Winner of the New Statesman SPERI Prize in Political Economy 2016


Showing posts with label Sweden. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sweden. Show all posts

Tuesday, 30 June 2020

Why does this government get away with murder?


In the government’s final press conference Chris Whitty, the Government's chief medical officer, said ““I would be surprised and delighted if we weren’t in this current situation through the winter and into next spring.” The significance of that statement cannot be overstated. Deaths in the UK from the virus are currently running 100 every day. (The true total may be higher.) The chief medical officer is saying don’t expect to see deaths running at an order of magnitude lower before the Spring of next year.

I fear we have become desensitized over coronavirus deaths. We keep being told by the government that they are at a much lower level than they used to be, every graph shows deaths are much lower than they were at the peak, resulting in a danger that we regard daily deaths around a hundred as somehow inevitable. But they are not inevitable. They are an order of magnitude higher than deaths in other European countries. Here is a chart of a three day moving average of deaths per day in the UK and some of our nearest neighbours over the past month.


With the possible exception of Sweden, which chose not to lockdown, daily deaths in the UK are an order of magnitude higher compared to our neighbours. If you think this has anything to do with the UK’s population size, there is the same chart per capita.


The only change is that Sweden now leapfrogs over us. From all those who write for The Telegraph and other right wing outlets saying we shouldn’t have locked down I look forward to their profuse apologies.

This comparison shows there is nothing inevitable about a hundred or more people dying from coronavirus every day. Other countries have got numbers much lower, so why can’t we? The answer is that our government has chosen not to cut numbers further. Our numbers are higher because our lockdown was less severe than in other countries, and we started reducing an already weaker lockdown while deaths were still high. The government didn’t protect care homes, and it didn’t protect medical staff. And the government decided to farm out test, trace and isolate (TTI) to their private sector friends rather than expand experienced local authorities. In other words there are a host of government failures that have led to deaths going down more slowly than our neighbours.

What is equally scandalous, but largely unnoticed by the media, is the government intends to do little to rectify the situation. That was the gist of Chris Whitty’s remarks. Let’s put 100 deaths a day in context. On average 5 people die a day from road traffic accidents. Far fewer die on average from deaths as a result of terrorism. But just think of the media publicity each terrorist incident gets in the UK. Coronavirus deaths can be just as accidental, perhaps being in the wrong place at the wrong time and being infected by a complete stranger.

One reason the government gets away with it is by playing off the majority against a minority. People are desperate to get back to normal. Businesses fear for their existence if lockdown continues. It seems churlish to spoil the day by saying we need to wait for numbers to come down further. Another reason is that the media seems obsessed about a ‘second wave’, and fails to notice the first wave is still killing more than a hundred a day. But there is no getting away from the fact that the government by its actions appear rather indifferent to people dying.

Their excuse is that they are saving the economy. This is nonsense. If daily infection numbers remain high, people will be reluctant to resume social consumption. This in turn will threaten the viability of some businesses, and lead to a lot of unemployment as other firms slim down. The government, by ending lockdown too early, is creating an economic crisis that will hit the UK in the second half of this year.

The root causes of this failure are two basic flaws in the government’s thinking. The first is penny-pinching by the Chancellor and the Treasury. I hate the word, but the fiscal space is there to save around 500 lives a week by giving support to individuals and businesses. It was the Chancellor who initiated the first relaxation of lockdown by insisting those who couldn’t work from home went back to work. The second is the Prime Minister’s dislike of lockdown which allowed the UK to flirt with herd immunity at the beginning of the pandemic and is now ending the lockdown with too many people dying.

Yet the government remains ahead in the polls. They have allowed tens of thousands of excess deaths, and continue to allow people to die who needn’t have done so, yet more people would still vote for them than the only alternative, an alternative government that does not suffer from the same flaws as this one. Incredibly 44% approve of the government’s handling of the pandemic. Trump famously boasted that if he shot someone in Times Square his popularity would be undented. This government through their incompetence and ideological blinkers have killed tens of thousands and still voters would put them back into government. If tens of thousands of unnecessary deaths cannot do it, just what will it take to diminish the popularity of this government?

Thursday, 24 January 2019

The key arguments for high top rates of income tax are political as well as pecuniary


When people complain that neoliberalism is a meaningless concept, I should point them to what has happened to the top rate of income tax since around 1980, not just in the US and UK but elsewhere. (Source HT Marcel Fratzscher)



Here is a chart of the United States top tax rate over the last century (HT Martin Sandbu). Eisenhower had top earners paying a 91 percent marginal rate.



No doubt there are complex reasons for these reductions, but key among them has to be a neoliberal belief that cutting top rates would lead to more dynamic CEOs who would produce more dynamic companies, and the benefits of this would trickle down to the economy as a whole. Low top tax rates would encourage entrepreneurs to take more risks that were socially beneficial and so on. The argument is so familiar, trotted out routinely by right wing think tanks, it hardly needs elaborating. It is a classic example of neoliberals using a bit of simple economics to justify policy that is advantageous to themselves or their paymasters.

