The reality behind fiscal scare stories, or mediamacro is alive and well

If you listen to the broadcast media, you will have almost certainly picked up the message that at some point in the near future the Chancellor is going to have to raise taxes or cut spending to ‘pay for’ all the support to the economy during the pandemic. At least the Financial Times has learnt the lesson of 2010, and notes in this editorial that the Chancellor

“must hold the line and resist attempts to push the UK into a premature fiscal retrenchment. Cutting spending in the middle of the worst recession since the creation of the country would be a historic blunder and make Britain poorer in the long run through unnecessary unemployment and business failure.”

If only they had said the same in 2010.

But they add “Eventually the bill for the crisis-fighting measures will come due.” This is also the message of the latest report from the OBR. We can see what they have in mind from this chart.

The upper dotted line is the OBR's worst case scenario. Next one down is the central scenario, followed by another dotted line which is their best case scenario. The other lines are previous forecasts.

All the scenarios, including previous pre-pandemic forecasts, show the same underlying instability. The difference is that as a result of the pandemic, this instability kicks in around the end of this decade rather than sometime in the next decade. Here we get to the crucial point I want to make. For the next five years, in its central forecast public debt moves either side of its projected level for 2020/1 of 104% of GDP. (For each year thereafter: 104, 105, 106, 102.)

The implication is that there is no immediate need for large scale fiscal tightening when the economy recovers. The deficit will be higher than we are used to, but with a higher level of public debt and very low interest rates the level of the deficit that stabilises this debt is also higher. Thus there is no immediate need for substantial tax increases or spending cuts immediately after the recovery is complete. According to the OBR something will need to be done after the general election, but I doubt any Conservative Chancellor will raise taxes substantially ahead of a general election based on OBR forecasts alone.

So the big news from the OBR’s report is not only that there is no immediate need for fiscal consolidation, but if the economy recovers according to its central scenario and it has got its fiscal numbers right, there is no need for substantial fiscal consolidation once the recovery is over. A permanent hit to UK output, which in other circumstances would lead to an unsustainable deficit, has been offset by the impact of low borrowing costs and a higher level of debt. Of course the OBR may turn out to have been too optimistic, and their pessimistic scenario does show debt rising through debt rising a bit between 2020/1 and 2024/5.

So why all the talk of fiscal gloom? (Not quite all. Ben Chu at the Independent has made the points I make above.) Are they reflecting what the OBR says? The report is called the “Fiscal Sustainability Report”, so you would expect them to flag the long term instability. But the final paragraph in their summary ends with this:

“in almost any conceivable world there would be a need at some point to raise tax revenues and/or reduce spending (as a share of national income) to put the public finances on a sustainable path.”

It seems that too many ignored the crucial three words “at some point”.

All this illustrates how deep seated the “deficit up = taxes will rise or spending will be cut” meme is. Of all the important economic stories that arise from this stage in the pandemic, the consequences for the deficit and future consolidation is not one of them. I guess one reason these stories are popular is that they are potentially relevant to everyone. Another is that they are so easy to write. Let us just hope that this time around politicians on all sides are not taking them seriously.

Posting may not happen for two or three weeks, because we are finally moving house..

Voting Labour isn’t going to turn the UK into Venezuela

but mainstream economists should make sure they are getting a hearing

It is tempting to laugh at the rhetoric of Conservative politicians or journalists when contemplating a possible future Labour government. As John Elledge writes, it isn’t long before Stalin or Trotsky or Venezuela is mentioned. As he notes, this is not a terribly clever tactic, particularly as many of the measures proposed by Labour are (by design) pretty popular. As Stephen Bush points out, the problem for the Conservatives is not that ‘young people’ have not learnt about the evils of communist regimes, but that this group are not impressed by Brexit or their wages and for many buying a house is something their parents generation did.

Yet this kind of hyperbole is not confined to politicians or journalists on the right. When John McDonnell, Labour’s shadow Chancellor, said at their party conference that they were ‘war-gaming’ for eventualities if they gained office like a run on sterling, I thought this showed mild paranoia. I was wrong. After I wrote that sterling was far more likely to rise at the prospect of a Labour government (standard macro: more fiscal, higher rates imply stronger currency), Buttonwood of the Economist wrote that there were at least five reasons why sterling might collapse, most of which involve some form of capital flight.

Although Buttonwood was careful to base analysis on measures that Labour proposed in 2017, I’m sure I was not imagining a subtext about what else could hard left politicians do. You can read much the same from some on the centre or soft left, who have learnt through experience to be wary of the hard left. Nick Cohen knows better than to call Labour’s new mass membership all militant entryists, but instead he says they are innocent (but should know better) lambs flocking towards wolves.

With language like this flying around, it is best to look for solid ground. In parliament Labour is a centre left party led by the hard left, to use popular labels. For that reason it would be impossible for it to pursue a hard left programme, and the leadership knows that. Contrast this with the current governing party: half soft, half hard right, with the latter having the upper hand because of the membership. The Conservative party’s ethos is such that the hard right have imposed a ruinous policy on our country without challenge, which actually did produce a collapse in sterling. Fortunately many Labour MPs have less loyalty and perhaps stronger principles, and would not allow anything similar if they were in power. As a result, I find pandering myths about Venezuela dishonest to be frank. If you want to fret about deselection, I suggest you talk to Nadine Dorries.

