When the current government took over in 2010, the UK economy
had begun to recover from the Great Recession. In 2010 Q2, real GDP was about
2% higher than a year earlier. The new government embarked on a programme of
enhanced fiscal consolidation (austerity). Growth over the next two years was
less than 0.4% at an annual rate. The imminent debt crisis that was supposed to
justify austerity never materialised - interest rates on government debt fell
significantly.
On the face of it, this looks rather bad for the government. So
it has been really important for its spin masters to manufacture a consensus
that there was no serious alternative to this policy. This has involved three
strands. First, that the recession was somehow the result of the previous
government’s fiscal profligacy. Second, following on from this, that the
government therefore had to ‘clean up the mess’ - austerity was inevitable.
Third, that the economic recovery, when it came, was the reward for austerity.
The first strand is untenable. Yes, fiscal policy might have been
tighter after 2000, particularly if we had known what we know now. But it
played no part in causing the Great Recession. The second strand therefore does
not follow. Among informed commentators on the UK economy, there is certainly
no consensus that austerity was necessary. The third strand is complete and
utter nonsense. To suggest that this story is self
evident is a lie. So how did the government manage to convince almost everyone
to accept the story as true?
First, it was vital that other governments were telling similar
stories, and that real debt crises were happening not too far way. The idea
that the Eurozone crisis is all about
fiscal profligacy is equally untrue, but Greece provided the cover. Second,
economists in the City tended to go along with the story, in part because it was in the interests of finance to
do so. Third, most journalists and newspapers were happy to toe the party line. The
occasional eminent journalist or academic would complain, and the Prime
Minister revealingly described them as ‘dangerous voices’, but in
truth they would only become dangerous if the political class took them
seriously. They did not, as we shall see. The ultimate success of the lie was
that political opposition to austerity died away.
There was just a little tidying up to do for the spin masters.
The IMF had originally supported the 2010 austerity programme, but soon began
to have doubts. As the economy continued to stagnate, those doubts grew more
vocal. The IMF has an authority which really was dangerous. So when everyone,
including the IMF, failed to forecast the strength of the 2013 recovery, the
spin masters saw their opportunity. Before the 2014 Article IV assessment, they
put out the line that the IMF really should apologise to the government for
getting its forecast so wrong, and for daring to criticise the need for
austerity.