Yet the evidence for such an effect is weak, at best. The intuition for why it should be weak is straightforward. Above a certain level of income, other incentives beyond the purely pecuniary become important. Top CEOs, like top footballers, want to be successful at what they do, and more successful than others. They will want success whatever the overall financial rewards of being successful.

Another bit of basic economics that neoliberals hardly ever mention is the diminishing marginal utility of consumption. This implies quite the opposite of low tax rates at the top. It is socially much more beneficial to tax those to whom one dollar is not worth the effort of picking off the sidewalk and transfer it to those who are poorer. A well known paper by Diamond and Saez found that, after allowing for disincentive and avoidance effects, the optimal top rate of income tax in the US should be 73%. [1] [2]

There are two reasons why even 73% might be an underestimate. Piketty, Saez and Stantcheva have argued that giving CEOs lots of money can have negative incentive effects. The CEOs start putting effort into increasing their salary rather than improving their firm. Part of your status comes from what you can afford. When all CEOs are taxed a lot at the margin the size of your salary has little impact on that, but when your salary is not taxed so much you can increase your salary and theefore status by extracting more from your own firm. To use some economics jargon, a low marginal tax rate on top incomes can be a good example of an incentive for rent extraction rather than an incentive for increasing social output. .

But while an extra dollar for a CEO is not going to incentivise them in a positive way very much, you could argue that it incentivises those with talent to aspire to be CEOs. CEOs are always going to be among the richest in society, because a lot of their income will be taxed at lower rates. A paper by Lockwood, Nathanson and Weyl turns that argument on its head. High salaries are associated with activities, like finance and law, that have what economists would call negative externalities, which means that they do much less good for society than the size of the salaries they pay might suggest. A lot of finance, for example, is about trying to take money off other people rather than growing the size of the overall pie. If high post-tax salaries incentivise talented people into those professions, that is negative for society, which would benefit if they worked in different jobs. You can reduce this misallocation of talent by having higher tax rates on top incomes.

Neoliberals have one last line of defence against raising top tax rates in a single country, and that is migration. The argument is that talent, which could be quite mobile, will move to where talent is most rewarded. There is clear evidence that this is true, to an extent. This concern does not mean we leave top tax rates where they currently are or even reduce them, but simply that we might not put them up as high as they should otherwise go while some countries that are attractive to talent continue to have low tax rates on top incomes. Sweden seems to do pretty well with a 70% effective top tax rate.

This danger of a race to the bottom with top tax rates makes it all the more important that the United States raises it’s top marginal tax rate, along the lines recently suggested by Democrat Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. For various fairly obvious reasons the US does not need to worry too much about a talent drain if it raised top tax rates.

In my view the arguments for higher top tax rates are at least as much non-pecuniary, by which I mean they do not depend on the points raised so far. The evidence that social welfare is higher in more equal societies seems compelling to me. In other words we should increase top tax rates just because that helps produce a more equal society. I have seen a few attempts to debunk the evidence for this in The Spirit Level, but they are not convincing as a collective, while there is even more evidence to support the idea that people are happier in more equal societies..

There is a final argument for high tax rates at the top which seems particularly relevant to the US and UK at the moment. If you have a political system like the US where money easily buys political influence, you will find some of those who earn very high salaries trying to do exactly that (some references here). You can create the kind of plutocracy I discuss here. Because money can also help to buy votes, that plutocracy may also be able to continue with democratic elections without in any way threatening the plutocracy. Even when you have laws limiting the amount that can be spent on elections, the UK shows there are ways for the rich to get around that, particularly if they control large sections of the press.

This is the argument made in this excellent NYT op-ed by Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman. They write
“An extreme concentration of wealth means an extreme concentration of economic and political power. Although many policies can help address it, progressive income taxation is the fairest and most potent of them all, because it restrains all exorbitant incomes equally, whether they derive from exploiting monopoly power, new financial products, sheer luck or anything else.”

The economist Greg Mankiw, in a short response to this op-ed, says
“most rich people I know would have been happy to spend vast sums of money to keep Mr Trump out of the White House. And many tried. The Trump phenomenon is not an argument that the moneyed elites have too much influence on politics. If anything, it is an argument that they have too little.”

But this misunderstands (as some on the left do) the nature of the plutocracy that super incomes and wealth create. It does not, as I make clear here, create a kind of committee of the very rich that between them decide who rules. It is much more erratic than this. Instead it allows small groups among the very wealthy, who may be quite unrepresentative, to hijack a democratic system. Trump and Brexit are clear examples. Mankiw is right that one way to avoid that would be to create a more representative kind of plutocracy, but a far better way of avoiding disasters of this kind is to deal with the problem at its source, by reinstating high rates of tax on top incomes.

