Winner of the New Statesman SPERI Prize in Political Economy 2016


Showing posts with label borrowing. Show all posts
Showing posts with label borrowing. Show all posts

Monday, 14 March 2016

Does public investment have to pay for itself?

A key distinction between Labour’s new fiscal rule and Osborne’s fiscal charter is that the former allows borrowing for investment. When supporters of the fiscal charter treat borrowing as if it was inherently sinful (‘Labour will borrow forever’) it is natural to remind them that firms often borrow to invest and grow, and consumers invariably borrow if they buy a house. We also note that public investment can enhance economic growth. But this can lead to a confusion about whether such investment has to ‘pay for itself’.

When a firm borrows to invest, it hopes to make enough profits to pay back the borrowing. There may be forms of public investment which could raise future GDP (and therefore income and spending) such that eventually taxes rise by enough to pay at least the interest on the borrowing that made the investment possible, or even start paying back the borrowing itself. But there are two other important reasons why it makes sense to borrow to invest.

The first involves intergenerational equity. Suppose we have a public investment project which significantly enhances the quality of life, but there is no pecuniary benefit: GDP does not rise. So taxes will have to rise at some point to pay for that borrowing. But who should pay those taxes? When we are talking about investments that are long-lived, the obvious answer is those that benefit from the investment, which means future generations as well as the current generation. That can happen if investment is paid for by borrowing rather than raising current taxes.

This helps answer a point that is often raised, which is what should count as public investment and what should not. With this reasoning it makes sense to borrow whenever the social benefits of public spending are long lasting. When the benefits are short lived, spending should be paid for by higher taxes. So the relevant metric for what should count as investment in this context is who benefits most. While paying doctors or teachers more may have some knock on benefits for the future, the main beneficiary will be today’s doctors or teachers. The benefits of new schools and hospitals are longer lasting. 

The second reason for using borrowing to pay for investment is if the increase in investment is a one-off. As taxes are distortionary at the margin, it makes sense to smooth those taxes over time. Once again, that can be achieved using borrowing.  

If a lot of public investment does not pay for itself, wouldn’t borrowing only to invest mean that debt just went on increasing and increasing? What matters here is the debt to GDP ratio. If you want to keep that ratio constant, and you always run a zero current balance, then that tells you how much investment you can do. The numbers are fairly simple to work out. If the economy grows in nominal terms by 4.5% on average, and debt is 80% of GDP, net investment could be around 3.5% of GDP to keep the debt to GDP ratio constant. Osborne plans net investment over this parliament averaging 1.6% of GDP.

This leads to one final, important point. You cannot have separate goals for all three of debt to GDP, the current balance, and public investment. In Labour’s new rule, the commitment to reduce borrowing as a share of trend GDP over the lifetime of a parliament, coupled with the zero current balance target, puts an upper limit on the amount of investment the government could do. Whether that is a sensible upper limit in economic or political terms, and what you do if it is not, I will leave as an exercise for the reader.


Friday, 11 March 2016

A (much) better fiscal rule

Today the Labour Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell will give a speech where he puts forward an alternative fiscal rule to George Osborne’s fiscal charter. It involves a rolling target for the government’s current balance: within 5 years taxes must cover current spending. It leaves the government free to borrow to invest. Investment cannot be unbounded, as there is a commitment to reduce debt relative to trend GDP over the course of a parliament.

No doubt we will hear the usual cries from the opponents of sensible fiscal rules: Labour plan to borrow billions more than George Osborne and they plan to go on borrowing forever. The simple response to that should be that it is right to borrow to invest in the country’s future, just as firms borrow to invest in capital and individuals borrow to invest in a house. Indeed, with so many good projects for the government to choose from, and with interest rates at virtually zero, it is absolute madness not to investment substantially in the coming years.

This part of the rule is similar to the main fiscal rule Osborne himself adopted under the Coalition, which in turn is not unlike previous rules adopted by Labour. What is new is that McDonnell’s rule involves what could be termed a ‘zero lower bound knockout’: if interest rates hit their lower bound following a recession, the focus of fiscal policy shifts from deficit targets to helping monetary policy support the economy. It reflects the knowledge we have gained since the global financial crisis.

