Triangulation or bipartisanship does not work when one side goes off the scale

Brad DeLong describes himself as a Rubin Democrat, which he defines as “largely neoliberal, market-oriented, and market-regulation and tuning aimed at social democratic ends.” It is a natural position for an economist to be: it is generally more efficient to tweek markets than destroy them. But he thinks the time has come for this kind of Democrat to pass the baton over to the left. “We are still here, but it is not our time to lead.”

That is an unusual thing to say, on either side of the Atlantic. In the UK the left under Corbyn is in the lead, but you see few of the people who used to run the Labour party saying anything similar. Instead some have conducted a relentless campaign to undermine him. Not only is DeLong unusual, I also think he is probably right, so I want to examine the reasons he gives.

The key point he makes is that the political right has torn up the normal rules of the game, by both moving further to the right and becoming totally partisan. This was very clear in the Obama years. Obama pursued Romney’s health care policy and John McCain’s climate policy and George H.W. Bush’s foreign policy. “And did George H.W. Bush, did Mitt Romney, did John McCain say a single good word about anything Barack Obama ever did over the course of eight solid years? No, they fucking did not.”

There is much less bipartisan cooperation in the UK compared to the US, but I think there is a clear analogy with triangulation. The lesson Brown and Blair drew from the defeats of the 1980s was that Labour needed to win the middle class, and that meant moving policy to the centre ground. There was little attempt to reverse the neoliberalism of Thatcher, but instead to mitigate its social effects.

But the problem is that the political right in both countries were not playing by the same rules. They had a quite different strategy, which was to shift policy on issues like taxation and the size of the state to the right, and instead try and win elections by pushing a socially conservative agenda. (Here is a formalisation.) There is no triangulation here, but instead an attempt to hide a right wing agenda by starting a culture war. [1] As the right has control over a section of the media, they can also misrepresent their own and their opponents position. That control, together with ineffective scrutiny by the non-partisan media, allows politicians to lie to an extent that would have been thought inconceivable a couple of decades earlier.

When the right adopts this strategy (what I have called elsewhere neoliberal overreach), attempts by the left to get bipartisan agreement or triangulate policies moves what most political commentators call the centre ground of policy to the right. This has two effects. The first is that policies that would be popular among a majority of the population don’t happen. It is often noted that Corbyn’s policies are popular, and the same seems to be true in the US. Second, those supporting the left wing party become dissatisfied with it, and try and move it back to where it once was.

A vivid illustration from the UK of how triangulation fails is immigration. The Conservatives, together with their allies in the media, decided to use immigration as a major weapon against the Labour government. Gradually the increase in the number of stories about immigrants living on welfare and ‘taking our jobs’ began to move immigration up the list of issues voters were concerned about. Immigration numbers were increasing because the government knew this was good for both the economy and public services, but newspapers used words like “mass”, “vast”, “large scale”, “floods”,“waves”“army”, or “hordes”. With a few exceptions it was not voters in areas where migration was increasing that were reacting, and the best predictor of voter concern was which newspapers voters read.

Eventually Labour decided they had to try and triangulate, by talking tough on immigration. The case for immigration was no longer made. The false belief that immigrants made access to public services worse became ingrained. This allowed the Conservative government to deflect a lot of anger over austerity on to immigrants, and it eventually led to Brexit. The strategy of triangulation was a disaster. It is interesting that since the negative impact of reduced immigration on the economy has become clear with Brexit, views on immigration in the UK have shifted to become positive rather than negative.

Another consequence of the right not playing by the old rules is a lack of proportionality. I remember reading Paul Krugman during the Clinton vs Sanders primaries. I think Paul mainly favoured Clinton because Sanders was too populist, which naturally grates for someone who knows and cares about the detail and the difficulties involved in populist policies. But I also remember him writing that the Republicans might be hard on Clinton but that would be nothing compared to what the right would do if Sanders was the Democratic candidate. I’m not sure that was correct, because the right were not playing by the old rules where you had to stick to facts.

As a result, Clinton was accused of all kinds of imagined crimes by Trump, and the non-partisan media played along by obsessing about her email server. Much the same happened in the UK if we look at the 2015 and 2017 elections. The right wing press relentlessly attacked Corbyn in 2017 with wild charges about what he would do as PM, but what they did to centre-left Ed Miliband (‘red Ed’) in 2015 was not that different. Their attacks were not proportionate to how left wing their opponent was.