[1] Some intuition on this number. If disincentive and avoidance effects were so large that an increase in tax rates led to no additional income, then there is no pecuniary advantage from doing so. If these effects did not exist, the optimal marginal rate at the top would be 100%. The paper estimates these effects are somewhere between these two extremes, so the optimum tax rate at the top will be between zero and 100%.

[2] For a discussion of these issues in a UK context, see https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/9678. Note that HMRC calculations that the short-lived raising of the UK top tax rate to 50% did not raise any revenue involve debatable assumptions, and much of the avoidance only worked because the hike was temporary.    



Thursday, 14 December 2017

The advantage of a central bank not being ‘ahead of the curve’

Imagine the following economy. Growth has been strong for a number of years: 2.7% 2014, 3.8% 2015, 3.1% 2016 and is expected to be above 3% again in 2017. The OECD also think the output gap is positive i.e. output is above the sustainable rate. Inflation was bobbing around zero for a few years, but since 2016 has gradually crept up to the target of 2%. It was just over 2% in the summer, but dipped just below target in the last two months. Fiscal policy is broadly neutral, and is expected to remain so. The unemployment rate is still slightly above 6%, but the average rate since the crisis in the early 1990s is over 7%.

We are talking about the very healthy Swedish economy. An economy where inflation is at target and some experts think the economy is running hot. What level do you think the Riksbank, Sweden’s independent central bank, has set its interest rate at? The answer is -0.5%. What is more the general expectation (the Riksbank publishes its interest rate forecast) is that rates will not start rising above -0.5% before min-2018. In addition, the Riksbank is undertaking its form of QE.

What can explain this dovish behaviour? Central banks are supposed to be inflation averse, and elsewhere they talk about the need to ‘normalise’ rates the moment the economy starts recovering, so that they are ‘ahead of the curve’. Part of the answer lies in the past. I have told the story in real time (here, then here, then here), so just a short synopsis this time. The Riksbank started raising interest rates from its then lower bound of 0.25% towards the end of 2010, because they were worried about a potential housing bubble. Rates continued to rise to 2%, but inflation began to fall, and did not stop until it hit zero at the end of 2012. There was no growth in GDP in 2012. The eminent macroeconomist Lars Svensson resigned from the Riksbank in protest at this departure from inflation targeting.

Sweden: Consumer Price Inflation and Short Interest Rates, plus forecast (from OECD Economic Outlook)

In 2012 the Riksbank admitted their mistake, and started lowering rates to the new lower bound of -0.5%, where they have been since the beginning of 2016. Having made the error of prematurely raising rates once, they are in no hurry to risk doing so again.

The Swedish experience I think illustrates a number of points that could also be applied to other central banks.

  1. Macroprudential policy is the way to deal with financial instability like housing bubbles. Using the interest rate instead can be very costly. Controlling inflation should be the only thing short term interest rates are used for.

  2. Low, below target, inflation can be very sticky. Swedish interest rates went below zero at the beginning of 2015, but inflation only went above 1% just under 2 years later, and this despite growth in GDP of 3.8% in 2015.

  3. Inflation went above target in July, August and September of this year. But the central bank, looking at the basic determinants of inflation like wage growth relative to productivity growth, held their nerve and kept rates at -0.5%. Inflation fell back to 1.7% in October, and has stayed below 2% in November.

  4. The argument that interest rates must be raised above their floor so that central banks are ‘ahead of the curve’ has not been as influential in Sweden as it has been elsewhere.

It could still go wrong for Sweden, but if it does not then the Riksbank's 2010/11 mistake may have a silver lining. By making the central bank extremely dovish, they have allowed the Swedish economy to grow strongly and unemployment to fall substantially. Perhaps the mantra adopted by other central banks of needing to be ahead of the curve in terms of early ‘normalisation’ is not such a clever idea.



Wednesday, 25 November 2015

Political economy assignments

Suppose you have two objectives for monetary policy: financial sector stability and real economy stability. You have two main instruments: interest rates and macroprudential policy (things like changing the capital requirements of banks, or making it less easy to get a mortgage; often called macropru for short). Should you assign one instrument to one objective (often called an assignment), or try and achieve both goals with both instruments?

As Tony Yates points out, assignments are rarely optimal from a purely macro point of view. Even if, say, interest rates are less effective at achieving financial stability than macropru, you would still want interest rates to contribute something to that objective. An exception is when one instrument completely dominates the other: then assignment is optimal. An example of this exception in a certain class of model is monetary over fiscal policy as means to achieve real stabilisation, as discussed here and here (less technical discussion here). But this type of result is unusual, and even when you get a result like this for a certain class of models it is not hard to add real world complications that remove the result.

