Deflation, inflation, oil prices and asymmetries

When both headline and core inflation rose above target after the financial crisis, helped by rising oil prices, the Fed and Bank of England kept their nerve and did not raise interest rates. They saw through what was a temporary episode. The ECB’s judgement was not as good. Even in the UK it was close, with three out of nine MPC members voting for a rate increase for a few months. But it was the outcome that mattered - excess inflation was ignored because it was temporary. To what extent is what we are seeing right now just the mirror image of this period?

In terms of where inflation is and the monetary policy response, the situation today does indeed look like a mirror image. Headline inflation is or is about to be negative, and core inflation has fallen below target. As Tim Duy points out for the US, core inflation seems to be heading lower rather than returning to target. However I think that is where the symmetry ends. While the dangers of letting inflation rise above target because of temporary shocks are small, the dangers in the opposite direction are more serious. 

One of the arguments used by the inflation hawks when oil prices were high is that even if the impact of higher oil prices on inflation was itself temporary, there was a danger that inflation expectations would increase, and the central bank would lose its anti-inflation credibility. My response at the time was three-fold: first, the private sector can see the reason that rates are not being raised (the continuing recession), so credibility should not be in danger; second, the best indication that the expectations that matter have shifted is when nominal wage inflation starts to pick up (which it did not), and third when that happens it will be easy to restore credibility and reduce expectations by raising rates. [1]

None of these arguments apply with deflation today. Then unemployment was clearly too high. Today unemployment is not clearly too low. How far we are from the natural rate is unclear, but no one would argue that we are in a boom that is the mirror image of the recession a few years ago. The second argument is that we could use changes in nominal wages as a clear indicator that the inflation expectations that mattered had shifted. That argument is not symmetrical because of the well known resistance to nominal wage cuts. Finally if credibility does seem about to be lost, the central bank will find it very difficult to take action to restore it because of the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB).

Please allow me to get technical for just one paragraph, which can be safely skipped. As has often been pointed out, the ZLB means that there are two steady states in the economy associated with a given real interest rate: the ‘intended’ equilibrium with target inflation, and the ‘ZLB equilibrium’ when inflation is negative. I recently discussed a paper that treated agents views about which equilibrium was appropriate as a ‘belief’ and that perhaps the liquidity trap could be a manifestation that agents believed we were heading for the ZLB steady state. The controversial aspect of this analysis is the suggestion that this belief could be shifted by the monetary authorities raising rates. I find that very unconvincing, but it would be a mistake to dismiss the exercise completely on that account. In that post I did suggest an alternative rationalisation for why we might be heading for the ZLB equilibrium: agents no longer believed that the monetary authority had the means to stop it happening.

This last asymmetry is the one that troubles me the most, and why I am not as relaxed as monetary policy makers appear to be about deflation. There are three interpretations of this relaxed attitude to negative headline inflation. The first is the one I suspect monetary policy makers actually hold, which is that the beneficial impact of lower prices on demand will with a year or so push inflation back to target, so there is no reason for concern. [2] I think the probability is that they are correct, but good policy does not just think about the most likely outcome, but should also be robust to risks, particularly risks with large consequences.

The second interpretation that the private sector could give for the relaxed attitude by central banks in the US and UK is that deviations above and below 2% are not treated symmetrically. In theory this should be more of a concern in the US than the UK, because in the UK asymmetry is against the central bank’s mandate. However I’m not sure the private sector thinks that is as important as MPC members do. There is one obvious additional asymmetry between now and a few years ago: many of those calling for higher rates back then are still pushing for higher rates today.

The third interpretation about why central banks are doing nothing is there is nothing they can do. Quantitative Easing seems to have come to a permanent halt either because it has stopped having a useful effect, or because policy makers fear it is having undesirable consequences. Under this interpretation the inflation target loses credibility not because the private sector no longer believes policy makers’ stated objectives, but because they no longer believe they have the means to achieve them. 

This possibility is the one that should really be worrying central banks right now. It is a scenario that is quite consistent with what is currently happening, and it puts at risk central bank credibility in a most fundamental way. Quite simply, central bank credibility is destroyed because people believe they have lost the ability (rather than the will) to do their job, and there is very little central banks can do to get it back because of the ZLB. This is what should be giving central banks nightmares. Strangely, however, they seem to be sleeping just fine.

[1] A footnote for macroeconomists: this is why I have never been convinced by Cochrane’s worries about using the inflation target as a transversality condition.

[2] Resistance to nominal wage cuts may also dampen any the deflationary path, giving time for these positive effects to come through. However resistance to nominal wage cuts does not mean the ZLB equilibrium will never occur – in the paper I discuss in this post, it is the reason why that equilibrium is associated with high unemployment.

  

Why below target inflation is a big problem

Much of the coverage of deflation seems to miss the key point. Deflation is a sign that resources are being wasted. The lower inflation is, other things being equal, the more resources are being wasted. Wasted resources are probably a bit economics speak. What it means is that society as a whole - you and I - are worse off for no reason. There are also good grounds for thinking the sums involved could be very large, dwarfing the numbers the media normally frets about. [1]

Once you look at it this way, lots of rather silly debates become clear. First and most obviously, there is nothing magic about the number zero. Other things being equal, zero inflation suggests more resources are being wasted than if inflation is 1%, but resources are still being wasted when inflation is 1% and the target is 2%.  

Economists have worried about some of the knock on effects that deflation might have. In particular, because deflation means that the real value of debts fixed in nominal terms is rising, that may induce debtors to cut back spending, with no matching increase in spending by creditors. This will make the waste of resources worse. However this effect is not a non-linear one that kicks in when inflation is zero. If this effect is important, debtors will still be more inhibited by their debt if inflation is 1% compared to 2%. And, of course, even if this effect is unimportant resources are still being wasted if inflation is below target.

This is also why looking at some measure of core inflation is important. If below target inflation is just due to lower oil prices, say, which in turn are just lower because of increased supply, say, [2] then this is no reason to think resources are being wasted. Just as inflation targeting central banks should largely see through any inflation caused by higher oil prices, they should also do the opposite. However in the UK, US and Eurozone core inflation is significantly below target, suggesting resources are being wasted everywhere.

The really interesting thing about the current situation is that in all three places nominal wages seem to be going nowhere fast. This could be partly because plenty of domestic spare capacity exists, but partly also because workers are aware of the potential employers have to use overseas labour as an alternative. In either case, the really good news that this implies is that we can allow the economy to grow at an above average rate for some time. (It also suggests that current fiscal projections may be too pessimistic.)

This is only good news if we take the opportunity it presents. We should use the monetary and fiscal tools we have at our disposal (and invent some new ones if need be) to do so. There is no magic to raising demand - we have various tried and tested means of doing so. The basic barrier to raising demand has been and always will be inflation, so when that barrier is nowhere in sight (in fact appears to be moving further away) it is a criminal waste not to expand demand.

But what of those who advocate caution. We should raise interest rates now, so as to avoid rapid increases later? I am sure some people who argue this way are genuine, but just wrong because they have not realised the implications of the position we are now in, and in particular the balance of risks involved. But I cannot also help noticing that some on the right have been arguing for higher interest rates for some time, and refuse to admit they were wrong. They are confirming Kalecki’s idea that although what he called full employment was good for society, it may not be good for some particular parts of society. Those pursuing this line should not be dismissed: they should be laughed into obscurity.   

[1] This would be clearer if all central banks had a dual mandate.

[2] Which in the current situation is probably not true, so this is just to make the point.