its GDP). In dollar terms, the Chinese government also spent more on Green R&D than Europe or the US. [1] The scope for US and European governments to spend more on researching and help with developing green technology is huge. Yet in the UK the government has recently cut back its support for renewable energy, even though the UK’s need for renewable energy is urgent.

Climate change may be the most important example, but it is not alone. It is absurd that when the potential for technological change leads people to write about robots taking over, actual productivity growth is slowing everywhere. As an IMF report says, "innovation [is] highly dependent on government policies." I think Brad DeLong, in commenting on Eichengreen’s article, has it exactly right when he writes “it is long past time for a frontal intellectual assault on the[se] dangerous and destructive ideologies”.   

 

[1] If we include corporate R&D, Europe moves ahead of China in $ spend, but China is still ahead of the US.       

Port Talbot and Neoliberalism

Brief synopsis for non-UK readers. Port Talbot is the latest UK steel plant to face closure at least partly as a result of dumping by Chinese steel producers. While the US government seems quite prepared to place high compensating tariffs on Chinese steel, the UK government had blocked EU attempts to do the same.

I used to think I knew what neoliberalism was. True it is a term that is employed far too liberally (no pun intended), but I thought neoliberals had a clear idea of what they were about. This was to keep markets free from government interference, and also to prefer almost without question market processes based on private property over state action. As a result, it was neoliberal to want to shrink the state as much as possible, as long as its role in defending markets and private property was preserved.

It was for this reason that I could say that the UK government’s actions in blocking tariffs on Chinese steel were nothing to do with neoliberalism. If China was a capitalist country where independent (from the state) producers received no state subsidies, then that would be different. But it appears that what we have instead is an all powerful state rigging a market. That couldn’t be neoliberal, surely?

I am aware that neoliberalism has a blind spot when it comes to what economists would call market imperfections. That seemed to me one difference between neoliberalism and ordoliberalism, with the latter seeing a clear role for the state in restricting monopolies. The way you could characterise this is that neoliberals started Econ 101 but skipped before the lessons on market failure, while ordoliberals held out a little longer to hear about monopoly.

That, at least, is how I saw it. I had also seen the Institute of Economic Affairs, a London think tank, as being a bastion of neoliberalism. Although often a supporter of Conservative government actions, they were not in favour of caps on immigration or Osborne’s hike in minimum wages. I was therefore rather surprised to hear its director say that the EU government would have been wrong to impose tariffs on Chinese steel. True, the idea that a producer in an oligopolistic market with high entry barriers could use its deep pockets to drive out other producers by temporarily cutting prices, and subsequently use its new monopoly position to raise prices by much more, might have been one of the economic lessons that were skipped. But when one of the most powerful states in the world does it? I would have thought that would have raised alarm bells for any neoliberal.

Either I am missing something, or I am being a typical academic (economist) in expecting an ideology and those who uphold it to be internally consistent. After all, another major example of large states interfering with markets is the implicit subsidy provided to ‘too big to fail’ banks, but I do not remember neoliberals attacking that much either. Neoliberalism is whatever neoliberals do?!

Or maybe not. I think critics of this UK government miss a trick when they call its failure to defend its steel industry as the actions of a “failed, laissez-faire Thatcherite ideology”. That gives it a kind of respectability it does not deserve. Instead it is a government that seems to have decided that defending the interests of China are more important than its own steel industry. When China announced on 1st April that it was imposing high tariffs on a type of steel produced in the UK, the only thing that looked like an April fool were the actions of the UK government.         

The big story behind Port Talbot

In today’s print edition of the New Statesman I have a brief review of Yanis Varoufakis’s new book. (The review also looks at Piketty’s newly published collection and translation of newspaper articles. I’ll talk more about each when the review appears online, but for now you can read a similar (in parts) double review by Paul Mason.) The organising macroeconomic theme in his book is the need to find systems capable of successfully dealing with current account surpluses. In my review I say I’m not sure whether this framework is really capable of holding up everything that the author wants it to support, but there is no doubt of the importance of the issue. For example, it seems to me this is the framework, albeit at a more industry specific level, with which to see the current crisis over the threatened closure of the UK’s steel plant at Port Talbot.

The surplus in question here is the surplus Chinese capacity to produce steel. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard in the Telegraph, who has a similar perspective, reports an OECD estimate that China's excess capacity is over twice the size of total European Steel production. Because China is able to subsidise production in various ways, this means this steel can beat UK production on price. The US department of commerce is reported as thinking that the subsidy on some types of steel justifies a tariff of 236%!

If this is correct, then this story is not about neoliberalism or the free market, but a story of a rigged market. To put it another way, it is a market where one set of producers have the ability to eliminate their competitors by flooding the market at a loss because they have the ‘deep pockets’ of a state behind them.

The EU have been trying to raise tariffs against Chinese steel producers for three years, but have been blocked by a coalition of countries led by the UK. The UK Business minister Sajid Javid has been quite explicit about this: he prefers cheap steel because it helps other parts of UK industry. It may also have something to do with wanting to curry favour with China because of other matters (which was the point of John McDonnell’s Little Red Book stunt, if only he hadn’t started reading from it!). This is not Javid upholding the principles of a free market, but instead allowing a large state to rig a market. The irony in this case is that the state in question is not the one he works for. 

Postscript (11/4/16) For more detail, see this from Ben Chu