If assignment in the case of real and financial stabilisation is not optimal, does this imply that those setting interest rates should take financial stability into account? It is important to understand what we are talking about here. We are not talking about how financial conditions might influence what interest rates need to be to achieve real stabilisation, which is the kind of issue discussed in this post by Bianca De Paoli for example. Nor is it talking about allowing for risk as I discussed here. Instead it would be saying that institutions like the US Fed should have a triple mandate when setting interest rates, where the third mandate was financial stability. Interest rates could be changed if financial stability was a concern, even if this had no implications for inflation or output. Equivalently, interest rates could move to help financial stability even if this took output and inflation away from target.

However we already have assignments that are clearly suboptimal from a purely macro perspective. Fiscal policy is assigned to the control of government debt, and reducing debt is certainly not a monetary policy objective. But in standard models this assignment is clearly suboptimal: when debt is high, reducing interest rates can be quite effective in reducing debt (particularly if government debt is mostly short term), and undesirable knock on effects on output and inflation can be countered by fiscal policy. Yet the mainstream consensus is that monetary policy should not be used to reduce debt.

The reason for this suboptimal assignment is most probably because of political economy concerns. Or to put it another way policy is mainly concerned about knowingly sub-optimal decisions. Reducing interest rates to reduce debt sounds too much like fiscal dominance. There is a fear that if there is no institutional assignment, politicians will depart from optimal policy and by keeping rates too low to reduce debt they will allow excessive inflation.

Can such political economy concerns be applied to financial stability and monetary policy, particularly as the same actor - an independent central bank - is in charge of both? My instinct is that it can, because central bankers are heavily influenced by pressures from the financial sector. As a result, there is a danger that if interest rates are set with both objectives in mind, central bankers will depart from optimal policy and, for example, needlessly raise interest rates before the real economy requires them to rise. The recent experience of Sweden is a clear example where this happened. For this reason I rather like the UK institutional set-up, with a separate MPC and FPC and a clear assignment for each.

Thursday, 30 October 2014

In praise of macroeconomists (or at least one of them)

This is a title that is sure to spur some angry comments. Didn’t the financial crisis prove that mainstream macroeconomics was hopelessly flawed, that the ‘Great Moderation’ (fifteen or so years of relatively stable inflation and output) that preceded the crisis was a sham, or worse still a cause of the crisis, and basing policy on lots of maths and rational expectations has been totally discredited?

One of the architects of that macroeconomic mainstream is Lars Svensson. He wrote a number of key papers on inflation targeting using lots of maths and rational expectations. Probably for that reason, he was a member of Sweden’s equivalent of the Monetary Policy Committee from 2007 to 2013. By the middle of 2009 Swedish short term interest rates were, like most other places, close to their ‘zero lower bound’ - in this case 0.25%. But in mid 2010 they began to rise again, reaching 2% at the end of 2011. The primary motivation for this continuing rise in rates was a concern that Swedish consumers were taking on too much debt.

Svensson fiercely and publicly opposed these increases, and eventually left the central bank in frustration. He argued that there was still plenty of slack in the economy, and raising rates would be deflationary, so that inflation would fall well below the central bank’s target of 2%. By the end of 2012 inflation had indeed fallen to zero, and since then monthly inflation has more often been negative than positive. It was -0.4% in September. This week the Swedish central bank lowered their interest rate to zero.

OK, so one eminent macroeconomist got a forecast right. Plenty of others get their forecasts wrong. Why the big deal? Suppose you took the statement in my first paragraph seriously. The Great Moderation was about central banks having an explicit forward looking target for inflation, and varying interest rates with the aim of trying to achieve it. So if the success of that policy was a sham or worse, and had been exposed by the financial crisis, a central bank should not worry too much if they abandon it. They should certainly not worry if they deviate from it because of concerns about the financial health of the economy. Which is exactly what the Swedish central bank did.

Now Sweden has negative inflation, and interest rates have come right back to zero. Deviating from what mainstream macroeconomists in general advocate (and what one in particular recommended) has proved a costly mistake. (Svensson estimates it has cost 60,000 jobs.) So maybe the story with the financial crisis is a little more nuanced. Perhaps good monetary policy, aided by the analysis of mainstream New-Keynesian theory, did help bring about the pre-crisis moderation in inflation and output variability. The Achilles heel was that monetary policy lost traction when nominal rates hit zero, but a number of mainstream macroeconomists had discussed the implications of that possibility before it happened in 2009. In the UK at least (and also elsewhere), it was politicians and central bank governors that did not take the consequences of this possibility seriously enough. The financial crisis suggests that what was missing was better financial regulation (including macroprudential monetary policy tools), rather than a need to rewrite how we set interest rates.

I am certainly not claiming that mainstream macroeconomics is without fault, as regular readers will know (e.g.) However it is important to recognise the achievements of macroeconomics as well as its faults. If we fail to do that, then central banks can start doing foolish things, with large costs in terms of the welfare of its country’s citizens. And while it might appear unseemly to occasionally blow one’s own profession’s trumpet, I suspect no one else is going to. 