I think you need to add in one additional point here, and that is a public that is looking for radical solutions, by which I means solutions that move away from the status quo. The reason for this is not hard to understand: the worst recession since WWII following the financial crisis, stagnant and declining real wages, and geographical areas (rural, towns) that seem to be falling behind more dynamic cities.

The lesson of Brexit and Trump is if you fight a culture war and lies with just well researched and targeted policy proposals, you lose. It is better to fight a culture war with an alternative vision and popular policy proposals, and a bit of class war too. I am not suggesting that you don’t have well researched and targeted policy proposals behind that: as DeLong says “we are still here”. But this is the time for radicals on both sides. I suspect Sanders would have been more effective than Clinton at taking on Trump, just as Corbyn was very effective at taking on Theresa May.

You might have noticed that I have said very little about policy divisions between the left and centre-left, and that is because in practice I don’t think they are very important. In both countries the left cannot implement much that the centre-left disagrees with, and much of what the left want to do the centre-left are prepared to accept. [2] (Maybe not rich Democrat or Labour donors, but crowdfunding means that is unfortunate rather than fatal.) The key question is whether the centre-left allows the left to lead when it needs to lead, or instead fights against the left and keeps the right in power.

Let me end with Brad again.

“Our current bunch of leftists are wonderful people, as far as leftists in the past are concerned. They’re social democrats, they’re very strong believers in democracy. They’re very strong believers in fair distribution of wealth. They could use a little more education about what is likely to work and what is not. But they’re people who we’re very, very lucky to have on our side.”

Some in the UK may feel that statement just does not apply here, but they need to ask whether DeLong is right and it is the left’s time to lead, because what he says about the political right in the US applies equally to the UK.

[1] Cameron talked the talk of centre triangulation, but that did not happen in practice (with the exception of one or two issues like Gay marriage and the aid budget). With austerity he pursued an attempt to shrink the state that Thatcher could only dream of, and the degree to which the Tories wanted to shift policy to the right was masked by the Coalition’s other partner.

[2] One of the problems we have in the UK is supporters of the left who do not understand this, and act as if the centre-left is the enemy and it can win without them. But the centre-left also needs to recognise that on some big issues like financialisation they have been wrong and the left has been right. Some discussion on US issues here from Paul Krugman.

The biggest economic policy mistake of the last decade, and it had nothing to do with academic economists

"The biggest policy mistake of the last decade" is the title of an article by Ryan Cooper, and the mistake is of course austerity. (It is a very US focused piece, so Brexit is not on the map.) Cooper goes through all the academics who gave reasons why austerity was necessary and how their analysis later fell to bits. (How much they fell to bits is still a matter of dispute as far as these authors are concerned.)

Here is his concluding paragraph:

“As we have seen, the evidence for the Keynesian position is overwhelming. And that means the decade of pointless austerity has severely harmed the American economy — leaving us perhaps $3 trillion below the previous growth trend. Through a combination of bad faith, motivated reasoning, and sheer incompetence, austerians have directly created the problem their entire program was supposed to avoid. Good riddance.”

There is a lot I could say about the details of the article, but this conclusion is essentially correct, and it applies at least as much to the UK and to the Eurozone countries. With Trump’s large tax cuts for the rich paid for in large part by borrowing, the Republicans can no longer credibly tell everyone austerity is essential. In contrast the political right’s enthusiasm for austerity in Europe remains strong.

Reading the article brought back memories of my first year or two writing this blog, where I became part of a mainly US blog scene of mainstream academics opposed to austerity, lead by Paul Krugman and Brad DeLong. We were trying to take down the academic arguments for austerity, and we succeeded. As Cooper’s article suggests it was not a very difficult task. Sometimes very senior economists who should have known better made simple mistakes of the kind I discussed here. On other occasions, like the predictions of massive inflation from Quantitative Easing that Cooper discussed, events quickly proved the Keynesians correct. Only in the case of the studies from the two pairs of Alesina and Ardagna and Reinhart and Rogoff was additional research required to challenge their conclusions.

