Did the UK really almost go bankrupt?

I normally publish posts in the first half of the week, but two separate attempts were overtaken by events, and they will have to wait for another day. I finally wrote something for the Guardian on the Governor’s interview that led to nonsense headlines about the UK almost going bankrupt. The piece explains why they are nonsense, but I should note here that the headlines are classic mediamacro, appealing to the idea that governments are like households.

Frances Coppola makes the same point a different way. You could describe what happened in March this year as a short term liquidity problem. There is no suggestion the UK is insolvent. And the thing about countries with their own currencies is that they never have a liquidity problem because they create money. She also notes that no headlines talked about the fragility of our commercial banks around the same time. You would think, after the GFC, that would be the big news. Here is a quote from Frances’s blog:

“I found the interviewers' constant focus on government financing a serious distraction from what was an important story about the Bank's vital responsibility for ensuring the smooth operation of financial markets. When financial markets melt down as they did in 2008, the whole world suffers. Central banks saw the same thing happening again in March 2020, and acted to stop it. And their action was extremely effective. It seemed to me that this was the story Bailey really wanted to tell, but the interviewers were intent on pushing him towards the issue of monetary financing and the Bank's independence.”

This episode was not, as some have suggested, an example of fiscal dominance. To make that clear, I give an example of what fiscal dominance would be in the article, where the Bank is forced to monetise borrowing against its better judgement. Dealing with market disorder in a pandemic is not that. But, rather more controversially, I do suggest that fear of fiscal dominance may make central bank governors not that objective when discussing fiscal policy.

So why does the media hype up some short run disorder in markets to be something it isn’t? Perhaps it all goes back to mediamacro’s view that government deficits are bad, whatever the causes. (I stress here that not every journalist thinks like mediamacro.) We have seen huge increases in these deficits as a result of the pandemic, which some in the media have written up with horror rather than as only to be expected. So maybe the media is looking for the markets to validate their view. I would be interested in what media folk think about why his interview was written up the way it was.

Some myths about government debt and how it is financed

That the Bank of England was temporarily eliminating the limit on the Ways and Means Facility caused a bit of a stir last Thursday (9th April). It in effect meant that the Bank of England could credit the government with as much money as it needed in the current crisis. That it should cause such a stir illustrates how pervasive many of the myths are around government debt. Here are three familiar examples.

1. It doesn’t matter that we are in a developing economic crisis, like a recession or a health pandemic, we still need to worry about what is happening to government debt.
   
   This is false for any country that prints its own currency, like the UK. In a crisis you should worry about dealing with the crisis. Government debt is what allows the government to put all necessary fiscal resources into fighting the crisis. To worry about debt is like worrying that a fire engine putting out a fire is using too much water.
   
   
2. OK, but we should worry about government debt the moment output stops falling (or in a pandemic, the moment any lock down is relaxed).
   
   Again false. This was the mistake that some large economies made after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). By worrying about debt they either slowed down, killed or reversed the recovery. Because governments can get the Bank of England to buy its debt (or continue to create money), there is no need to worry about debt until the economy has fully recovered from the crisis. This will be equally true in any recovery from the pandemic.
   
   
3. When the government starts financing its deficit by printing money rather than issuing debt, rampant inflation is just around the corner.
   
   

Many thought this after the GFC, when central banks started buying government debt through their Quantitative Easing programme, because they bought the debt by creating money. Subsequent events have shown that those who thought inflation was inevitable were completely wrong, as many of us said at the time. The reason they were wrong is because interest rates are at their lower bound, and at the lower bound it does not matter too much how the government deficit is financed. The reason is intuitive: when rates are zero, you are indifferent between cash and short term debt. So why would issuing money rather than debt cause inflation when rates are zero? No reason at all.

Which brings us to the Ways and Means Facility. In practice this lifting of the limit is likely to be simple cash flow management, with the government still issuing debt at the end of the day. But the Bank of England will keep buying debt as part of their new QE scheme. Ironically it is possible that we may get some inflation this time round, but it will have nothing to do with QE, and everything to do with some sectors not hit by the pandemic taking advantage of high demand, or sectors still functioning but with some labour shortages passing on higher costs. The Bank of England is likely to ignore that inflation if it happens.

Why does the government prefer to issue debt rather than create money to cover its deficits? After all, doing so costs it money. Even when short term interest rates are zero, interest rates on long term government debt are higher, to compensate for having the money locked up or the capital risk in selling it earlier. To say that financing deficits by money creation creates inflation is too trite, because it appeals to a simple linkage between prices and central bank created money that we just noted fails to happen in recessions.

A better answer is the one Keynes gave. In a recession you can create a lot of money, because it is willingly held by nervous banks and investors. But outside a recession investors and banks will want to get rid of that money, which will force down rates of interest in the economy, encouraging too much borrowing and discouraging savings. That excess demand will create inflation. Central banks are only able to control the general level of interest rates in the economy by restricting the amount of money they create, which is why government deficits are largely financed by issuing debt.