Tuesday, 1 July 2014

The financial instability argument for raising rates

There is a nice juxtaposition of recent articles in the Economist. This one, by P.W. (it is weird this convention they have for signing with just their initials), puts the “case against maxing out monetary policy” (a.k.a. raise rates now). The Fed, Bank of England and ECB “argue that the priority is to restore growth and to do battle against low inflation. But [they] grievously misread the risks before the financial crisis, which weakens their claim to be reading them correctly now.” Let’s call the proposition that we should raise rates now to avoid financial instability the BIS case, after the Bank of International Settlements who have been making this argument ever since the recession began. In contrast Ryan Avent writes that there are two big problems with this argument. I want to expand on his discussion, and be a little less polite.

I want to begin by conceding a point. Suppose, as a monetary policymaker, you believe a financial crisis is possible, and that by raising rates you may be able to prevent it. Assume, crucially, that there is nothing else you can do to help prevent the financial crisis. In that case, you will consider raising rates, even if inflation is below target. If you have just one instrument (interest rates) and two targets (inflation and preventing a crisis) you will be influenced by both targets. If you want this point expressed more formally, see this post and the paper by Mike Woodford it discusses. 
 
However that is not the end of the story. If you raise rates to prevent financial instability when inflation is below target, inflation will remain below target or may fall even further. You cannot ignore that. So if interest rates are raised today to head off a financial crisis, they will have to be lower in the future to deal with the lower inflation or even deflation you have caused.

This is not just what macroeconomic theory says. In mid-2010 the Swedish central bank started raising interest rates (from 0.25% to 2%), despite forecasts that inflation would stay below target and with unemployment well above its natural rate. They did this explicitly because they were worried about the build up of household debt and a possible housing bubble. Inflation began to fall, and since 2013 it has been at or below zero. As Lars Svensson has pointed out, even on its own terms this is not a very clever policy, because with lower inflation the real value of debt is higher than it would otherwise have been. But the key point for the current discussion is that now interest rates are coming down again (currently 0.75%), because you cannot ignore inflation being over 2% below target.

Some of those making the BIS case understand this. What they hope is that if interest rates are raised to, say, 2% and stay there, that will still give us enough monetary stimulus to eventually get inflation back up to target. It clearly was not correct in the Swedish case, and with Euro inflation still at 0.5% it looks pretty improbable there too. But maybe it could be correct for the US and UK. So by raising rates by a modest amount today we might prevent financial instability, but at the cost of delaying the recovery.

I want to make two observations that follow from the BIS argument. The first is that they are in effect saying that the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) constraint on monetary policy is even more severe than we thought, because if we leave interest rates at the ZLB for too long this generates an unacceptable risk of financial instability. That in turn must strengthen arguments (pdf) for raising inflation targets above 2%. Strangely, I do not hear advocates of the BIS case also arguing for higher inflation targets. The second is that, the more severe the ZLB constraint is in practice, the more compelling the case for using fiscal stimulus when we hit the ZLB. (Fiscal policy has become more expansionary in Sweden.) Again, this is something you do not hear BIS advocates argue for – in fact they often push austerity.

As Ryan Avent says, we can avoid all these difficulties by adding an extra instrument, which is macroprudential regulation. If parts of the financial system appear prone to instability because people are taking insufficient account of risks, bring in controls (or maybe taxes) of various kinds to stop this happening. Now, as R.A. notes, those taking the BIS position counter that such measures are untested and may not be effective. Here is a typical example in the FT, where it is stated that “macroprudential policies will fail to stop investors taking irrational risks”.

So we must raise interest rates, and delay the recovery, because nothing else can stop some in the financial system taking excessive risks. To which I can only say, summoning all my academic gravitas, what audacity, what impudence! Not only have we had to suffer the consequences of the Great Recession because of excessive risk taking within a largely unregulated financial system, we now have to cut short our main means of getting out of that recession because they might do it again. I do not know what planet these people are on, but if its mine, can they please get off and play their games elsewhere.


Thursday, 12 June 2014

John Williams on bubbles and monetary policy

I have always found what John Williams writes interesting, from long before he became president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. So this post just reviews a speech he recently gave at the Bundesbank’s delightful conference centre on the banks of the Rhine. For me he said three interesting things.

1) He first emphasised the dangers of deviating from monetary policy’s primary goals because of a concern about financial stability. What was interesting for me is that he did this by example, looking at what had happened in Sweden and in Norway. Now my impression is that central bankers do not make a habit of publicly criticising their colleagues in other countries, but Williams’ verdict is hardly nuanced. He is particularly concerned that inflation expectations in those countries have fallen sharply away from the target. (I discussed the dangers that could arise from this here.) He concludes “If the anchor were to slip, it would wreak lasting damage to a central bank’s control over both inflation and economic activity, at considerable cost to the economy.” We are used to hearing this about positive deviations of inflation from target, so it’s nice to hear it applied equally to negative deviations (ECB please note).