As far as us Keynesians were concerned, the intellectual battles were won by the end of 2012 if not before. In particular Paul De Grauwe’s influential analysis of why Eurozone countries were experiencing a debt crisis, pointing to the lack of a sovereign lender of last resort, put an end to the academic credibility of ‘we are going to become like Greece’ stories. When the ECB introduced OMT in September 2012 and the Eurozone debt crisis came to an end De Grauwe was proved right. In 2013 Krugman wrote of austerity:

“Its predictions have proved utterly wrong; its founding academic documents haven’t just lost their canonized status, they’ve become the objects of much ridicule.”

What we didn’t know for sure then was the lasting damage that austerity would bring, and which Cooper notes.

I want to add two important points that Cooper’s article does not cover. The first is that although by 2013 most academics had become convinced about the austerity mistake (it was always a minority view anyway), economic journalists in the non-partisan media could not recognise that because the politicians were continuing to implement the policy. Here is Robert Peston in 2015:

“And before I am savaged (as I always am) by the Krugman crew of Keynesian economists for even allowing George Osborne’s argument an airing, I am not saying that the net negative impact on our national income and living standards of cutting the deficit faster is less than their alternative route of slower so called fiscal consolidation. I am simply pointing out that there is a debate here (though Krugman, Wren-Lewis and Portes are utterly persuaded they’ve won this match – and take the somewhat patronising view that voters who think differently are ignorant sheep led astray by a malign or blinkered media).”

We now know that voters were indeed being led astray by a malign or blinkered media, or at least a media that did not have the courage to call the result of the academic debate.

The second point is that this academic debate had zero impact on politicians. In that sense Cooper’s article is of purely academic concern. Austerity was not begun because politicians chose the wrong academic macroeconomists to take advice from, and the fact that the Keynesians won the debate therefore had no impact on what they did. The academic debate was in this sense a complete sideshow. I think many Keynesian academics understood that: it was a fight we had to win but we were under no illusions it would change anything. I wrote in 2012 that if all academics were united we might have an impact on public opinion, but that illusion did not last very long and Brexit showed it was indeed an illusion.

I think this lack of influence that academic economics can have is not understood by many. It often suits some heterodox economists to pretend otherwise. Economists can be influential, but only when politicians want to listen, or the media is prepared to confront them with academic knowledge. For example politicians have not done nearly enough to ensure another financial crisis does not happen, but that isn’t because economists have told them not to or have not shown them how to do so. It is because politics prevents it happening.

The reason why economists like Alesina or Rogoff featured so much in the early discussion of austerity is not because they were influential, but because they were useful to provide some intellectual credibility to the policy that politicians of the right wanted to pursue. The influence of their work did not last long among academics, who now largely accept that there is no such thing as expansionary austerity or some danger point for debt. In contrast, the damage done by austerity does not seem to have done the politicians who promoted it much harm, in part because most of the media will keep insisting that maybe these politicians were right, but mainly because they are still in power.  

Misrepresenting academic economists

Brad DeLong entered the debate between myself and Unlearning Economics with a post entitled “The Need for a Reformation of Authority and Hierarchy Among Economists in the Public Sphere”. He writes

“Simon needs to face that fact squarely, rather than to dodge it. The fact is that the "mainstream economists, and most mainstream economists" who were heard in the public sphere were not against austerity, but rather split, with, if anything, louder and larger voices on the pro-austerity side.”

The dodge, and I think it is a pretty good dodge, is that politicians and a good part of the media choose the economists they publicise. If you accept that austerity came from what I call deficit deceit - an attempt to reduce the size of the state using the false pretext of deficit reduction - then obviously politicians and their supporters in the media would choose those economists whose views were useful in promulgating that deceit. As the UK discovered during the Brexit debate, even a tiny proportion of economists (8!) can appear much larger if the media gives them much more attention than they deserve.

But the argument remains a dodge in the following respect. How were people outside economics, including much of the non-partisan media, meant to know that particular academic economists were unrepresentative of the majority? Indeed how can even economists be sure of this? I’ve argued that the majority of academic macroeconomists were always against austerity, particularly once the reason for the Eurozone crisis had been resolved by Paul De Grauwe, but the evidence I use to back this up is piecemeal and indirect (see here, pages 3 to 4).

