When we have a recession caused by demand deficiency such that
interest rates hit their Zero Lower Bound (ZLB), the obvious response from a
macroeconomic point of view is fiscal stimulus. Instead governments have become
obsessed by their debt and deficits, and so we have austerity instead.
It is important to understand that this deficit obsession is
not a worry about the long run sustainability of government finances. We know
this for two reasons. First, if it was only a concern about long run
sustainability, there would be little need to act on that concern now (when
doing so is so costly), rather than waiting a few years for the ZLB problem to
be safely behind us. Indeed, governments should be worried that austerity now
could actually damage long run sustainability, because of the hysteresis
effects examined by DeLong and Summers (pdf, and note that their arguments could
equally be applied to the impact of cutting back public investment even if there was no hysteresis). Second, governments seem happy to cut current deficits using
measures that actually detract from long run sustainability (because it worsens their intertemporal budget constraint). Privatisation
at give-away prices is an obvious example.
This political economy point is important, because it means
that ideas such as Miles Kimball’s alternative to tax cuts - which is to give
everyone a fixed period loan - will not be considered because it still
increases the current budget deficit,
even though long run sustainability is potentially unaffected. The political
economy problem is that governments are obsessed with the deficit over the next
few years.
From a macroeconomic point of view, there is an obvious way
around this deficit obsession, and that is to finance any fiscal stimulus using
money rather than debt. In a recession creating money does not create an inflation problem, as we have all seen in the last few years with Quantitative Easing (QE).
The problem with this textbook solution (often called money financed fiscal stimulus) is that we have ruled it out by
creating independent central banks. Governments cannot create money to finance
fiscal stimulus. Central banks are creating money - lots of it - but can only
use that to buy assets. Whatever political economy problem independent central
banks have helped to solve, they have restricted our policy options in what has
turned out to be a very serious way.
Helicopter money is the obvious solution to this. But it raises
a potential problem. Helicopter money describes a means by which central banks
can put money into the system in an effective (reliably demand expanding) way, but that
process is not reversible. No one is proposing that a central bank can take
money away from every citizen. So what happens, once the recession is over, if
the central bank wants to reduce the amount of money in the system?
This, as Eric Lonergan and Cecchetti & Schoenholtz explain, is the
only reason why the central bank’s balance sheet matters. If it runs out of
assets to sell, its ability to take the money out of the system that it
put in with its helicopter is reduced. This problem is not new. It has already occurred
with potential losses arising from QE. In the UK, the central bank has dealt
with that problem by getting the Treasury to cover these losses, if they arise.
There are many things that the central bank could do if it ever runs out of
assets to sell as a result of implementing helicopter money, but the most
straightforward is to generalise this arrangement. Governments should commit to
providing central banks with the assets they need to control inflation.
Making ‘fiscal backing’ of central banks explicit also indicates a contingent liability for governments. Helicopter money creates a
contingent liability, and in doing so worsens the expected value of their long
run budgetary position. But as we have seen, this is not the major concern for
governments. The UK government did not object to QE because it created a
contingent liability for them. All that mattered is that it did not raise projected deficits over
the next few years.
While Eric Lonergan says central banks need not worry about
their balance sheets, Cecchetti & Schoenholtz say that they are right to do
so, for political rather than economic reasons. A poor balance sheet, which
might make the central bank dependent on the government, compromises its
independence. I think this argument is very weak. It imagines that central bank
independence is about protecting the public from a government of nightmares
that actively wants high inflation. As I argued here, a government that wants high inflation
will not let an independent central bank get in its way. It is also ironic that central banks still worry about
profligate inflationary governments when our problem is governments that put
current fiscal probity above everything else, including the health of the
economy. The combination of a government that is obsessed with its current
deficit and a central bank that is obsessed with hypothetical future inflation
is a dangerous mix.