As far as City scare stories are concerned, as I indicated earlier and Ben Chu confirms, you will always be able to find those predicting doom. One of the refreshing things about this Labour leadership is that they do not cower defensively at such attacks, but come out fighting. As Corbyn’s video could have added, it was City economists who told us that austerity was necessary because otherwise there would be a flight from UK government debt. They were horribly wrong then, as interest rates on debt fell, and they are likely to be wrong again with new stories about capital flight under Corbyn.

While talk of Venezuela is ludicrous, there is a more interesting question about where the influences on future Labour policy are coming from. To set the scene, there was a recent prank outside the LSE designed to suggest heterodox economists were the Luther to economic mainstream Catholicism, and this was followed by a column from Larry Elliott in the Guardian. Now there are plenty of things to criticise about economics, but these are not them. As Frances Coppola recounts, the ‘economics reformation’ document is embarrassingly bad. If you want to read a short but to the point and well written response, see here.

So, in case you thought otherwise, mainstream economists do not spend their time attacking any form of market intervention, but instead try to design efficient market intervention. As I have argued many times, most mainstream macroeconomists did not endorse austerity, for the simple reason that textbooks and state of the art models suggest it would be a very bad idea. But there are some (not all) heterodox economists who would like you to believe otherwise.

What has this got to do with a future Labour government? Christine Berry presents a comprehensive account of who is shaping future Labour policy. It contains the following paragraph.

“John McDonnell’s Council of Economic Advisors, set up during the first days of the leadership, was a valiant effort to give the party’s economic policy some heavyweight academic backing. But many of its members were not natural Corbyn supporters, and ran alarmed from the public ridicule heaped on the leadership in the early days – resulting in the Council being largely disbanded. Academic input now seems to be ad hoc rather than systematised.”

That is not how it happened. It is true that some of us had to suffer some public ridicule when we joined, but that just reflected badly on those doing the ridiculing. The breakup of the Council was inevitable after the EU referendum. It is hard for any group of serious economists to publicly advise in such a forum any political party that appears to support a Brexit policy that is doing (see Chris Giles here) so much damage and could do much more.

The understandable wish of many heterodox economists to have an influence on Labour policy does mean there is a potential competition for influence. Will Labour policy be based on policies derived from mainstream analysis, or those favoured by some heterodox economists? It would be wrong to exaggerate this competition: most mainstream economists agree with most heterodox economists about austerity, for example. But there are some clear differences. (In some ways you see something similar on the right, where City economists compete with mainstream economists for influence on Conservative party policy, which is one reason Conservative macroeconomic policy can produce major disasters.)

Ann Pettifor has an article about why business would do well under Labour, which invokes some of the points made in an earlier Financial Times piece. Once you discount the scare stories, I agree with Ann that the economy and therefore businesses will do much better under Labour than under the Conservatives. But her article contains an interesting remark which I think tells us something about the current leadership. Ann’s says

“Here I must acknowledge a disagreement with Professor Simon Wren-Lewis, of Oxford University, who advised Labour to adopt a fiscal rule that once again prioritises monetary policy …”

Ann follows the heterodox MMT school that favours using fiscal rather than monetary policy to stabilise output and inflation. Of course both Ann and I were on Labour’s Economic Advisory Council, and so it is obvious that there was a similar discussion in this group.

The fact that McDonnell chose a more conventional but still innovative approach (which happened to be the one I put forward), and has also stressed the importance of central bank independence, shows us two things: he has a distinctly conservative streak, and he wants Labour not only to win but to be successful in economic terms. But while McDonnell may have opted for a mainstream approach on monetary and fiscal policy, there is still plenty to play for in other areas. I am not suggesting that mainstream economists should always win when conflicts occur, but it is important for mainstream economists not to arrive late to these battlefields, or worse still wait for politicians to read their papers.

The BBC and Patrick Minford

Over the last few days the BBC has given considerable publicity to Patrick Minford’s new report published by the ‘Economists for Free Trade’. I have looked at both the BBC News website entry and listened to the Radio 4 Today programme’s discussion. They are both classic ‘2 sided controversy’ formats, with Monique Ebell from the National Institute of Social and Economic Research (NIESR) providing the main opposition.

So why was this coverage something the BBC should be deeply ashamed about? There are two main reasons, but first let me make a more general point which applies to journalism more generally. There is no quality control in most of the media when it comes to giving publicity to a report like this. There is a very simple reason for this, and that is the primacy given to immediacy. In a better world, when a report like this came out, journalists would spend a few days ringing around to see what the reaction of other experts were, or nowadays just look at reactions on twitter.

In this particular case such a strategy would have thrown up some apparently large errors, and this should have led journalists to question whether they should give the report any publicity. They might at the very least have waited until the full report was published next month.