Part of the problem is a certain disregard for consensus among economists. If you ask most scientists how a particular theory is regarded within their discipline, you will generally get a honest and fairly accurate answer. In contrast economists are less likely to preface a presentation of their work in the media with phrases like ‘untested idea’ or ‘minority view’. In macro it also reflects periods in the past, which still resonate today, when there was deep division and antagonism between different groups. This extends to not being sure what is taught at masters level in the top schools: it turned out, when André Moreira and I did the research, that there was more consensus in one key respect (Chicago excluded) than some had imagined.

Part of Brad’s post it seems to me is simply a lament that Reinhart and Rogoff are not even better economists than they already are. But there is also a very basic information problem: how does any economist, let alone someone who is not an economist, know what the consensus among economists is? How do we know that the people we meet at the conferences we go to are representative or not?

To help fill that gap we have in the US the IGM Economic Experts Panel survey, and in the UK/Europe the CFM survey. (The IGM survey has recently started a European version.) The US IGM survey has asked a question about the Obama stimulus package on more than one occasion, and the latest result is here. It is one key part of the evidence for my claim that most academics were and are against austerity.

However all these surveys share a common feature which I find problematic, and which also reflects on Brad’s concern. They are selective, and deliberately designed to only include the academic elite. IGM writes that panel members are all senior faculty at the most elite research universities in the United States. So they tell us not what academic economists think, but what a chosen sample of ‘elite’ economists think. Now if those samples are well chosen, as I think they mostly are for these surveys, that may not matter too much, but how representative they are can always be questioned. It also gives the impression that it is only this elite that are worth listening to when it comes to policy issues, something I think is simply wrong as well as being elitist.

As part of the build up to the Brexit vote, the Observer newspaper commissioned Ipsos MORI to email all members of the Royal Economic Society. 91% of those who responded thought Brexit would have a negative impact on UK GDP in the longer term. As most UK academic economists are RES members, it was therefore possible to say that there was a clear consensus among academic economists that Brexit was harmful. To be able to say this about all economists, rather than just a select few, in my view strengthens the power of the survey. (Some defend elitist surveys because the elite is ‘influential’, but if they influence their fellow economists that will show up in a larger sample.)

I think the experience with austerity and Brexit suggests it is time for national economics associations (like the RES or AEA) to start representing the opinions of economists by conducting such polls of their members under their own initiative. With email addresses the technology makes it easy to do. It is time these organisations started telling both us and the world about what the consensus (if any) is on key policy issues. It would be an important step towards ending the misrepresentation of economists and economics.

Ann Pettifor on mainstream economics

Ann has a article that talks about the underlying factor behind the Brexit vote. Her thesis, that it represents the discontent of those left behind by globalisation, has been put forward by others. Unlike Brad DeLong, I have few problems with seeing this as a contributing factor to Brexit, because it is backed up by evidence, but like Brad DeLong I doubt it generalises to other countries. Unfortunately her piece is spoilt by a final section that is a tirade against mainstream economists which goes way over the top. Let me just go through the factual errors.

“Economists dictated the terms for austerity that has so harmed the British economy and society over the past ten years.”

The only support she gives for this statement is the 20 economists who signed a letter to the Times on 14th February 2010. She neglects to mention that 58 equally notable economists signed a response in the Financial Times on 18th February arguing the 20 were wrong. Austerity has always been a minority view among academic economists, a minority that has got smaller over time. Of course those that signed the first letter, and in particular Ken Rogoff, turned out to be a more prominent voice in the subsequent debate, but that is because he supported what policymakers were doing. He was mostly useful rather than influential.

“As the policies have failed, the vast majority of economists have refused to concede wrongdoing, nor have societies been offered alternatives.“

In the case of the 20 economists who signed that letter, nearly half did revise their views just two years later. More importantly, for the last few years pretty well every macroeconomist of note, including Ken Rogoff, has advocated a substantial increase in public investment. So this sentence, in so far as it relates to austerity, is almost as wrong as it could be

“[On Brexit} All the heavyweights of the economics profession … were wheeled out to warn the British people of economic facts known, and understood apparently, only to ‘experts’... But the ‘experts’ and the economic stories they tell have been well and truly walloped by the result of this referendum. And rightly so, because while there is truth in the story that international and in particular European cooperation and coordination are vital to economic activity and stability, there is no sound basis to the widely espoused economic ‘religion’ that markets—in money, trade, and labour—must be unfettered, detached from democratic regulatory oversight, and must be left to ‘govern’ whole countries, regions, and continents.”