2) He then talked about asset market bubbles. What he had to say was not too controversial, but it is of immediate relevance to the UK. After looking at some persuasive empirical evidence, he said:

“Low interest rates boost fundamental valuation of assets. In a world of rational expectations, asset prices adjust and that’s it. But, if one allows for limited information, the resulting bull market may cause investors to get “carried away” over time and confuse what is a one-time, perhaps transitory, shift in fundamentals for a new paradigm of rising asset prices.”

Recently I talked about how expectations of a prolonged period of low real interest rates could lead to sharp increases in house prices, as we have recently observed in the UK and elsewhere. What Williams is suggesting is that this process can lead to overshooting, as the market gets carried away.

3) All this seems to be leading to the inevitable discussion of macroprudential controls rather than interest rates to deal with overshooting of this kind. He says “monetary policy actions should only be a last resort.” But then his discussion took an unexpected turn, for me at least.

“One of monetary policy’s most important lessons—borne out in both theory and practice—is that the framework for policy is more important than the details of the execution. In terms of price and economic stability, anchoring inflation expectations and responding in a systematic way to economic developments are by far the most important elements of good monetary policy.
 Instead of thinking about how monetary policy should respond to risks to financial stability, we should focus on studying ways to design policy frameworks that support financial stability with only a modest cost to macroeconomic goals and anchoring inflation expectations.”

What does this mean? He is careful to say “I am not personally advocating either of these proposals, but I do view them as creative ways to think of how to bend the curve in terms of macroeconomic and financial stability tradeoffs.” Well one of the two ideas he notes is that monetary policy should target nominal income rather than inflation. “The idea that nominal income targeting could be supportive of financial stability is relatively straightforward (Koenig 2013, Sheedy 2014).” The paper by Koenig [1] I did not know, but the paper by Kevin Sheedy [2] I discussed over a year ago in this post. You read it here first!


[1] Koenig, Evan F. 2013. “Like a Good Neighbor: Monetary Policy, Financial Stability, and the Distribution of Risk.” International Journal of Central Banking 9(2, June), pp. 57–82.

[2] Sheedy, Kevin D. 2014. “Debt and Incomplete Financial Markets: A Case for Nominal GDP Targeting.” Presented at Brookings Panel on Economic Activity, March 20–21.



Thursday, 8 May 2014

Hawkery, or is the Bank biased

An interesting contrast in my evening reading yesterday. In the US, Matt O’Brien in the Washington Post’s Wonkblog making fun of reporting that inflation is just around the corner. There is one particularly nice line: “Well, there's always demand for pieces about why we need to raise rates — mostly from 60-year-olds who think it's always 1979 …” The contrast is with the Financial Times’s Chris Giles, who in yesterdays FT accuses the Bank of England of ‘institutional dovishness’, which he compares to institutional racism. The Bank is “institutionally biased against higher interest rates.”

Now, lest I be misunderstood, let me say three things before addressing Chris Giles’s charge. First, I’m pretty sure Chris is well short of 60. Second, Chris is no fool who blindly follows some party line: this piece on the Treasury’s exercise in dynamic scoring is as good as economic journalism gets. Third, central banks can suffer from what I and others prefer to describe as ‘groupthink’. Laurance Ball argued that this happened at the Fed when it came to not trying what I call forward commitment (promising higher inflation and a positive output gap in the future to combat the zero lower bound).

Having said that, Chris can occasionally pursue a line that, while popular in some quarters, makes little macroeconomic sense. The idea that UK austerity did not matter much had him clash with not just the usual suspects (including me), but also US academics Alan Taylor and Oscar Jorda. (I discussed an earlier version of their paper here: their latest version is here). In a similar way, over the last few months Chris has relentlessly pursued the idea that UK interest rates should rise very soon.

Chris’s charge against the Bank is that they keep moving the goalposts. For example, they say they will think about raising interest rates when unemployment dips below 7%, but when unemployment does go below 7% they decide that there is no reason to raise rates, and so on. But for the Bank the goalposts are the inflation target, and inflation is below target.

In the past I have made the point that, given uncertainties about the size of the output gap, it is best to err on the side of expansionary policy. This is because the Bank can easily deal with inflation if it does begin to rise, but because of the lower bound the opposite is not true. Chris responds that “no one should expect that an overheating economy will quickly set prices and wages on the climb”. “As the pre-crisis period showed, economies can overheat and develop dangerous imbalances without displaying the usual warning sign of inflation.” He is of course talking about house prices. But raising rates is a very inefficient way of dealing with a housing boom, which is why we now have the Financial Policy Committee at the Bank with its macroprudential tools. It is also very inefficient for the Bank to be trying to undo effects caused by the Chancellor’s policies (Help to Buy).