Let me give an analogy. Suppose a report of a medical trial had suggested a miracle cure for some serious disease. The report had not been peer reviewed, and its author had connections to a drug company that stood to benefit from the alleged cure, but the BBC had decided to give it considerable publicity nevertheless. Within days it became clear that there were serious problems with the report, and that there were other existing papers that came to a completely different conclusion. The BBC would then look very foolish, and many sufferers from this disease would have been given false hope. I suspect for that reason the BBC would be much more cautious. Yet if the report is about a subject matter with any political implications this caution appears to go out of the window.

Now let me get to the two reasons why the BBC should be ashamed in this case. First, Patrick Minford is no expert in international trade. He is a macroeconomist, who in his younger, less obviously political, days served as something of a role model for me. He published a very similar argument about the benefits of unilateral trade liberalisation during the referendum campaign. It was heavily criticised by individuals or groups that are experts in international trade. So we have already had the quality control, yet the BBC decided to ignore that. Returning to my analogy, it is as if there had been earlier claims of miracle cure that had been thoroughly debunked by medical experts and the BBC had ignored these.

Second, at no point in either of the two items I looked at is there any mention that the overwhelming consensus among academic economists is that Brexit would be harmful to the economy. We just have reports that give two opinions, with no context whatsoever about which opinion is the consensus view and which is the maverick. It is exactly equivalent to giving considerable publicity to a report from some climate change denial outfit, and including a response from one or two climate scientists with no mention of what the consensus among climate scientists is. Again to draw on my analogy, it is like reporting a miracle cure and failing to say that nearly all doctors thought this was rubbish.

This last point about ignoring the clear consensus touches a particular nerve for me, because it is exactly what the BBC appeared to many of us to do during the referendum campaign. Yet when the Royal Economic Society complained about this, they were told that the economic consensus had been mentioned in this and that bulletin. Whether this was cherry picking by the BBC is not easy to establish after the event. [1] Well here is an example where it was not mentioned, and I would like to hear from the BBC why this information was not thought to be useful to convey to its audience. [2] 

On both counts, this is very bad journalism, even if you do not think economics has the same standing as medicine. The BBC may have thought they had brushed off complaints from economists, but here is a specific example where they really do have a serious case to answer. As Ben Chu rightly says: “The legitimate news story around Minford’s work is how bad science can survive and thrive when it supports the desires and prejudices of powerful people in our society … the BBC ... has become part of the problem.” Brexit is the Emperor's New Clothes, and no one - including the BBC - dares say that the Emperor has no clothes.

[1] Not easy but not impossible: it would cost a few thousand pounds in research time for someone to go through the main news reports during the Brexit campaign and establish how many times the economic consensus was mentioned.

[2] Channel 4 News did put the point to Minford that many economists thought his work was flawed, to which he responded by saying “all these trumped up economists and the consensus they are all hired hands”‘. A very political answer from a very political economist, and therefore very revealing, but not a question the BBC apparently thought worth asking.  

Underestimating the impact of austerity

There have been many ideas put forward to explain the low growth in UK productivity, but among mainstream accounts the impact of austerity is not usually high up on the list of possibilities. I have talked before about what I call an ‘innovations gap’, and how the UK is currently suffering a particularly large innovations gap. The idea of an innovations gap can link inadequate demand, like austerity, to low productivity growth.

Let me use a very simple example to explain how an innovations gap can arise after a deep recession followed by austerity. Assume that improvements in technology and production techniques are constantly taking place, or being learnt from other firms/countries, but they need new investment to put them in place. This is what economists call embodied technical progress.

Imagine a firm where demand is not increasing. Will that firm invest to become more productive? Only if the additional profits it can make as a result of investing (suitably discounted) is greater than the cost of the investment. For this firm we therefore need quite a big innovation gap before it is worth its while to undertake investment and before its productivity increases.

Now imagine that demand increases. The firm now has to undertake some additional investment to increase its output. It makes sense to invest in techniques that embody the latest technology. The increase in demand leads to both higher investment (what economists call the ‘accelerator’) and higher productivity.

In a normal recovery from a recession, demand recovers rapidly (growth easily exceeds past trends), leading firms to invest in the latest technology. Any innovations gap that might have opened up in the recession is quickly closed. In contrast, a very slow recovery caused by austerity will reduce the need for investment, allowing a large innovations gap to open up.

This idea fits in with some recent work which suggests that productivity growth in ‘frontier’ firms (firms that already have relatively high productivity) has not slowed, and a gap has opened up between these frontier firms and laggards. (See also here.) This would make sense if the frontier firms are growing (because they are the most productive) but the laggard firms are not. Growing firms need to invest to expand, but stagnant firms are not expanding.

The same model could also suggest how wage led productivity growth could occur (see Ben Chu here for example). As most innovations are likely to be labour saving, then higher wages can increase the profits that come from any particular investment, without necessarily increasing the cost of that investment. So an increase in wages caused by an increase in the minimum wage, for example, could increase investment and therefore increase productivity. The other side of that coin is that the period of stagnant wage growth we have had since the recession provided no incentive for firms to invest in higher productivity techniques.