If we shouldn’t worry about government debt during crises, or as crises are coming to an end, should we worry about it at all? It is a good question, which can only be answered by looking at why having high levels of government debt might be bad. So let’s look at three myths or misunderstandings about government debt.

1. High debt risks financing crises.
   
   The general view at the moment is that there is a shortage of safe assets in the world, and the clearest evidence for that is low interest rates on government debt. As to short term market panics, we have seen that for a country that prints its own currency that is not a concern.
   
   
2. It is a burden on future generations
   
   

The idea here is that any debt has to be serviced (the interest has to be paid), and this can only be done by raising taxes. But the level of debt interest depends on interest rates as well, so when these are low, debt can be higher with the same ‘burden’. The other thing to be said (which should be obvious but is often missed) is that failing to stimulate in a recession can cause lasting damage to future generations. As can not dealing with climate change.

The same point applies to the idea that higher taxes to service debt discourages labour supply. When interest rates are very low, the impact of debt service on taxes is also low. There is a common error often made here. People note that the amount of money required for debt service could build many new hospitals, so let’s reduce debt to get more hospitals. But getting debt down to zero would require severe fiscal consolidation for decades before that goal was achieved.

3. It crowds out investment
   
   

This is an obvious mistake during an era of low real interest rates. Government debt crowds out private capital in OLG models by raising interest rates. So if interest rates are low enough to finance any decent investment, there can be no harmful crowding out.

To sum up, in an era of very low interest rates government debt can safely be much higher.The case for reducing the debt to GDP ratio from what it ends up being after the pandemic is over has to be made, and that case needs to take account of what causes real interest rates to be so low (secular stagnation) as well as the literature on safe asset shortages. In particular, as Olivier Blanchard has emphasised, if real interest rates on government debt are less than the growth rate, positive shocks to debt caused by recessions will gradually unwind of their own accord.

I have, however, to end with one final myth. This is

Deficits don’t matter as long as they don’t create excess inflation.

This is just not true when independent central banks (ICBs) control interest rates, because central banks will vary interest rates to control inflation. ICBs have been very successful at bringing inflation right down to low levels, which is why no government or opposition is going to abandon them anytime soon. In that situation, deficits that are too large or small will lead to changes in interest rates rather than inflation. (ICB’s are not so good at preventing recessions when inflation is low, which is why we need a state dependent assignment.)

Once recessions, caused by whatever means, are over then it makes sense to have targets for the government deficit (excluding investment) as a share of GDP. What that target should be will depend on a view of what the ideal debt to GDP ratio should be. (For more detail see here.) These targets are there not because high deficits will be the end of the world - far from it. Instead they are a disciplining device for governments. In the past it was thought they were needed to stop left wing governments spending too much, but in the UK and US the more likely problem is of right wing governments taxing too little.

Which brings us to why so many people think government debt and deficits are much more important than they actually are. In the past spurious concern about deficits has been seen by many to be an essential way of keeping a lid on government spending when a left wing government is in power, or even as a way to shrink the state when a right wing government is in power. It is ironic that in a era when there is an imperative to reduce climate change, the importance of deficit targets may be to stop right wing governments cutting taxes.  

Different kinds of fiscal stimulus

Newspaper day. In the Guardian I have a piece that looks at how we should regard any tax cuts that Boris Johnson may announce as part of the forthcoming election. And make no mistake tax cuts are coming (we already know they intend to cut the tax on petrol), because the spending review signalled that the governments rule will change, as Chris Giles discusses in a good article in today’s FT in which I among other economists are quoted. .

In the Guardian piece I argue that tax cuts are a bad idea because in the context of us leaving the EU they will almost certainly produce unsustainable increases in the deficit without much of a compensation in higher output. As I say in the Giles FT article, policies that if unchanged would lead to steady and permanent increases in debt to GDP are not a good idea. That in turn will mean that at some stage either taxes will have to rise or we will be back to austerity.

But why did I also imply that Wednesday’s spending review was to be welcomed? Are not spending increases and tax cuts not two sides of the same fiscal stimulus coin? There is the obvious point that in many areas public spending cuts have gone way too far. But there is a macroeconomic point as well. Spending increases directly raise aggregate demand by the same amount. Things like income tax cuts, particularly if they go to the better off, are largely saved. (A number of around a third is commonly found in empirically studies for the amount actually spent.) So you get less demand stimulus for your money.

According to calculations done in a separate article by the Financial Times, Labour’s likely plans will also raise the ratio of debt to GDP. But if you look beyond the ‘scare’ headline, the reasons are quite different. Labour will still meet its fiscal rule for current spending, but the amount of investment planned could lead to the ‘falling debt to trend GDP’ part of the rule being breached. These calculations need to be taken with a pinch of salt, because they assume the additional investment produces no increase in GDP, and therefore no higher tax take. Even the IFS when they evaluated Labour’s election plans in 2017 allowed additional public investment to boost GDP. Which is just one reason why the FT’s analysis annoyed the large number of economists, including me, who signed this letter published in the FT today.