To see what can happen in this situation, we just need to look at Sweden. Sweden raised interest rates from almost zero to 2% beginning in 2010, because they were worried about overheating in the housing market. They now have deflation: inflation was -0.6% in March. As a result, the central bank has had to bring interest rates back down again. Lars Svensson, one of the world’s leading macroeconomists who resigned from their equivalent of the MPC while this happened, can only say I told you so.

While we are on the subject of premature interest rate increases, let us not forget the ECB raising rates just before the second Eurozone recession. And let us not also forget that the MPC almost followed their lead - not much evidence of institutional dovishness there.


I suspect and hope that the Bank and MPC have their eyes on the big picture. UK GDP per capita is currently around 15% below the level we might have expected it to be at if it had followed pre-recession trends. At no time since WWII has the economy not come back to this trend. We have no even half decent theories about why this trend should have dramatically changed. In these circumstances, starting to put on the brakes when we have only just begun to catch up lost ground, and when inflation is below target, just seems dumb and dangerous. 

Sunday, 17 November 2013

Should fears of financial instability raise interest rates?

Inflation is significantly below 2% almost everywhere. In the US, Japan and the UK (even though in the UK inflation is still just above 2%) central banks are doing a great deal to get inflation back to 2%. Maybe not enough, but their goal is clear. The ECB is belatedly following the same path (although it remains somewhat behind), but this has caused a very public split in its ranks. One reason given by those who have opposed the ECB’s latest rate cut is a risk to financial stability, and house price increases in certain Eurozone cities. [1] In the US some have raised concerns that continuing QE might generate financial instability. In the UK one of the three ‘knockouts’ to forward guidance, that could allow interest rates to rise even if unemployment remained above 7%, concerns financial stability.

And in one country, Sweden, the independent central bank has kept interest rates above the ZLB, even though prices have been literally falling. While the central bank cut short rates to 0.25 in 2009, during 2010 they were increased to 1%, and during 2011 to 2%. They have since been cut to 1%, but the central bank does not want to cut any further despite prices being flat or falling throughout 2013. Yet the central bank has a clear target for inflation of 2%.

The reason the Swedish central bank - the Riksbank - is overriding its inflation target were clearly set out in a speech given by Kerstin af Jochnick, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, in January 2013. The Riksbank is concerned that low interest rates will exacerbate a housing bubble. The discussion is interesting for at least two reasons. The first is that the Riksbank is not primarily concerned about the impact of any bursting bubble on the financial sector itself. It is not worried about a second financial crisis. Instead it is worried about the impact a bursting bubble might have on households (creating another balance sheet recession) and overseas confidence.

The second is that the Governor is explicit that higher interest rates are a second best solution to this problem. The first best solution is macroprudential regulation. But, to quote the speech: “One reason why monetary policy in Sweden has needed to give consideration to financial imbalances is because there has been no framework for macroprudential policy.” The speech discusses the progress that the central bank has made in developing a framework for macroprudential regulation.

In passing I would want to add that interest rate policy is probably the third best solution to housing market concerns. The potential for using particular fiscal policy instruments is often overlooked. For example, just as the UK government has tried (somewhat opportunistically) to stimulate the housing market through fiscal means (Help to Buy), these means can also be used to dampen that market. Indeed Goodhart and Baker have argued that Help to Buy can be seen as a macroprudential instrument.

My more substantive point is that a monetary policy of the Swedish kind risks undermining the legitimacy of independent central banks. As regular readers will know, I believe strongly that there are areas of macroeconomics where delegation can be highly beneficial. You only need to look at the influence that misguided, and sometimes crazy, macroeconomic ideas can sometimes have among politicians to see why. On the other hand, delegation potentially undermines the democratic process. There is nothing which says that central bankers, or experts who sit on monetary policy committees, have any particular right to take decisions which can have a substantial impact on people’s lives.

That is one reason why Alesina and Tabellini [2], among others, stress that successful delegation happens when there is a broad consensus on what constitutes sound policy. I think one reason that delegation of monetary policy to central banks has been largely uncontested so far is that this consensus existed for monetary policy. Essentially the task of central banks was to keep inflation low. Of course there is plenty of scope to discuss the details of how this is done, which macroeconomists spend a great of time doing. But the primary task, and the proximate means by which it should be achieved, were clear and commanded near universal support.

For some time the only potentially competing goal was keeping unemployment low: hence the dual mandate in the US. However there was near universal agreement amongst economists that the only sustainable level of unemployment or output that monetary policy should try to achieve was precisely the level that kept inflation stable. If that level of unemployment was too high, then means other than monetary policy should be used to address that problem. Again there are disputes at the margins, particularly when supply or cost-push shocks hit, but little dispute about the basic idea.