I doubt that this story explains more than a part of the UK’s productivity gap. In the UK investment in plant and machinery fell sharply in the recession, and has not yet recovered to pre-recession levels, but its decline is unlikely to be enough to explain a productivity standstill. (For an account of some other key factors that could explain the UK productivity puzzle, see here.) But if it explains even a little, it makes austerity a lot more costly.

One way of describing what I’m saying is that austerity influences supply as well as demand. You could say austerity ignores the accelerator as well as the multiplier, which is cute but does not capture the idea of embodied technical progress which is crucial to this argument. It is why it is always best to run a high pressure economy (see Martin Sandbu here who links to an interview between Jared Bernstein and Josh Bivens).

As I explain here, I do not use austerity as just another name for any fiscal consolidation, or fiscal consolidation involving cuts to spending. Fiscal consolidation need not reduce output for the aggregate economy if monetary policy is able to offset its impact. But if interest rates are at their lower bound, as they are once again in the UK [1], fiscal consolidation will reduce output and lead to another needless waste of resources. Since Brexit we have a second period of UK austerity. In assessing how costly this will be, we need to look not just at whether it creates a negative output gap, but also how it creates an innovations gap that reduces productivity.

[1] We know this, because the Bank is increasing the amount of QE.

A response to Gudgin, Coutts & Gibson

The authors have a post on the Prime website in which they, among other things, respond to two blog posts of mine where I mention their work on Brexit. In the first post they mention [1], I use a graph from their paper to illustrate how important the Single Market was for UK exports. Here is the graph.

I then wrote

“But didn’t the CBR report say that the benefits of the Single Market had been exaggerated by the Treasury? Yes it did. Here is some of its reasoning. That growth in UK export share after the Single Market is not as impressive as it looks, because there is an underlying 6% positive trend in the share, which you can detect before we joined the EU. That looks pretty on a picture, until you realise it is nonsense. A 6% trend rise in an export share will imply that at some point not too far away UK exports to the EU will be as high as total EU GDP. UK exporters are just not that much better than exporters in other countries. There is no underlying trend rise in the UK’s export share.”

By export share, it is obvious that I’m talking about share in destination GDP, as in the chart. In my paragraph there is an error. I used a 6% figure rather than the correct 3.5% figure for their trend in export penetration relative to the non-EU penetration. It was a particularly stupid error, because just below Chart 7 is Chart 8, which contains the correct figure.

But, as the authors must know, this error is not important to my argument. Replace 6 by 3.5 in the relevant paragraph and it still makes perfect sense. What I was criticising was the notion that there was any substantial underlying trend in export penetration, and that the impact of EU membership should be judged relative to that trend. You can see from this chart how ludicrous a 3.5% trend is: it implies that without EU membership the UK exports share would be now above 10% and rising fast. This trend seems to be an important part of their judgement that UK export penetration relative to the EU would fall by substantially less than the Treasury assume in their analysis. The trend makes no sense, unless the aim is to make the impact of EU membership look small.

So what is the authors’ response to my basic criticism in their Prime piece? There is none.

As far a the 6 rather than 3.5 is concerned, it is also odd is that this is the first time they have mentioned the error to me. The post was from mid-January, and I would have happily changed 6 to 3.5 if they had pointed it out to me earlier.

The second post was a discussion of the notion of ‘fake economics’. I said fake economics could be described as “economic analysis or research that is obviously flawed but whose purpose is to support a particular policy.” or “We can equally talk about evidence based policy and its fake version, policy based evidence.” Here is what I wrote in full about their study in that post.

“The CBR analysis is less obviously fake. However Ben Chu has gathered the views of some academics who are experts in trade theory, including Richard Baldwin (who has just written a definitive and widely praised book on the ‘new globalisation’) and Alan Winters, both hugely respected with immense experience, who pour some very cold water over the study.”

How do the authors respond to this second post in the Prime piece. They write

“It is unusual for Wren-Lewis to rely uncritically on mainstream economists, but he was willing to do so in this case. With many of Wren-Lewis’ articles being used by one of us in economics teaching to encourage students to query and to test what is considered ‘mainstream’ it seems more than a little surprising to be discredited for daring to do so.”

This is wrong in many ways. First, I was not relying on others, as I had serious misgivings about their use of trends that I outline above. Second, I made no mention of ‘mainstream’ and heterodox anywhere, so any suggestion that this was behind what I wrote is their invention. Finally, there is no problem with anyone challenging anyone else.

Let me reproduce one of the quotes from Ben’s piece

“The HMT [Treasury] use of gravity model was perfectly in line with best practice. It was classic evidence-based policy analysis”, said Richard Baldwin, Professor of International Economics at The Graduate Institute of Geneva. Professor Baldwin went on to accuse Mr Gudgin himself of engaging in “policy-based evidence making” and “using evidence the way a drunk uses a lamp post – for support, not illumination”.

So Richard Baldwin was accusing the authors of exactly the fake economics that I talked about. Given my suspicions about their treatment of trends discussed above, I felt justified in writing about their piece in this context.

