Our money

The UK government is currently trying to stop researchers who receive government grants from using their results to lobby for changes to laws or regulations. Nothing surprising there: this government has shown no hesitation in trying to rig the system to make its own re-election more likely. (Wonder where they got this idea from? Is this kind of thing now regarded as normal in the UK and therefore permissible behaviour?)

What I thought was interesting was the reported motivation for introducing the new rules.

“According to the Cabinet Office, it is intended to broaden government action aimed at stopping NGOs from lobbying politicians and Whitehall departments using the government’s own funds.”

The government’s own funds. You can imagine an irate cabinet minister saying “we gave them our money to do research, and now they are using this research which we paid for to question our policies”. The problem with this logic is that it is not the minister’s money. It is public money disbursed to departments, which departments use to fund research. The research should then be public research, which should be available to all the public (including the researchers) to make any points they wish. The real scandal here is government commissioned research which is not published when it is completed.

This reminds me of a much more common misuse of language, which is to talk about public money as taxpayers money. I had a go at this here. This widespread misuse of language is no accident: the political right is way better at this kind of framing than the left. It legitimises a (natural) desire not to pay taxes, but also encourages a sense of entitlement, which leads to an us (income tax payers) and them (only indirect tax payers) mentality which is so socially destructive. It is this same sense of entitlement that leads government ministers to think they own the research that was funded with public money.  

How to reference the REF

Or how to go beyond a league table position in evaluating a UK university department

Every five years or so all UK university departments get their research assessed in one gigantic peer review exercise, which is now called the REF. Each discipline is assessed separately, and scores can be used to compile a league table. The exercise has direct financial implications: the better the research, the more money universities get from the government. But if you know what academics are like, you will not be surprised to learn that those in the UK obsess about this exercise and its results to a far greater extent than the money involved would justify. The results of the latest exercise have just been published, and turned into league tables by Times Higher Education (THE) here. 

You could say that the REF now provides the same sort of incentive system for UK universities as profit does for a firm. In some cases academics whose research is below their departmental average are put under pressure to leave by one means or another, and most academics feel acutely the pressure to improve on how their own output will be assessed by this exercise. In contrast, poor performance in teaching or administration is not nearly such a serious issue.

Many academics complain bitterly about the indignity of all this. An alternative system would be one where getting tenure was the last performance hurdle an academic had to pass, and from then on they were free to do what they liked. Research money could all be allocated on a project by project basis. I personally doubt that would be a better system from society’s point of view, and I do find it annoying how academics can complain so much about pressures that are taken for granted elsewhere.

It would be a mistake, however, to think that the position in some REF league table told you all you needed to know to evaluate the quality of research in a department. The REF releases a wealth of data, and going beyond the headline number (usually the GPA score) can be informative. In the latest exercise departments were evaluated under three headings: outputs, environment and impact. Details about what is involved for each category can be found here.

Outputs, which has the highest weight in the total (65%), looks at the quality of the four best recent publications of each submitted member of staff. The key word to note here is ‘submitted’. A department/university can choose not to submit all its staff to the REF, and by not submitting staff that a department/university considers are well below average it can raise its GPA score (if it gets its assessments right). So to the extent that staff are not submitted, the GPA will overestimate the average quality of the research done in that department. As I said, league tables normally just look at the GPA score [1].

To some it may seem strange that this is allowed, but there are arguments to justify it. Departments do pay a significant financial penalty for leaving staff out - they only get money for submitted staff. To get a guide to the total amount of quality adjusted research done in a department, simply multiply the GPA score by the number of people submitted (called ‘power’ by THE).

The decision about whether not to submit a member of staff is an agonising one [2] that involves many difficult trade-offs. To the individual not being submitted it is a nasty slap in the face. For the department, the perceived benefits in getting a higher position in GPA based league tables may outweigh the financial cost of not submitting staff members. Decisions on this front do vary from university to university, and from department to department: in economics, compare the third and fourth columns of the table below.

Although it only counts for 15% of the total GPA score, the ‘environment’ heading may be of particular interest to potential PhD students. It is based on a number of different criteria, including the number of PhDs, the support provided for research, and research income from outside grants. Only three economics departments had all elements of environment judged to be of the highest (4*) quality this time: UCL, LSE and Oxford.

Impact is a new category, accounting for 20% of the total. It is based on case studies where research has engaged with public, private and third sector organisations, or directly with the public. For example, one of Oxford’s case studies for economics was my own work on fiscal councils. A quick look at the results suggests that this new element has had a significant influence on the overall results. In economics, for example, the only department where all the submitted case studies were judged to be of the highest quality was Bristol. So while Bristol only came 12th= on published outputs, a strong impact and environment score lifted them to 6th in the overall ranking.

As with any evaluation system, there are difficult judgements to make on the details, and these can lead to possibilities to ‘play the system’. Chris Bertram focuses on one particular issue at Crooked Timber. Each iteration of the assessment exercise attempts to change the details of the rules to avoid this, only to allow some new possibility to exploit the system. Partly as a result, after each exercise many academics feel that there must be a better and less time consuming way to judge the quality of research produced by individual academics or departments, but perhaps the fact that we keep returning to the same basic procedure suggests otherwise.

REF 2014 results: economics and econometrics

University	GPA Score	No. of staff submitted	Eligible staff	Power	% 4* Outputs	% 4* Environ.	% 4* Impact
UCL	3.78	37	45	139	70	100	92
LSE	3.55	51	56	182	56	100	87
Oxford	3.44	84	97	289	43	100	64
Cambridge	3.42	27	38	92	55	13	50
Warwick	3.41	42	52	142	43	38	60
Bristol	3.32	19	25	62	22	63	100
Essex	3.25	33	40	108	29	63	20
Edinburgh	3.14	18	28	55	31	50	13
Royal Holloway	3.11	14	23	45	35	0	60
Nottingham	3.05	35	46	107	20	13	18
UEA	3.04	14	22	43	20	0	20
Surrey	3.01	21	25	62	27	13	0
Queen Mary	2.98	24	31	73	20	13	13
York	2.93	28	46	82	14	0	40
St. Andrews	2.92	21	31	60	24	0	0
Manchester	2.89	33	45	96	11	13	40
Glasgow	2.86	24	30	68	18	0	0
Sussex	2.84	17	24	49	15	0	37
Exeter	2.78	25	31	68	13	25	13
Birmingham	2.78	24	27	67	8	0	27
Southampton	2.70	22	28	59	22	0	10
Birkbeck	2.60	25	32	65	10	0	0
Leicester	2.59	22	29	58	19	0	0
Sheffield	2.58	15	26	38	8	0	40
Aberdeen	2.48	19	26	48	5	0	0
City	2.44	14	26	33	17	0	20
Kent	2.32	22	26	51	3	0	13
Brunel	2.20	26	29	58	2	0	0

Note that many economics departments are assessed under Business and Management, and are not included here. Sources: columns 2,3 and 5: Times Higher Education, column 4: HESA, columns 6-8, REF.

[1] THE publishes an alternative university wide ranking (aggregated across departments) that multiplies the GPA by the proportion of staff submitted, but that implicitly gives the research of non-submitted staff a score of zero, which is likely to be too extreme. It is better to simply note either the power score, or the proportion of staff submitted. Approximate information on the number of staff eligible for submission by department can be found here.

[2] This is based on my own experience at my previous university, where I was research director for the school. Thankfully I have played no role in these decisions at Oxford!