Where did these heavyweights talk about “economic facts known, and understood apparently, only to experts”? When they were given the chance, they explained the common sense idea that trade would suffer if we left the EU because it is easier to trade with your neighbours, and the easy to understand empirical findings that more trade increases productivity and therefore economic growth. There is no religion involved at all, but rather statistical evidence. If you are looking for religion, you need to focus on the handful of economists supporting Brexit, who really did believe that it could usher in a neoliberal nirvana that would more than offset the costs of Brexit. To the extent that the public ignored the warnings of economists, it was probably because these warnings were ‘balanced’ in the media by this handful.

When Ann talks about the failings of economists related to the financial crisis she has a point, but it is one that she grossly exaggerates. Economists hardly “led the way to the re-regulation and ‘liberalization’ of the finance sector over the past 40 years”. The way was led by the financial sector itself. If more economists had backed up rather than dismissed Rajan’s warnings in 2005, I doubt if anything would have changed. Why do I think this? Because mainstream economists have subsequently argued that the only way to prevent another crisis is to substantially increase the capitalisation of banks, but they have been completely ignored by policymakers. If economists are being ignored after the financial crisis which created untold damage, why should things have been any different before the crisis?

I think the same point applies to globalisation. Most economists have certainly encouraged the idea that globalisation would increase overall prosperity, and they have been proved right. It is also true that many of these economists did not admit or stress enough that there would be losers as a result of this process who needed compensating from the increase in aggregate prosperity. But once again I doubt very much that anything would have changed if they had. And if they didn’t think enough about it in the past, they are now: see Paul De Grauwe here for example.

There is a regrettable (but understandable) tendency by heterodox economists on the left to try and pretend that economics and neoliberalism are somehow inextricably entwined. The reality is that neoliberal advocates do use some economic ideas as justification, but they ignore others which go in the opposite direction. As I often point out, many more academic economists spend their time analysing market imperfections than trying to show markets always work on their own. They get Nobel prizes for this work. I find attempts to suggest that economics somehow helped create austerity particularly annoying, as I (and many others) have spent many blog posts showing that economic theory and evidence demonstrates that austerity was a huge mistake.         

What is so bad about the RBC model?

This post has its genesis in a short twitter exchange storified by Brad DeLong

DSGE models, the models that mainstream macroeconomists use to model the business cycle, are built on the foundations of the Real Business Cycle (RBC) model. We (almost) all know that the RBC project failed. So how can anything built on these foundations be acceptable? As Donald Trump might say, what is going on here?

The basic RBC model contains a production function relating output to capital (owned by individuals) and labour plus a stochastic element representing technical progress, an identity relating investment and capital, a national income identity giving output as the sum of consumption and investment, marginal productivity conditions (from profit maximisation by perfectly competitive representative firms) giving the real wage and real interest rate, and the representative consumer’s optimisation problem for consumption, labour supply and capital. (See here, for example.)

What is the really big problem with this model? Not problems along the lines of ‘I would want to add this’, but more problems like I would not even start from here. Let’s ignore capital, because in the bare bones New Keynesian model capital does not appear. If you were to say giving primacy to shocks to technical progress I would agree that is a big problem: all the behavioural equations should contain stochastic elements which can also shock this economy, but New Keynesian models do this to varying degrees. If you were to say the assumption of labour market clearing I would also agree that is a big problem.

However none of the above is the biggest problem in my view. The biggest problem is the assumption of continuous goods market clearing aka fully flexible prices. That is the assumption that tells you monetary policy has no impact on real variables. Now an RBC modeller might say in response how do you know that? Surely it makes sense to see whether a model that does assume price flexibility could generate something like business cycles?

The answer to that question is no, it does not. It does not because we know it cannot for a simple reason: unemployment in recessions is involuntary, and this model cannot generate involuntary unemployment, but only voluntary variations in labour supply as a result of short term movements in the real wage. Once you accept that higher unemployment in recessions is involuntary (and the evidence for that is very strong), the RBC project was never going to work.

So how did RBC models ever get off the ground? Because the New Classical revolution said everything we knew before that revolution should be discounted because it did not use the right methodology. And also because the right methodology - the microfoundations methodology - allowed the researcher to select what evidence (micro or macro) was admissible. That, in turn, is why the microfoundations methodology has to be central to any critique of modern macro. Why RBC modellers chose to dismiss the evidence on involuntary unemployment I will leave as an exercise for the reader.