I could have ignored Richard Baldwin’s criticism and my own suspicions, and not included them in this post. But here is another quote from Ben’s piece:

“Dr Graham Gudgin of the CBR criticised the Treasury’s analysis, which predicted a major hit to the UK economy by 2030 if the UK experienced a “hard Brexit”, in unusually strident terms describing it as “very flawed and very partisan”. Dr Gudgin said he “suspected” Treasury civil servants had been leaned on by ministers to produce the results David Cameron and George Osborne wanted.”

Recall that the Centre of Economic Performance argued, based on their own extensive analysis, that the Treasury had underestimated the costs of Brexit, so presumably the accusation of ‘very flawed and very partisan’ applies to their analysis too. If one of the authors was happy to argue that the analysis of others had been designed to produce certain results, I felt it only fair to ask the same question of the authors.

[1] Actually the second post by date: the two post were a day apart.

The Output Gap and the Innovations Gap

A major objection to my suggestion that the UK is in an self-fulfilling expectations led recession is that measures of the output gap suggest that gap is near zero. What I want to argue here is that measures of the output gap ignore what I will call the innovations gap, and the innovations gap could indicate that demand expansion would not be inflationary.

The output gap is the difference between actual output and trend output, where trend output is the level of output at which inflation is stable. The OBR are the output gap kings. They have a composite measure, which Ben Chu shows here, but this is derived from many different measures, shown in the OBR’s latest forecast on page 36. The OBR also show (p38) that estimates produced by other organisations vary widely. Most measures of the output gap can be categorised into four kinds.

1. Time series filters. These, at their most simple, just smooth the data on actual output to produce the measure of trend output that is one half of the output gap. These have no economic content and therefore tell us almost nothing.
   
   
2. Production function estimates. These combine measures of the labour force with the capital stock to give potential output: the level of output that could be produced if all factors of production were fully utilised. The major problem with these measures is that they have no measure of technology: how much can be produced by capital and labour. What is generally done is to use time series methods to estimate this, which takes us back to the smoothing idea. As a result, measures produced by the IMF and OECD suggest the years before the recession were a huge boom, which is implausible given other evidence we have.
   
   
3. Labour market measures, like unemployment or participation. There are of course many problems in knowing what the non-inflationary level of these variables are.
   
   
4. Firm surveys. These ask questions like are you producing at normal levels of capacity utilisation. The answer you get right now is that firms are indeed working close to normal capacity.
   
   

With these definitions in mind, what we have to ask is do any of these measures tell us what we really want to know, which is would firms react to increases in demand by raising prices and wages. I want to argue that they may not after an economy has grown at rates well below previous trends for a while. The reason is that, in these circumstances, firms may know that their current production methods are outdated, too labour intensive and inefficient, but at current levels of demand it is not worth them investing in new techniques. However if demand did increase, rather than raise prices to choke off that new demand, it would be more profitable to investment in new equipment to meet that additional demand. An expansion in demand would not be inflationary because firms would not raise their prices. In addition, because these new techniques were labour saving, there would be no inflationary pressure in the labour market (although real wages would rise because productivity increased).

We can tell the following story about the UK economy. At the peak of the recession, unemployment was high and firms had spare capacity. All the output gap measures said the output gap was large. What would normally happen next is that output would start recovering rapidly at above trend rates of growth, leading to a pickup in investment and new techniques being embodied in new production. But that didn’t happen in the UK, mainly because austerity held back demand and interest rates couldn’t go negative. 

When demand did finally begin to expand at a modest rate in 2013, cautious firms decided to meet that additional demand not through new investment but by using existing spare capacity. During 2013 and 2014 employment increased and the output gap fell, but productivity was stagnant because most firms were not investing in new techniques. (The market leaders were, because being market leaders they were expanding more rapidly and investing. So as Martin Sandbu has discussed, the UK productivity puzzle is associated with the average firm, not leading firms.)

This meant that by 2015, unemployment had fallen to more normal levels, and firms no longer had spare capacity. All this had been achieved with stagnant productivity growth, because most firms had stopped investing in new innovations. It was not because those innovations had stopped being made. So the output gap had been replaced by an innovations gap, with most firms using out of date production techniques that are too labour intensive.

If this story is right, we have become locked in a self-fulfilling low growth trap. Firms will not invest because they see recent slow growth continuing. They are right, because policymakers, looking at the output gap rather than the innovation gap, are doing nothing to expand demand for fear of inflation, or worse still because of mistaken worries about government debt. I do not know if this story is right, but it seems to me that the cost in lost output if it is right is so great that it is foolish to ignore this possibility.   

Fake Economics and the media

If there is Fake News, is there such a thing as Fake Economics? I thought about this as a result of two studies that have received considerable publicity in the press and broadcast media over the last few weeks. Both, needless to say, involve Brexit. The first are two bits of analysis by ‘Change Britain’, saying Brexit would generate 400,000 new jobs and “boost the UK by £450 million a week”. The second is a more substantial piece of work by economists at the Centre for Business Research (CBR) in Cambridge, which was both very critical of the Treasury’s own analysis of the long term costs of Brexit and came up with much smaller estimates of its own for these costs.