I didn’t like the FT write up for another reason. It seemed to be designed simply to be one more fiscal scare story. If I had been writing this I would have asked whether, if the policy did in fact break the debt to trend GDP part of the rule because of more public investment, that part of the rule made sense. A company increasing investment would happily increase its debt to sales ratio if it did a lot of investment, as would an individual increase their debt to income ratio when buying a house. Perhaps that part of Labour’s fiscal rule is a hangover from the days when mediamacro thought government borrowing was a bad thing, even when it was additional investment?

That is the key difference between Labour and the Conservative policies. If the debt to GDP ratio rises because of supposedly permanent tax cuts, that leads to steadily increasing debt to GDP and so cannot be sustained. Running public investment at high levels because you are restoring the public capital stock and as part of a Green New Deal may be prolonged but it is not permanent, and temporary increases in debt to GDP to finance investment make sense.

How to pay for the Green New Deal

The Green New Deal has recently been promoted by a group of Democrats including the inspirational Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. I first came across it in a report in 2008 by the Green New Deal group, most of whom are pictured above a decade later (HT Andrew Simms). The view that we face a potentially existential climate change crisis, which politicians seem currently reluctant to sufficiently tackle, and which therefore requires a government led programme on the scale in each country of Roosevelt’s New Deal, is something I share.

Why a New Deal? What is wrong with treating climate change as we would any other kind of pollution, with a mixture of regulations, taxes and subsidies? I think the answer is put rather well at the end of an article in the Economist (HT Laurie Macfarlane) which seemingly complains about the Green New Deal’s departure from what it calls ‘economic orthodoxy’. They write

“In fact, the criticism of the economic approach to climate change implicit in the Green New Deal is not that it is flawed or politically unrealistic, but that it is a category error, like trying to defeat Hitler with a fascism tax.”

I would put it in the following way. Tackling climate change is resisted by powerful political forces that have in the past prevented the appropriate taxes, subsidies and regulations being applied. Which is a major reason why the world has failed to do enough to mitigate climate change despite decades of warnings from scientists. You need something like a Green New Deal to push aside those vested interests, and get the right taxes, subsidies and regulations into place. Just as proponents of a Green New Deal are savvy about the need to overcome the resistance of, for example, the oil and gas industry, they also realise that the Green New Deal needs to be politically popular. So the New Deal package has to include current benefits for the many, perhaps at the expense of the few.

What the most effective measures are to mitigate climate change, and perhaps other global environmental disasters, is a fascinating topic. We can learn a lot from the successes so far. Solar energy is now at least as cheap as coal, oil and gas, but this was not always so. It required substantial subsidies or state help for initial development, despite protests that solar energy would always be too expensive. Once a technology is widely used it tends to get cheaper to produce because innovations continue when a mass market emerges, and that is what happened with solar energy. It is impossible to pick winners in advance, so we need to try a number of things some of which will fail. Partly because of those failures a great deal of the required research and development must come from the public sector. No stone must be left unturned when the future of humanity is at stake.

Which all sounds rather expensive, and in particular will require large amounts of public money. An interesting and important issue is how this should be paid for. In the scheme proposed by among others Thomas Piketty, higher taxes on multinationals, millionaires and carbon emissions generate funds to tackle poverty, migration, and climate change. Others have suggested that this spending is better funded by borrowing or creating money. To examine who is right, I want to talk about some of the work of John Broome, an Oxford philosopher and economist.

John Broome was a key advisor to the Stern review on climate change. He argued, and Stern agreed, that we should not discount the welfare of future generations as much as market interest rates appear to do. The reason is ethical: the current generation had no justification for valuing the welfare of the unborn less than their own welfare. This helped Stern to recommend much more current action on climate change than other US based analysis. As Broome emphasised, the key argument here was ethical not economic.

In terms of the funding debate, ethical arguments are also critical. The polluter pays principle suggests that the current generation should pay to mitigate the impact of the pollution they cause. So we should all be paying more for energy, for example, so that the carbon used to produce that energy is priced to reflect its impact on climate change. The idea that the polluter should pay makes economic and ethical sense. It embodies an idea of fairness that most people would accept.

Unfortunately this does not work well enough in practice because those with an interest in selling more carbon and their political allies make people doubt that climate change is real. In addition the connections between the prices people pay and the emissions that cause climate change are often not transparent. So how do you deal with societies that for these reasons fail to pay enough to mitigate climate change?

The argument that Broome put forward (following work by Duncan Foley) is that measures to tackle climate change can be funded by issuing debt. This breaks the polluter pays principle, but it can still lead everyone to be better off (what economists call a Pareto improvement). If government debt rather than taxes are increased to pay for, for example, investment in greener infrastructure the current generation gets away with not having to pay. If future generations have to pay back the debt used to pay for these measures, that cost falls on them, but it is more than matched by the benefits to them because of the climate change avoided as a result. In other words if you cannot make the polluter pay, it is still better to take action to stop climate change even if future generations have to pay the cost of that action.

