It is part of folk
lore among politicians and most social scientists that concern about
immigration is governed by the number of immigrants. So how do we
account for the decline in the relative salience of immigration since
the EU referendum (source)?
There are of course
many explanations for this decline. Perhaps people now see the
benefits of immigration after all the post-referendum talk of nursing
and doctor shortages. A rather more straightforward explanation is
that people think that by leaving the EU the immigration 'problem' is
being solved (i.e immigration numbers are much reduced). If it is the latter, then their knowledge is incomplete.
Immigration from the
EU has declined dramatically, which is not surprising, but this has
been partly offset by a significant rise in non-EU immigration
(source).
Are people really more concerned about EU immigrants than non-EU
immigrants?
Roy Greenslade notes
that the newspaper articles full of stories of immigration peril have
all but disappeared. He writes
“It was the press phenomenon of the age 10 years ago, and for at least the following six years – right up to the EU referendum. Since then, however, immigration has all but disappeared from newspaper pages.”
Could it be that the explanation for the diminished salience of
immigration is the very simple one that it is no longer in the news?
The folk law comes from the fact that the increase in concern about
immigration at the turn of the century coincided with the increase in
immigration numbers, first from outside the EU and then from the A8
countries joining the EU. However, as I note here,
there is a two or three year lag between the initial increase in
immigration and public attitudes. The lag is much shorter with a time
series for the number of stories in the press about immigration.
This shouldn’t be a surprise. Much of the concern about immigration
is in areas that see very few immigrants. If people are getting their
information ‘first hand’ from friends or relatives living in
areas of high immigration you might expect a relatively short lag
between numbers and concern, but if people are getting their
information from the media you would require some change in how the
media covered this issue before salience changed. Or to put it more
crudely, salience to some extent is inevitably going to reflect what
is ‘in the news’.
This does not mean salience is completely divorced from what people
think. You could fill newspapers with stories about the housing
problems of the very wealthy and it is unlikely that housing would
start climbing the salience ranking. It is also true that rising immigration numbers helped newspapers write stories of 'floods' and 'waves'. But what it does mean is that if
stories about immigration start disappearing, salience will gradually
decline.
The more interesting question is why newspaper headlines about
immigration, which in newspapers like the Sun and the Mail were
explicitly or implicitly hostile to immigration, should decline
sharply after the referendum vote. Roy Greenslade writes
“Yet the undeniable truth, the sad, sick, unvarnished truth, is that migration is off the media’s central agenda for two reasons. Firstly, it is no longer a political issue. With the pro-Brexit vote having been achieved, there is no need to keep on injecting the same poison into public debate. Job done. Secondly, seen from the newspaper editors’ perspective, it is not a sales-winning topic at present. No need to play to the gallery. There is no “value” in running anti-immigrant stories.”
In other words, newspapers are not publishing alarming stories of
waves of non-EU immigrants coming to the UK because there is no
political or sales motive for doing so. It is like saying if people
who are hostile to immigration think leaving the EU means job done
then let them. Increasing immigration salience was politically
important for these newspaper owners while Labour was in government
and to push the Tory government to support Brexit, but no longer.
Which, in turn, is why a Conservative government not led by Theresa
May and without immigration targets can contemplate a fairly relaxed
immigration regime, as Jonathan Portes notes.
The other reason is that opposition to immigration (rather than
salience) has been declining since a couple of years before the
referendum, as the Migration Observatory also shows.
Since 2017 more people
think immigration has had a positive impact on the UK than think the
opposite.
As Rob Ford notes,
we don’t know why the public are feeling more positive about
immigration, but equally too many have failed to notice how things
have changed. I would add that too few also realise how changes in
the salience of immigration tells us a lot about what has been in
newspapers, and rather less about the underlying views of voters or,
indeed, the number of immigrants coming in to the UK.