Defining exactly what Fake News is can be difficult, although we can point to examples which undoubtedly are fake, in the sense of reporting things to be true when it is clear they are not. Fake News often constitutes made up facts that are designed for a political purpose. You could define Fake economics in a similar way: economic analysis or research that is obviously flawed but whose purpose is to support a particular policy. (Cue left wing heterodox economists to say the whole of mainstream economics is fake economics.) We can equally talk about evidence based policy and its fake version, policy based evidence.

The study by Change Britain seems to fit into that category. In looking at the impact on jobs of potential new export markets once Brexit has happened, it counts the jobs from any extra exports but ignores the jobs lost from extra imports. It adds the extra value of exports sold to the direct budgetary saving, which is a meaningless thing to do.

The CBR analysis is less obviously fake. However Ben Chu has gathered the views of some academics who are experts in trade theory, including Richard Baldwin (who has just written a definitive and widely praised book on the ‘new globalisation’) and AlanWinters, both hugely respected with immense experience, who pour some very cold water over the study.

My key point is that both of these studies were given considerable exposure in the media, and not just in the part devoted to pro-Brexit propaganda. Here is Larry Elliott in the Guardian on the CBR study. In all the cases I’ve seen the reporting has been uncritical, with no attempt to get the opinion of experts in the field. (The Guardian in their coverage of the ‘Change Britain’ report did note that the organisation was backed by pro-Leave campaigners, but it still published the claims without any criticisms of the analysis.)

It is not difficult to understand why this happens. It is a combination of two problems: lack of journalistic resources and the concept of old news. It is the latter that means a report has to be reported on the day of publication, leaving little time to get critical reactions (particularly from academics). But these factors do mean that the non-partisan mainstream media is wide open to fake economics. (Columnists like Elliott should be able to do better, but he did support Brexit.)

This is how the public, and to be honest, journalists themselves get a distorted view of the economics of Brexit. The impression is given that, as usual, economists are divided over the issue, whereas in reality academics are pretty well united in their view that Brexit will reduce UK living standards. (And of course it already has.as the depreciation leads to inflation and lower real wages.)

Journalist resources and culture are not going to change anytime soon. Which is why economists have to think seriously as a collective about how they can best counter fake economics. This has to involve doing something individual academics are not very good at: giving fast responses if journalists ask whether some new report is serious economics or fake economics. .

Brexit: a battle lost but who will fight the war?

The Brexit vote was, in economic terms, an act of self harm. You do not need to just ‘trust the experts’ on this: it is pretty close to common sense. As Rebecca Driver clearly explains, leaving the single market will make it much more difficult for (particularly small) firms to trade in Europe. As Europe is on our doorstep and geography matters, that cannot and will not be compensated for by trading more elsewhere. [1] Finally greater trade is associated, for clear reasons, with higher growth. Lower growth will impact unfavourably on every area in the UK, whether they voted Leave or Remain.

The harm done is not just economic. As Ben Chu writes, “The crude majoritarian politics of this referendum has seen half of the population (a generally poorer, less well-educated and elderly half) effectively strip major freedoms and even a cherished identity from the other half (a more prosperous and predominantly younger half)”. Before the referendum, I had conversations with people arguing that a Brexit vote would be more harmful than a Trump presidency, and this deep sense of anger, loss and despondency will not go away. We therefore need to understand why it happened.

In my last post I argued that Brexit was a protest vote against both the impact of globalisation and social liberalism. The two come together over immigration, and of course the one certainty of the Brexit debate was that free movement prevented controls on EU migration. Globalisation has benefited the majority in the UK, so those who had not benefited could not alone have won a Brexit vote. Equally social conservatives have lost battle after battle in the UK on specific social issues. Brexit was the perfect storm where these two groups came together, and combined they just managed to win.

Explanations do not imply inevitability, but instead tell us why the result could easily have been different. We need a sensible discussion about immigration, rather than assume it is always and everywhere a problem. However to follow the social conservative route and say concern over immigration is just xenophobia is not helpful. [2] We need to challenge the view the right wing press has patiently built up that immigration is responsible for declining public services and making it difficult to get housing. Too many people continue to discount the power and influence of the media: that is a mistake, as this research on Fox news shows. It is not difficult to get across the benefits of immigration, given how much the NHS and our construction sector depend on immigrants, but it is not something many of our leading politicians have done for some time.

More generally it is becoming increasingly clear how destructive the doctrine of neoliberalisation has been. Neoliberalism combines the encouragement of globalisation with demands for a much reduced role for the state. In the advanced economies the deindustrialisation implied by globalisation and the growth of China and elsewhere has been beneficial overall, but there are sections of society that have lost out, which invites a backlash. As Kevin O’Rourke shows, globalisation has often led to fierce resistance in the past. Dani Rodrik has demonstrated how state spending can protect, and has often in the past protected, the losers from trade. [3] (As an economist mights say, globalisation is a Kaldor/Hicks improvement, but in recent times the compensation part has been missing.) Brexit, like the financial crisis and perhaps also Donald Trump, are in this sense problems created not by globalisation alone but by neoliberalism.