The case for using government debt to fund the Green New Deal has been strengthened by recent observations by Olivier Blanchard. He noted that interest rates on government debt have over the last half century been below the growth rate of GDP. What this means is that a one-off increase in debt may not require higher tax rates in the future, because that debt as a share of GDP will gradually shrink.

If both these reasons for using debt finance to partially pay for the Green New Deal fail to convince, just think of it this way. No one in a 100 years time who suffers the catastrophic and (for them) irreversible impact of climate change is going to console themselves that at least they did not increase the national debt. Humanity will not come to an end if we double debt to GDP ratios, but it could come to an end if we fail to combat climate change.

All this means that the question of how a measure is financed should never prevent that measure being implemented if it has a reasonable chance of reducing climate change. The whole point of the Green New Deal is that measures should be judged on how effective they will be at achieving their goal, and not on whether they can be afforded. Funding through taxes should be the first option because the polluter should pay, but if this is not politically possible then government debt should increase.

What are the chances of either of the two main political parties implementing a Green New Deal in the UK? It is hard to see a Tory government doing so because of its aversion to debt finance, its neoliberal reluctance to have government lead the way, and because the party contains many climate change deniers. The Labour party is much better placed, and has already set out plans to create its own Green New Deal. Crucially their fiscal credibility rule makes the distinction between current spending that does need to be covered by taxes in the medium term and investment spending that does not, because future generations benefit from that investment. The Green New Deal is all about investing now to improve the welfare of future generations.

Should we worry about temporarily raising government debt? - Blanchard’s AEA Address

This post not about the main part of this address, although as its my area and interesting I may write about it later. Instead I’m going to talk in a non-technical way about its premise, because that alone has implications that may be well known among economists but not elsewhere. The following is based on his presentation.

Should governments worry about temporarily paying for things by borrowing? One standard answer is yes, because although nothing obliges government to pay off this extra debt (it can be rolled over), it has to pay interest on that debt which requires higher taxes. If the government didn’t raise taxes to pay the interest on the debt, but instead just borrowed more to pay the interest, you would enter what is sometimes called a debt interest spiral, where debt goes up and up and eventually explodes.

But does a slow explosion in debt matter if the economy is also growing? A government (like a firm of individual) should look at debt as a ratio to its ability to pay, and the easiest way to do that is to look at the debt to GDP ratio. A company would not worry about increasing debt if its profits were rising even faster. For a given stock of debt, its growth rate is given by the rate of interest on the debt. So GDP rises faster than debt if its nominal growth rate (real growth plus inflation) is greater than the rate of interest on that debt. In shorthand, g > r.

Typically economists like me tend to assume that this is not true, and instead r > g. But the starting point for Blanchard’s lecture is that currently, and on average in the past, g > r. There has been only one decade since the 1950s when this hasn’t been true, and that is the 1980s when governments were pushing up interest rates to bring inflation down. Most of the time g > r. So the fact that g > r today may be the rule and not an exception.

Why do economists typically assume r > g when the opposite has generally been true? One answer is called financial repression, which is a label given to attempts by governments in the past to keep interest rates ‘artificially low’ in conjunction with various credit controls. The idea was that in a financially liberalised world where interest rates are used by central banks to target inflation there will be no financial repression, and real interest rates will be higher. So it made sense, the argument went, to assume r > g from now on even though g > r in the past. However what economists call secular stagnation suggests that the average interest rate required to keep inflation constant has actually been steadily falling, so Blanchard’s findings become relevant again. There is plenty of scope here for more research and debate.

So if normally g > r, does this mean we do not need to worry about debt? Not quite. What it means is that one of the standard objections to raising debt, which is that taxes will have to rise to pay the interest, no longer holds if g > r. If g > r the government can borrow to pay the interest, and yet the debt to GDP ratio will still gradually decline, because the economy is growing faster than debt. The objection to raising debt that taxes will have to rise in the future to pay for it disappears. Indeed the whole ‘burden on future generations’ objection to raising debt falls away, because the debt to GDP ratio declines by itself: there is no future burden.

An important proviso, however, is that we are talking about one-off increases in debt. Such one off increases would include, for example, increases in debt to build new public infrastructure or increases in debt caused by fiscal expansions to fight a recession. g>r does not mean we do not need to worry about persistent primary deficits (by which I mean spending permanently higher than taxes). A persistent primary deficit will add to the growth in debt, so the debt to GDP ratio will rise despite g > r.

This is just the starting point for Blanchard’s lecture, and if you are an economist I recommend watching it as it is very easy to follow. In policy terms I think it is the last nail in the coffin of what Paul Krugman calls the deficit scolds. Those who argued for austerity because of the burden on future generation, although on weak ground even if r > g, find their argument collapses if g > r. [1]

[1] Blanchard shows this remains true even if there are periodic shocks where r > g, as long as on average g > r.