The New Keynesian (NK) model, although it may have just added one equation to the RBC model, did something which corrected its central failure: the failure to acknowledge the pre-revolution wisdom about what causes business cycles and what you had to do to combat them. In that sense its break from its RBC heritage was profound. Is New Keynesian analysis still hampered by its RBC parentage? The answer is complex (see here), but can be summarised as no and yes. But once again, I would argue that what holds back modern macro much more is its reliance on its particular methodology.

One final point. Many people outside mainstream macro feel happy to describe DSGE modelling as a degenerative research strategy. I think that is a very difficult claim to substantiate, and is hardly going to convince mainstream macroeconomists. The claim I want to make is much weaker, and that is that there is no good reason why microfoundations modelling should be the only research strategy employed by academic economists. I challenge anyone to argue against my claim.

Its ideology, stupid

Wolfgang Münchau takes to task in today’s FT the latest example of German opposition, and in particular opposition from finance minister Schäuble, to ECB policies. However I think he ends up missing the obvious target. He discusses the particular problems negative rates pose for Germany’s financial sector, and in his last paragraph writes

“This episode is a reminder that the collective spirit that was so strongly present in the first years of the eurozone has gone. That — not the presence of imbalances or other technical problems — constitutes the single biggest danger to the long-term viability of Europe’s monetary union.”

I would suggest this has the causality wrong. Any collective spirit has gone because of these ‘technical problems’. The biggest technical problem is an obsession with inappropriate collective fiscal consolidation (austerity). In the Eurozone the ECB is being forced to try negative interest rates because it is having to undo the impact of fiscal consolidation. And the man most responsible for this obsession is Schäuble.  

Gavyn Davies nicely sums up my own view about negative interest rates. Without radical institutional and social changes (which may not be desirable), bank profitability puts a limit on how far central banks can go, and for that reason exploring these frontiers could be counterproductive. But the alternative of more QE, possibly directed at other assets besides government debt, is way down the list of effective and reliable instruments for managing aggregate demand right now. Helicopter money is a much better way of giving central banks more ammunition. But the focus right now should not be on any of this, if we are genuinely concerned about social welfare. As John Kay says, “we need less financial ingenuity and more common sense”.

What we should be talking about is why governments are not doing much more public investment. Yet in the US, Germany and the UK any dramatic increase in public investment seems out of the question. Barry Eichengreen, in an article entitled “Confronting the Fiscal Bogeyman”, writes of Germany:

“The ordoliberal emphasis on personal responsibility fostered an unreasoning hostility to the idea that actions that are individually responsible do not automatically produce desirable aggregate outcomes. In other words, it rendered Germans allergic to macroeconomics.”

In the US, antagonism to the Federal government rooted in the past has meant Republican leaders are  

“antagonistic to all exercise of federal power except for the enforcement of contracts and competition – a hostility that notably included countercyclical macroeconomic policy. Welcome to ordoliberalism, Dixie-style. Wolfgang Schäuble, meet Ted Cruz.”

He ends

“Ideological and political prejudices deeply rooted in history will have to be overcome to end the current stagnation. If an extended period of depressed growth following a crisis isn’t the right moment to challenge them, then when is?”

He does not mention the UK, where the antagonism to public investment seems to lack any deep historical explanation, and may just reflect stupidity or an ideology imported from the US.

When I talk about public investment people normally think about big projects, like HS2 in the UK. I like to point out that simpler and perhaps more boring things, like repairing roads, are at least as important, and can be done immediately. But if there is one area above all else where much more needs to be done right now it is investment in renewable energy.

The recent news on climate change is not good. It is foolish to read too much into one or two months figures, but this chart is nevertheless quite scary. It is scary because we know of various possible ‘tipping points’ (like the melting of all Arctic ice or the mass release of methane from permafros) which could accelerate global warming. Most climate models assume we will control carbon emissions in time to stop that happening, but we cannot be sure of that, because we are in uncharted territory.