For the UK it is worse than that. It is not just that austerity is the real cause of declining public services, and a failure to build houses is the cause of rising prices and rents. (See Chris Dillow or Mariana Mazzucato) It is that this government in particular has connived with the right wing press to transfer blame for an NHS in crisis and unaffordable housing from their own policies on to immigration. The Remain campaign was Cameron and Osborne, and neither were prepared to change their tune and start talking about how limiting immigration would mean there was even less money for public services. As I noted in the previous post, the NHS was an important concern for Leave voters, and they thought Brexit would make things better. Can you imagine a worse background for the EU referendum vote than a government that continually stressed the importance of limiting immigration, but failed to achieve those limits so spectacularly. [4]

This was not the only problem with the Remain campaign. In terms of getting the message across, Leave seemed to understand their target audience much better. (It is not my field, but this from Mark Hind makes sense.) To get the message across the Remain campaign relied on the institutions of the establishment: the Treasury, Bank of England, IMF etc. Fine for those for whom the establishment is respected, less so for those who regard it as remote and detached from their lives. Remain made very little use of academics, despite the fact that this group is trusted by the public. [5] Leave did seem to understand this, which is why they went to ridiculous extremes to discredit these experts. The broadcast media hardly ever noted the consensus among economists that Brexit would reduce everyone's standard of living, and instead did their ‘he says, she says’ thing. This media also failed to point out the lies Leave told, preferring ‘balance’ over truth.

All this implies that while the potential for a Brexit vote was always there, reflecting the perfect storm of anger against globalisation and social liberalism, it might not have been realised if the Remain campaign had been better, the Leave campaign had been honest and the broadcast media had not departed from its mission to educate and explain. The lies of the Leave camp are already apparent. The depreciation in sterling that immediately followed the vote is a cut in living standards for everyone in the UK with no lasting compensation. It is permanent unless the markets have got things spectacularly wrong. The economic downturn that is underway is as predicted. In both cases voters were told this was fear mongering by the Remain side: now those that promoted Leave are in the ludicrous situation of arguing that markets and firms have somehow been deceived by Project Fear.

In normal circumstances this would all be a cause for optimism. We do not need many voters to realise that they were conned by the Leave campaign before Leavers become a minority, or at least for the majority to favour a deal that can keep the UK in the single market with essentially free movement of labour. (There may have even been such a majority on the day of the vote.) To call this the denial stage in some ‘grieving process’ by Remain voters misunderstands the nature of the decision. Leaving is compatible with a whole range of alternative arrangements: some quite close to EU membership, some not. In that sense the vote only gave the green light to an ongoing struggle over what these arrangements will be. (For a discussion of the politics involved, see here but also here.) Thus those who say we should accept the verdict of the people are wrong, because a great deal is still to play for.

Yet circumstances are far from normal, and there seems little ground for optimism. Our new Prime Minister - who was as complicit in the sham targets for immigration as Cameron and Osborne - has appointed those who supported Leave to handle negotiations. She knows that the only way she can unite her party is to end free movement and therefore leave the single market.

Worse still, the government will do whatever it wants to do when it comes to the type of Brexit we have. Our official opposition will, if the polls are right, be the same opposition that was both ineffective and conflicted in the Brexit campaign, preoccupied as it will almost certainly be with cleansing the PLP rather than the details of trade arrangements. There is no alternative opposition with any strength. The SNP cannot speak for the rest of the UK, and anyway will be focused on trying (and probably failing) to drum up enough support for independence. As a result the 48% or more who did not want an end to the single market will not be able to do much about it. I fear that if you want a vision of what Britain after Brexit will become, you just need to look in the pages of the newspapers that were a vital part in bringing Brexit about.

[1] My impression was that discussion on broadcast news programmes, which is the main source many people have to unbiased news coverage, or even the debates never got to this point. We had someone from Remain saying trade with Europe would suffer, and someone from Leave saying we would be ‘free’ to trade with other countries. You do not need the Treasury’s gravity equations to make this simple point about geography and trade, but you need to go a little beyond soundbites.

[2] A similar point can be made about nationalism, which is hard to combat and may be a symptom rather than a cause.

[3] Rodrik, D. (1998), "Why do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?" Journal of Political Economy 106(5): 997-1032

[4] None of this was hard to see before the last general election. Those who in 2015 voted Conservative but also wanted to Remain need to ask why they took no notice of the warnings that some of us made. Those ‘business leaders’ who seemed to unanimously endorse Cameron need to ask, or be asked, why they were gambling with their company’s future in doing so.

[5] Part of the problem is that Leave voters tended not to trust anyone. This, by Jean Pisani-Ferry, is good on experts and trust.