Why should someone who is anti-austerity care about debt

Most of the posts I have written about austerity have been aimed at countering the idea that in a recession you need to bring down government deficits and therefore debt. But what if you accept all that (you are anti-austerity). Why should you care about debt at all? Why do we have fiscal rules based on deficits? Why not spend what the government needs to spend, and not worry that this resulted in a larger budget deficit?

The story often given is that the markets will impose some limit on what the government will be able to borrow, because if debt gets ‘too high’ in relation to GDP markets will start demanding a higher return. You can see why that argument is problematic by asking why interest rates on government debt would need to be higher. The most obvious reason is default risk. But for a country that can create its own currency there is never any necessity to default.

However there is another reason to demand a higher nominal interest rate on debt, and that is if you think there will be additional inflation in the country. Spending more without raising taxes will tends to increase inflation. But if the government or central bank is sure to raise interest rates to offset this inflationary pressure then the concern about inflation disappears.

In MMT inflation is also the fundamental constraint on how far you can raise spending without raising taxes. MMT also says that you do not need to worry about the deficit, but this is only true if - as they advocate - fiscal policy rather than monetary policy controls demand and inflation. Under MMT the link between the deficit and inflation is direct (assuming no change in the composition of either) .

When inflation is controlled using interest rates the situation is fundamentally different. There is now no single point at which the deficit is consistent with stable inflation. In the short term there are a whole range of interest rate/deficit combinations that keep inflation stable today (e.g. high deficit and high interest rates or low deficit and low interest rate). Does this mean we do not need to worry about the deficit and the debt it leads to because monetary policy will always take care of inflation?

The answer is no, if we think about dynamics. What happens if we choose a high deficit high interest rate combination because we want higher government spending without paying more in taxes? There are two important dynamic effects here. The most basic is that a high deficit raises the stock of government debt. Because of interest rate payments on that debt the deficit rises further. In addition raising interest rates to stop inflation will itself tend to raise debt interest payments. This is an unstable debt interest spiral. You cannot say why not fund the additional debt interest payments by creating money, because that will tend to reduce interest rates and raise inflation.

This means that over the longer term you have to adjust spending and taxes to keep government debt relative to GDP stable, That does not mean debt has to be stabilised at a particular level, but just that if there is not a compelling reason to do otherwise you need to keep debt stable rather than rising upwards. A recession is one such compelling reason, and there are others (like adding to the public sectors stock of assets).

Stability does not mean deficits have to be zero because we have to allow for the growth in GDP. The maths is simple (see [1]). Take the stock of debt to GDP as a fraction of GDP (say 0.8), multiply by the trend rate of growth of nominal GDP as a fraction (say 0.04), and you approximately have what the total deficit should be as a fraction of GDP to keep debt stable (0.032), which is a deficit of 3.2% of GDP. .

There is always the temptation for politicians to raise debt now, and let future governments stabilise debt at a higher level. In the past the US under Republicans and other countries (but not the UK) tended to let this happen in the 30 years before the GFC, and economists call it deficit bias. Fiscal rules began life because it was hoped they would reduce deficit bias.

So why not raise the level of debt by spending more for a period, and then stabilise it by cutting spending or raising taxes a generation later? Here we have to note that the stabilising deficit (the deficit that keeps debt to GDP stable) includes debt interest payment. What we call the primary deficit is the total deficit less interest payments, You should now be able to see the problem with allowing debt to increase and stabilising it later. If you raise the level of debt to GDP and then stabilise it, debt interest payments will be higher and the level of the primary deficit left over is smaller than the one you started with. This is one sense in which letting debt rise today takes from future generations. [2]

This is why it is never a good idea to increase the stock of government debt without good reason, as Trump is doing, because it either cuts spending or raises taxes in the long run. This logic does not mean that future GDP is any lower (although there may be other theoretical reasons why higher debt can reduce output), but it means that if debt to GDP is stabilised, debt interest rates will be higher and so something else has to adjust to compensate, which means higher taxes or lower spending. [3]

There is an important caveat to this dynamic, which becomes clear if you do the maths. You only get a debt interest spiral if the nominal interest rate exceeds the growth rate of GDP (call the difference between the two the ‘very real interest rate’). If the very real interest rate is negative, extra debt for a given deficit allows a higher primary balance. Journalists sometimes look at the level of debt interest as a share of GDP (currently 2% in the UK) and say government spending could be 2% of GDP higher (or taxes lower) if we didn’t have to pay interest on debt. But if you could somehow magic your debt to zero so debt interest rates were zero, the stabilising deficit would fall from a current level around 3% to 0, requiring a 3% fall in the primary balance. This reflects that the current very real interest rate is negative.

Does this mean we do not have to worry about the debt interest rate spiral, and therefore debt? Only if we know that the very real interest rate will stay negative. This is unlikely to happen, particularly if interest rates are having to rise to combat the inflationary effects of high deficits. Because debt levels should never be adjusted down quickly, it is best to act as if the very real interest rate will become positive at some point.