We know we need a massive expansion of renewable energy, but one problem that has so far stopped that being a complete solution to climate change has been that sometimes the wind neither blows nor the sun shines. We need to be able to cheaply store electricity, but our current battery technology is not good enough. Battery technology is also crucial in making electric cars as attractive as petrol based cars. But technology could come to the rescue. Existing batteries could be made much more efficient, or completely new battery technologies could be made viable. Much more efficient transmission could also help. And if you look at all three links, you may notice one common factor. These potential breakthroughs have all come from research undertaken in the public sector. As Mariana Mazucato has argued, the state is “better able to attract top talent and pursue radical innovation”.   

China put over $80 billion into the renewable energy sector in 2014. That is nearly 1% of its GDP. It has committed to spend 25 times that amount over the next 15 years on clean energy. Both the US and Europe spent much smaller amounts ($38 and $58 billion respectively), even though their economies are much larger (the US figure is around 0.07% of its GDP). In dollar terms, the Chinese government also spent more on Green R&D than Europe or the US. [1] The scope for US and European governments to spend more on researching and help with developing green technology is huge. Yet in the UK the government has recently cut back its support for renewable energy, even though the UK’s need for renewable energy is urgent.

Climate change may be the most important example, but it is not alone. It is absurd that when the potential for technological change leads people to write about robots taking over, actual productivity growth is slowing everywhere. As an IMF report says, "innovation [is] highly dependent on government policies." I think Brad DeLong, in commenting on Eichengreen’s article, has it exactly right when he writes “it is long past time for a frontal intellectual assault on the[se] dangerous and destructive ideologies”.   

 

[1] If we include corporate R&D, Europe moves ahead of China in $ spend, but China is still ahead of the US.       

Helicopters are easy to fly

The debate over helicopter money seems to have got past the ‘shock, horror, people’s faith in the monetary system would collapse’ phase, and past the ‘it wouldn’t work because people wouldn’t spend the money’ phase, to the ‘what happens next’ phase. And to be fair to the critics, many proponents of helicopter money have not been clear on this issue.

The point was put very clearly yesterday in an FT Alphaville piece by Gerard MacDonell. Once the recession is over, there is likely to be too much money in the economy from the central bank’s point of view (which means, money has to be withdrawn to maintain the inflation target). We cannot say how much, but equally it would be wrong to ignore the problem. So what happens next?

I think I have been clear (at least recently) on this point. First, helicopter money as I see it is not a way to get inflation overshooting by the back door. The idea that the increase in money is ‘permanent’ is meaningless, as Eric Lonergan says. Overshooting may be a good idea, but there is no need to be devious about it. Second, the obvious way to ensure the central bank still achieves its inflation and other objectives is to recapitalise the bank if necessary. The central bank could enforce very high reserve ratios on commercial banks, but is that a desirable thing to do?

In my view helicopter money would be accompanied by a commitment by the government to recapitalise the central bank if that was needed. Yes, commitments can be broken, but only by the kind of government that would happily revoke central bank independence anyway.

The answer to what happens next is therefore easy. When it becomes clear after the recession that there is now too much money in the economy, the central bank takes it out. In other words, monetary policy acts as normal. If the central bank runs out of assets to do this, it gets recapitalised. Recapitalisation means more government debt. So we can end up in a position which is exactly equivalent to one where the distribution of money had been financed by an increase in debt in the first place: a conventional fiscal expansion.

In this world, helicopter money is (a particular type of) fiscal expansion by the back door. As Narayana Kocherlakota points out, this back door method has no purely macroeconomic advantages over the real thing. But the reason why we need a back door is obvious right now. Economists need to get real about these political constraints. Obsession with debt is not just based on ignorance, but it serves an ideological purpose which is not going to go away.

Yet even if governments were not obsessed with current levels of debt (and that is all they are obsessed by), go back to the textbooks on why monetary policy is prefered to fiscal policy as a stabilisation tool. One of the reasons you will find is that monetary policy is quick to invoke, with no institutional (aka democratic) hurdles to pass. Those who argue that helicopter money is just like fiscal policy seem to ignore this. There is also the (obvious) point that helicopter money allows what I call the consensus assignment to work (by expanding the meaning of monetary policy a little beyond interest rate changes), rather than leaving it with the rather large Achilles Heel of the zero lower bound.