Economists versus bankers

Nearly a year and a half ago I wrote a post about encouraging dialogue between economists and other social scientists. I concluded with the following three paragraphs:

“Let me take a real world economic problem: the response to the financial crisis. Some have suggested that banks have become too large and need to be broken up, or that the activities of high street banking need to be separated from the activities of the casino. Your economic analysis tells you that networks of many small entities can be as subject to crises as networks involving a few large banks. You are also able to devise a system of Chinese walls that mean that the activities of the casino can be separated from those of the high street even within the same company, and your political masters seem to prefer this approach. You recognise that different assets differ in their liquidity, and so you devise complex weighting algorithms for computing capital ratios. Your suggestions form the basis of negotiations between officials and bankers, and a set of rules and regulations are agreed.

Over the next few years you watch in dismay as your complex system begins to unravel. The CEOs of the large banks seem to constantly have the ear of politicians, who in turn gradually compromise your elaborate controls to render them less and less effective. Those in charge of administering the rules find it much more lucrative to work for the banks, and so regulators gradually lose expertise and resolve.

And you realise that right from the start you made the wrong choice. You decided to focus on what you knew, which was how to design systems that worked well as long as those systems remained unchanged, but which were not robust to intervention by self-interested parties. In short, they were too open to rent-seeking. You realise that actually the best thing to have done was to break up the banks so that their political power was forever diminished. And you recall a conversation with your social science colleague when this all started, who might have been trying to tell you this if only you had understood the words he was using.”

I was afterwards asked whether I had one particular UK economist, John Vickers, in mind when I wrote this. He chaired, at the government’s request, a commission on banking reform. He has become increasingly vocal about how his original commission’s proposals (pdf) are being watered down and how the Bank of England appears to be putting public money at risk once again. (For his detailed assessment, see this paper. And here is what another commission member, Martin Wolf, thinks about the financial sector. Adam Barber details how the attitude of the UK government has changed. In the US this very issue became an important point of difference between Clinton and Sanders.)

The honest answer is that I did not have him in mind. It was a fictional account designed to make a point, and so I took elements from different debates which together apply to no one country or individual. The point is that in finance good reforms are those that can best resist political or economic manipulation by banks, and perhaps economists in general have been slower to see that than some of their colleagues in other social sciences..

It would probably be fair to say that before the financial crisis economists got on pretty well with the financial sector. There was a common interest in monetary policy (although the motivation for that interest might have been different) and the sector was a useful source of funds for conferences and (for a few) consultancy. Most economists did not look too hard at what the financial sector was actually doing, although those that did often raised serious questions. Behind this nice piece by Ben Chu is an army of academic research which suggests that fees paid to manage funds are a waste of money.

The situation changed after the financial crisis, for obvious reasons. Since then economists have increasingly questioned whether the whole business model behind banking is sound. In particular they have questioned why banks should be so different from other companies in terms of the amount of equity capital they hold in relation to their assets. These economists include the previous governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King. They have also questioned whether one of the side effects of current regulation is to maintain the monopoly power of big banks.

If all that was not bad enough, we have the influence that the financial sector has on monetary policy. Mainstream macro has put a lot of emphasis on the importance of day to day monetary policy being independent of politicians, and far too little on it being independent of the influence of finance and bankers. Paul Krugman has talked about the links between interest rates and bank profits and how that might ‘guide’ the views of bankers. If you want to see a clear case of that, read this FT op-ed by David Folkerts-Landau, chief economist at Deutsche Bank.

The article could not be more wrong. The reason the Eurozone has performed so badly compared to the US, Japan and even the UK is not because of lack of structural reform, but because of the relative reluctance of the ECB to stimulate the economy. Rates were raised in 2011, and Quantitative Easing delayed until 2015. The article is full of hopeless lapses in logic. If there is any sense here at all, it is that high unemployment is required as a political incentive to undertake structural reform. So the ECB “has become the number one threat to the eurozone” because it has allowed politicians to put that reform off.

Here I can do no better than quote Adair Turner. “Vague references to “structural reform” should ideally be banned, with everyone forced to specify which particular reforms they are talking about and the timetable for any benefits that are achieved. If the core problem is inadequate global demand, only monetary or fiscal policy can solve it.” In the Eurozone the core problem is lack of aggregate demand, as below target inflation shows.

Why this hostility from German bankers to low or negative rates? What the author does not tell you is that the profits of German banks, and the viability of other parts of the German financial system, are particularly (IMF pdf, box 1.3) vulnerable to low rates. (For those that can access it, Wolfgang Münchau in the FT provides an excellent summary.) And also that the profitability of Deutsche Bank is not great right now, as Frances Coppola notes. In the UK or US if this kind of nonsense from bankers appears in the press it gets a lot of kick back from economists - in Germany perhaps less so.

So who cares if economists have crossed swords with bankers? It matters because finance gets away with so much partly through a process of mystification. Mystification is how banks can perpetrate widespread fraud on consumers and businesses. When bankers say that being forced to ‘put aside’ more capital keeps money out of the economy it sounds plausible to many, even though it is completely false. (Admati and Hellwig (pdf) list 30 other similar false claims.) There is also a belief that because bankers are involved in financial markets, they must know something about how the macroeconomy works, a belief which the FT op-ed shows is clearly false. In all these cases, economists can provide demystification.

If we are ever to cut finance down to size (metaphorically, and perhaps also literally), economists are going to be vital in the battle to do so.