This is not the only reason why raising government debt to GDP in the long run can be detrimental, but this one is simple because it depends only on some basic economics, algebra and logic. This and other reasons will never be enough to justify cutting deficits in recessions, not even close. But being anti-austerity does not mean we can forget about debt completely, as long as we are using interest rates rather than fiscal policy to control demand. (On why you might want to do that see here.)

[1] G is government spending, T taxes, r is the nominal interest rate, and B the stock of debt. Little letters mean as a ratio of nominal GDP (Y). x is the growth rate of nominal GDP, delta means change in. We ignore money for reasons given in the text. The budget identity is

G - T + rB = deficit = delta B

So dividing by GDP gives

g - t + rb = deficit/Y

In continuous time (or approximately otherwise) we can write

deficit/Y = delta b + xb

So for delta b to be zero, deficit/Y = xb

Or equivalently g - t + (r-x)b = 0

[2] More strictly in this case it takes from future generations the benefits of public spending or adds to the cost of taxes, and transfers it to bond holders.

Government debt phobias, and possible cures

After my Thursday post and New Statesman piece, I had a lot of comments that said something along the lines of: I see what you are saying, but we really cannot afford more government debt in this country. This is perhaps not surprising. After seven or more years of a constant stream of politicians and media folk talking about the UK maxing out its credit card, many people just feel it in their bones that the UK government has a serious debt problem. (It isn’t just the UK: here is a compilation from the US.)

How do we undo 7+ years of conditioning? It depends in part on what the fear is. Here are five

1. The country will go bankrupt
   
   
2. When will the debt be paid off?
   
   
3. Money could go on something more useful than paying interest
   
   
4. Why should my taxes be higher just to pay interest on debt?
   
   
5. What about the ‘burden’ on the children?
   

1. The country will go bankrupt

A simple truth, which you will not hear in the media, is that in an economy with a flexible exchange rate and its own central bank like the UK, the government can never be forced to go bankrupt, because the central bank can buy the government’s debt.

That of course is exactly what has been happening across the globe - not because central banks were trying to avoid the government going bankrupt, but because these banks were trying to keep long term interest rates low using Quantitative Easing (creating money). For example the Bank of England owns about a quarter of UK government debt (source). That meant that, at the slightest hint that the private sector might not have wanted to buy government debt, the central bank would have done so as part of its policy to control inflation.

At the end of the day, the central bank is a part of government, and so will always buy the debt of the government if necessary. That is why the government cannot be forced into bankruptcy. Could high and rising debt lead to inflation getting out of control? Yes, as Zimbabwe shows. When inflation is well above target and the central bank is creating a ton of money we can worry about that. When inflation is low and close to the target it would be daft to worry about this possibility.

2. When will the debt be paid off?

Here you should just stop thinking about government debt as being like personal debt. One reason it is different is that while a person dies, the country and therefore its government never do. Suppose you lived forever. Would you worry about paying your debt off?

What you should do is two things. First, use debt to spread the costs of investment over a large number of years. Many people are familiar with this, because they take out a mortgage to buy a house or a loan to buy a car. Second, use debt to smooth out fluctuations in your income. So in bad times let debt run up, but be sure to run it down in good times. Governments are exactly the same. For that reason they never have to pay all that debt back, but the ratio of debt to GDP should rise in bad times and fall in good times.

What level of debt to GDP should governments be aiming for in the very long run? This is a very good and interesting question, but to answer it you will probably have to become an economist, because it remains an unanswered question in macroeconomics.

3. All this debt interest could go on something more useful, like paying nurses more.

This was the fallacy I tried to deal with in my New Statesman piece, but here is another way of squashing this fallacy. We cannot just stop paying interest on debt, because that would involve the government defaulting on its debt. So the only way we can replace debt interest with spending more on nurses pay is to pay off all government debt. To do that, we would either have to raise taxes or spend less, and spending less means paying nurses less. It would also likely take about 30 years if you didn’t want a revolution. So 30 years of lower nurses pay just to get, after 30 years, higher nurses pay.

That does not make the idea wrong. But it does make it look rather less attractive than the impossible idea of swapping debt interest with something more useful tomorrow.

4. Why should my taxes go up just to pay interest on government debt

To help answer this question, we need to ask who gets these interest payments? For reasons we have already noted, a quarter of these interest payments go to the Bank of England as a result of its Quantitative Easing programme. The Bank then returns these interest payments to the government. In other words, on a quarter of UK government debt the government pays itself. [1]

Half of UK government debt is owned by the UK private sector. The majority of this is insurance or pension funds. In other words, the interest on government debt is in part helping to pay for your pension. And if by some magic that government debt was not there for your pension fund to buy, that fund would be forced to invest instead in some other, less desirable asset. If you are in the UK and have some money saved in the form of national savings, that is government debt too. The interest of this debt goes to you.

The key takeaway from this is that government debt is always someone else’s asset. If you think that you will end up paying more taxes to pay this debt interest than you will get back in pension payments or whatever, then debt is a distributional issue. You are complaining that you pay taxes (a small amount of which goes on debt interest payments) but you do not have enough wealth to buy government debt and receive these payments. That is a legitimate complaint, but it is part of a general complaint about how income and wealth is distributed, and not something unique to government debt.