Helicopter money is just another way of doing textbook demand management. What it does is move around current institutional boundaries a bit, to reflect real institutional and political constraints. There is nothing magical about the current institutional boundaries. Perhaps if you think (as Brad DeLong does) about the profits the central bank makes as a social credit that gets automatically distributed to people rather than given to an intermediary (the government), you might feel easier about it.       

Confidence as a political device

Some technical references but the key point does not need them

This is a contribution to the discussion about models started by Krugman, DeLong and Summers, and in particular to the use of confidence. (Martin Sandbu has an excellent summary, although as you will see I think he is missing something.) The idea that confidence can on occasion be important, and that it can be modelled, is not (in my view) in dispute. For example the very existence of banks depends on confidence (that depositors can withdraw their money when they wish), and when that confidence disappears you get a bank run.

But the leap from the statement that ‘in some circumstances confidence matters’ to ‘we should worry about bond market confidence in an economy with its own central bank in the middle of a depression’ is a huge one, and I think Tony Yates and others are in danger of making that leap without justification. Yes, there are circumstances when it may be optimal for a country with its own central bank to default, and Corsetti and Dedola (in a paper I discussed here) show how that can lead to multiple equilibria.

But just as Krugman wanted to emulate Woody Allen, I want to as well but this time pull Dani Rodrik from behind the sign. In his excellent new book (which I have almost finished reading) Rodrik talks about the fact that in economics there are usually many models, and the key question is their applicability. So you have to ask, for the US and UK in 2009, was there the slightest chance that either government wanted to default? The question is not would they be forced to default, because with their own central bank they would not be, but would they choose to default. And the answer has to be a categorical no. Why would they, with interest rates so low and debt easy to sell.

The argument goes that if the market suddenly gets spooked and stops buying debt, printing money will cause inflation, and in those circumstances the government might choose to default. But we were in the midst of the biggest recession since the 1930s. Any money creation would have had no immediate impact on inflation. Of course their central banks had just begun printing lots of money as part of Quantitative Easing, and even 5 years later where is the inflation! So once again there would be no chance that the government would choose to default: the Corsetti and Dedola paper is not applicable. (Robert makes a similar point about the Blanchard paper. I will not deal with the exchange rate collapse idea because Paul already has. A technical aside: Martin raises a point about UK banks overseas currency activity, which I will try to get back to in a later post.)

Ah, but what if the market remains spooked for so long that eventually inflation rises. The markets stop buying US or UK debt because they think that the government will choose to default, and even after 5 or 10 years and still no default the markets continue to think that, even though they are desperate for safe assets!? In Corsetti and Dedola agents are rational, so we have left that paper way behind. We have entered, I’m afraid, the land of pure make believe.

So there is no applicable model that could justify the confidence effects that might have made us cautious in 2009 about issuing more debt. There are models about an acute shortage of safe assets on the other hand, which seem to be ignored by those arguing against fiscal stimulus. Nor is there the slightest bit of evidence that the markets were ever even thinking about being spooked in this way.

Martin makes the point that just because something has not yet been formally modelled does not mean it does not happen. Of course, and indeed if he means by model a fully microfounded DSGE model I have made this point many times myself. But you can also use the term model in a much more general sense, as a set of mutually consistent arguments. It is in that sense that I mean no applicable model.

Now to the additional point I really wanted to make. When people invoke the idea of confidence, other people (particularly economists) should be automatically suspicious. The reason is that it frequently allows those who represent the group whose confidence is being invoked to further their own self interest. The financial markets are represented by City or Wall Street economists, and you invariably see market confidence being invoked to support a policy position they have some economic or political interest in. Bond market economists never saw a fiscal consolidation they did not like, so the saying goes, so of course market confidence is used to argue against fiscal expansion. Employers drum up the importance of maintaining their confidence whenever taxes on profits (or high incomes) are involved. As I argue in this paper, there is a generic reason why financial market economists play up the importance of market confidence, so they can act as high priests. (Did these same economists go on about the dangers of rising leverage when confidence really mattered, before the global financial crisis?)

The general lesson I would draw is this. If the economics point towards a conclusion, and people argue against it based on ‘confidence’, you should be very, very suspicious. You should ask where is the model (or at least a mutually consistent set of arguments), and where is the evidence that this model or set of arguments is applicable to this case? Policy makers who go with confidence based arguments that fail these tests because it accords with their instincts are, perhaps knowingly, following the political agenda of someone else.