The moment central banks start allowing inflation to be persistently below target (with the loss in output that this implies) because of concerns about housing bubbles, this consensus will evaporate. Again Sweden provides a clear example. Lars Svensson, a highly respected academic and a former Deputy Governor of the central bank, has strongly disputed that this policy will achieve the goals it is designed to achieve, and instead suggests that the central bank is violating its mandate. (A good summary is here.) On the more general issue of how much monetary policy should take account of financial risk or housing bubbles there is a wide spectrum of views among economists.   

It is also not difficult to see how reasoned debate could easily escalate into attacks on central bank independence itself. If the central bank begins to be perceived as protecting the interests of the financial sector rather than the public at large, then demands for the government to take back the control of interest rate setting could become difficult to resist (even if the government wanted to resist). I would have no difficulty writing the slogan myself. First the banks created the recession, and now (through the central bank) they want to take away the recovery.

One response to this argument might be that the public would not forgive a central bank that allowed a second financial crisis to develop. I would agree that in the absence of any other remedy interest rate policy should be influenced by the possibility of a financial crisis, as Michael Woodford has demonstrated formally (see this post). So how do you exercise this option of last resort, but still ensure the legitimacy of independent central banks by focusing on the control of inflation? I quite like the arrangement in the UK, where there is a separate Financial Policy Committee (FPC) that works with but is independent of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). The FPC, not the MPC, is in charge of macroprudential policy. The knockout to forward guidance that I mentioned above involving financial instability is called by the FPC, and the MPC can then decide whether to act on that call.

Such an arrangement works best if both committees are populated by experts from outside the central bank, and in the case of the FPC those experts are not just current or past bankers. It has the advantage that before the MPC can even begin to consider allowing fears of financial instability to influence its interest rate judgement, the FPC has to in effect say we have exhausted all the other means at our disposal. It would be also good if the FPC was explicit about any micro fiscal issues that might also be involved, just as Bernanke has been explicit about the problems macro fiscal policy has caused him in the last year or so. This institutional arrangement makes it clear that it is for others, and not those who set interest rates, to protect mortgage borrowers from their own potential folly.




[1] See this article by Hans-Werner Sinn for example. To be fair housing is only briefly mentioned there, and the main point seems to involve something else, although what exactly is less clear to me.

[2] Alesina, A. and Tabellini, G. (2007) “Bureaucrats or politicians? Part 1: A single policy task.” American Economic Review 97: 169–179.

      

Tuesday, 30 April 2013

Leading Macroeconomist Leaves Central Bank


Maybe not the most compelling title for a post, but the news that Lars Svensson is not renewing his term as Deputy Governor of Sweden’s central bank (HT Saroj Bhattarai) will be of great interest to academic macroeconomists. What I want to suggest here is that it should also be of wider interest.

Apart from making major contributions to the discipline, Svensson has also been extremely influential among policymakers, and is often associated with the idea of flexible inflation targeting. (Here is just one example.) It is interesting news because of why he is leaving. He says: "I have failed to find support for a monetary policy that I believe would lead to better performance, with both a higher inflation rate closer to the target of two percent and a lower unemployment rate." He has for some time been fighting a losing battle to persuade his colleagues that current Swedish monetary policy is too deflationary (see for example Britmouse), and he has decided to give up the fight.

Interest rates in Sweden are low, at 1%, but according to Svensson they should have got there faster and should now be even lower. Here is a plot of inflation (blue, left hand scale) and unemployment.




Inflation is currently zero, so well below the 2% target. GDP growth was 1.2% last year. Unemployment rose in the recession, came down a bit, but has begun to rise again. The case for lower interest rates over the last two or more years looks pretty clear.

So why have most of Svensson’s colleagues not been following his advice? Their concern is that low interest rates are encouraging Swedes to borrow too much. Now of course one of the ways monetary stimulus is supposed to work is that it encourages more borrowing, but the worry is that borrowing in Sweden is dangerously high, and could threaten financial stability. There are echoes here of doubts expressed by some members of the Fed (see here and here) and international organisations (Tim Taylor here). However so far these have been just concerns, which do not seem to have had a major impact in preventing expansionary policy. Except in Sweden.

Svensson’s arguments against such concerns are persuasive (pdf), and I find the argument that there are better financial instruments available to deal with these problems particularly strong. However I want to draw a slightly different parallel, with policy at the ECB. At first sight similarities appear slight: although both central banks are resisting a cut in interest rates from low to very low levels, in the Eurozone growth is negative rather than just slow, and inflation is currently only a little below target rather than zero (although the ECB itself expects it to fall to nearly 1%). In addition, the ECB has not focused on financial stability as a reason for not cutting rates. Yet the parallel is this. In both cases we have central banks making decisions that appear to contradict the wisdom of mainstream macroeconomics. So what, you may say, but in both cases the cost is being measured in unnecessary unemployment, and below target inflation. Compute the cost in terms of lost output, and they are the kind of losses that could cost a politician their job. The cost in terms of human misery is greater still. You may be pretty skeptical of the wisdom of macroeconomists, but do you really think that these central bankers know better?