And there is this point. If you think you want to reduce government debt because you are paying higher taxes and none of that is coming back to you or your pension, how do you think the government is going to reduce its debt? By raising your taxes of course.

So we come to the quarter of UK government debt where the taxes you pay that are then paid by the government as debt interest end up overseas. Surely that bit of debt interest is wasted, because it is going to someone overseas rather than someone here. But think about this. Suppose all government debt was owned domestically, and then some pension fund decided they would be better off by swapping their government debt with an overseas asset. Is that pension fund worse off? No, it is better off if its calculations are right. No one anywhere else in the UK is worse off because some government interest is now being paid overseas? If lots of people in the UK decide to do the same it still will not matter. It must therefore be true that selling debt to people overseas, whether directly or indirectly, makes no difference. Your concern is still a distributional issue.

To make this point another way, it would be possible to arrange the distribution of government debt such that everyone who paid higher taxes to cover debt interest received that debt interest back as a return, directly or indirectly via pensions, to their wealth. In that sense, the government paying interest on its debt is just like paying ourselves. To the extent that this isn’t true for you personally is a distributional issue. [2]

5. What about the children?

It is theoretically possible for the current generation’s government to go on a huge spending and tax cutting binge and leave the tab to be paid for by future generations. But that is not what has happened over the last ten years. Debt went up because we had a massive recession, and government deficits help cushion the impact of recessions. Should the government have stopped teaching children to avoid the deficit rising? Of course not, because that would have hurt future generations. Should the government have cut welfare payments to the unemployed to stop debt rising. Again we have good evidence that has a scarring effect on children. Should the government have embarked on an austerity programme that reduced public investment making future generations worse off. It should not.

Trying to cut the deficit by cutting public investment, or government spending that has long lasting effects like education or health, because you are worried about the burden of debt on future generations is, quite simply, idiotic. You are hurting the people you say you want to help.

Does this mean I should never worry about government debt?

In today’s economy, it is quite wrong to say government debt does not matter at all. There is a kind of simple golden rule here. When times are good, the government should be reducing its debt: debt to GDP ratios should be falling. How do you know when times are good? Not by asking politicians, obviously. One reliable sign that times are good is if interest rates are well above their floor. When interest rates are this high, cutting them can completely cushion the negative demand effects of fiscal consolidation (i.e. reducing the deficit). For this reason, austerity - fiscal consolidation in bad times - is completely unnecessary for economies like the UK.

For MMT readers

Before you start writing comments, a simple point. In an MMT world, where fiscal policy rather than monetary policy stabilises inflation, you would never worry about government debt or deficits beyond their impact on inflation. If you like that kind of world, then say that is how governments should be controlling inflation. But as it is, outwith the zero lower bound, governments are using interest rates to do this job. So to tell people not to worry about debt without mentioning the controlling inflation part is just confusing, to say the least.

Summary

We can sum all this up as follows. It makes perfect sense in many situations for the government to increase its debt. Investing when interest rates are very low is one of those situations, a recession is another. Those who tell you government debt should be reduced in all situation at whatever the cost should be ignored, because they are either fools or they have a hidden motive.

It also makes sense for governments to reduce their debt in good times, when interest rates are higher than they are now. [3] But in a economically advanced democracy the reasons why ever rising debt (often called deficit bias) is a problem are to do with economicky things like disincentive effects, and not because it will mean we are all doomed. You should not be frightened about allowing debt to rise when the situation demands it.

[1] Why is the debt held by the central bank counted as debt? One answer is that one day the Bank might sell it to the private sector, so it is a potential liability. But central banks may just let this debt run to term, so it will never be a liability. An alternative theory is that government debt owned by the central banks is kept in the figures to make them look more scary.

[2] Of course no one knows if their taxes are paying this debt interest or not. Even if we are paying ourselves, there is still a problem, which is that these taxes are not lump sum, so they involve a disincentive effect. This is a valid reason for wanting to keep government debt low, but it is not the reason most people worry about.

[3] How about now in the US? Should we worry about the Republican tax bill because it will increase the deficit? As interest rates are off their lower bound and rising, I would say we should, particularly as those who get most of the tax cuts are unlikely to spend them. But we should worry about it a lot more because it is a transfer from most people to a plutocratic elite.      

Japan and the burden of government debt

I don’t write enough about Japan, and now that some of my posts are very kindly being translated into Japanese I should try to remedy that. In fact there is currently a very good reason to write about the Japanese economy, and that is a very strong 2017 Q2 performance. Annualised growth was 4%, compared to 1.2% in the UK. What is particularly heartening about recent Japanese growth is that it is led by domestic demand rather than trade. In the past Japan seemed to have the opposite of the UK’s problem: growth was often led by trade, while domestic demand was weak.

This recent growth is not just making up for poor past performance compared to other countries. Comparisons of GDP growth are misleading for Japan because (unlike the UK and US) it has relatively little inward migration, so it is better to use GDP per head for such comparisons. (As Noah Smith points out, even this my bias comparisons against Japan because its population is aging.) Between 2006 and 2016, Japan increased GDP per head by a total of about 5.5%, compared to around 5% in the US and about 3% for the UK. Good compared to other countries, but all these countries should have had stronger recoveries from the recession.

Strong growth is good news because inflation is so low (around 0.5%): way below the 2% inflation target. The government is trying to stimulate growth using a modest fiscal stimulus and large scale quantitative easing (short and long interest rates are exactly zero) as well as implementing various structural reforms. But the striking thing about all this is that their net government debt to GDP ratio is 125% and rising (OECD Economic Outlook measure). This is higher than any other OECD country except Greece and Italy.

Does the conjunction of relatively strong growth and high government debt confound economic theory, as Bill Mitchell suggests? Like high powered money and inflation, any relationship between government debt and growth just does not work when interest rates are stuck at zero. High government debt could crowd out private investment (although some dispute this), but not when real long term rates are zero and inflation is near zero. Servicing high debt could discourage labour supply, but again not when interest rates are zero. Nor is debt a burden on future generations when the real rate of interest is well below the growth rate.

Of course most people think such high debt levels are a real concern because of ‘the markets’. But the markets will only stop buying this debt if they expect default or rampant inflation, and there is no way a government with its own currency can be forced to default. There is also no way it will choose to default with interest rates so low. This is the basic truth that our leaders in the UK choose not to tell us (and pretend otherwise).

But what happens when growth finally raises inflation, and interest rates rise. Will debt not be a problem then? Maybe, but only in the long term, so the government will have plenty of time to fix that roof when the sun shines. [1] Right now Japan does worry about its high levels of government debt, but it rightly worries about the combination of low growth and low inflation much more. In that sense it sets a good example to other countries.

[1] Fixing the roof while the sun shines is one of the Cameron/Osborne little homilies I approve of. The problem when they used it was the UK economy was actually in pretty poor shape, as we could tell because interest rates were so low.    

Whatever happened to the government debt doom spiral

A number of people, including the occasional economic journalist, are puzzled about why government debt at 90% of GDP seemed to cause our new Chancellor and the markets so little concern when his predecessor saw it as a portent of impending doom. I always argued that this aspect of austerity had a sell by date, so let me try to explain what is going on.

The 90% figure comes from a piece of empirical work which has been thoroughly examined, and found to be highly problematic. (Others have used rather more emphatic language.) Part of the problem is a lack of basic thinking. Why should the markets worry about buying government debt, beyond the normal assessment of relative returns. The answer is that they worry about not getting their money back because the government defaults.

If a government cannot create the currency that it borrows in, then the risk of default is very real. Typically a large amount of debt will periodically be rolled over (new debt sold to replace debt that is due to be paid back). If that debt cannot be rolled over, then the government will probably be forced to default. Knowing that, potential lenders will worry that other potential lenders will not lend, allowing self fulfilling beliefs to cause default even if the public finances are pretty sound.

The situation is completely different for governments that can create the currency that the debt they sell is denominated in. They will never be forced to default, because they can always pay back debt due with created money. That in turn means that lenders do not need to worry about forced defaults, or what other lenders may think, so this kind of self fulfilling default will not happen.

Of course a government can still choose to default. It may do so if the political costs of raising taxes or cutting spending is greater than the cost of defaulting. But for advanced economies there is an easier option if the burden of the public finances gets too much, which is to start monetising debt. That is what Japan may end up doing, and what others may also do if QE turns out to be permanent. But this is a very different type of concern than the threat of default. And it does not, in the current environment, lead to the emergence of large default premiums and market panics.

How can I be so sure? Because with QE we have had actual money creation, and it has not worried the markets at all. It seems hard to tell a story where markets panic today about the possibility of monetisation in the future, but are quite sanguine about actual monetisation today.

So for economies that issue debt in currency they can create, there is no obvious upper limit anywhere near to current debt/GDP ratios when economies are depressed and inflation is low. Japan shows us that, and we must stop treating Japan as some special case that has no lessons for the rest of us. (How often did we hear of their lost decade in the 1990s that it couldn’t happen anywhere else.)

It was good that the IFS suggested Hammond has a look at Labour’s fiscal rule. As I explained in this post, Hammond’s new ‘rule’ is pretty worthless. But one key part of Labour’s rule that keeps being ignored but is crucial in today's environment is the knockout if interest rates hit their zero lower bound. It is for the reasons described above that this knockout is there and is perfectly safe: when interest rate policy fails you can completely and safely forget the deficit and debt and use fiscal policy to ensure the recovery. It is the basic macro lesson of the last 6 years that is fairly well understood among academic economists but still remains to be learnt by most people who talk about these things. Whether senior economists in the UK Treasury need to learn it or just keep quiet about it for other reasons I do not know.