Again critics will claim that the knockout would have meant building up even more debt after the last recession. But what matters with debt is its relationship to GDP, and it is far from clear whether more stimulus in 2009 and 2010 would have increased the debt to GDP ratio, because you are increasing GDP as well as debt. But even if debt to GDP did rise, this reflects the right choice. It means prioritising the real economy - jobs and wages - over an obsession with government debt.

We will no doubt be told by government supporters that this would have led to financial disaster, just as we are also told that the coalition saved us from disaster. We will be told this by some economists working in the financial sector - a sector that created the Great Recession. But there is no evidence for this impending disaster, and plenty of evidence that it is a complete myth. As Paul Krugman might say, in a country with its own central bank the bond vigilantes just keep failing to turn up.

Recessions come and go, you might respond, but higher debt will always be with us. That ignores two key points. First, prolonged and deep recessions cause lasting damage. UK GDP per head is currently over 15% below pre-recession trends. Does none of that have anything to do with the slowest UK recovery from a recession in centuries? Second using fiscal policy to end recessions quickly does not mean higher debt forever. The key point is that debt can be reduced once the recession is over and interest rates are safely above their lower bound. Doing that will be no cost to the economy as a whole, as monetary policy can offset the impact on demand. Obsessing about debt during a recession, by contrast, costs jobs and reduces incomes, as every economics student knows and as the OBR have shown.

The rule happens to mean that pretty well all of the additional austerity Osborne has detailed since the election is unnecessary. But that is a byproduct of adopting a sensible rule. If there is any ‘reverse engineering’ going on, it is with the fiscal charter, which some argue was adopted with the political purpose of making Labour look less prudent before the election. As McDonnell notes, no economist has attempted to defend Osborne’s fiscal charter.

Yet I know this point worries some Labour MPs and commentators. They say, quite rightly, that one of the main reasons the 2015 election was lost was because Labour were not trusted on fiscal policy. But the basic truth is that you do not enhance your fiscal credibility by signing up to a stupid fiscal rule. Apart from getting attacked for doing so by people like me, your collective heart is not really in it and it shows. You get trapped into proposing to shrink the state as Osborne is doing, or hitting the poor as Osborne is doing, or raising taxes which makes you unpopular. And if by chance it ever looks like you might be getting that trust back, Osborne or his successor will move the goalposts again.

The far more convincing way to get trust back is to adopt a fiscal rule that makes sense to both economists and the public (‘only borrowing to invest’), and actively talking about it. When the Conservatives accuse you of borrowing, you do not try and change the subject, but remind people that is what firms and consumers do. Borrowing is not a dirty word, particularly when it is on vital investment and you can do it for almost nothing! Indeed borrowing to invest shows you are optimistic about the future and are prepared to do things to make it better. In contrast those who would turn down these investment projects in order to reduce debt as fast as possible have a negative outlook that fears the future.

The Conservatives know they are vulnerable on public investment. Osborne tries to give the impression that he is doing a lot of it, but the figures do not lie. In the last five years of the Labour government the average share of net public investment in GDP was over 2.5%. During the coalition years it fell to 2.2%, and for the five years from 2015 it is planned to average just 1.6%. That is not building for the future, but putting it in jeopardy, as those whose homes have been flooded have found to their cost.[1]

[1] Besides cutting spending on flood prevention while part of the coalition, Damian Carrington revealed yesterday that UK funding for research on flooding has been cut by 62%! There can be no better indication of the madness of George Osborne’s deficit obsession.   

Thursday, 8 August 2013

Bringing economics back into fiscal policymaking

Today around the world the dominant framework for making fiscal policy decisions is personal finance for the overextended household. The state is like an individual who has borrowed too much, and so it must cut back on its borrowing. It is as if the basic insights of macroeconomics (let alone the more sophisticated analysis of the last 20 years) never took place. To take just one example: John Quiggin describes the success story of how Australia dealt with the Great Recession, which included a large fiscal stimulus, yet the politicians that helped achieve that success are now on the defensive because the budget is not in surplus.

As I argued in a recent post, what we have here is a combination of two things. First a strong political force that wants deficit reduction to be the focus of policy because it sees this as a useful way of reducing the size of the state. Second, public perceptions that try and understand events in terms of what they know: their own borrowing and spending decisions. So the need for immediate austerity becomes the dominant policy almost everywhere. I get frustrated sometimes that some colleagues, naturally concerned about the details of academic debate, cannot see the bigger picture here. The bigger picture is the marginalisation of our discipline - used when it suits a particular political purpose, but ignored otherwise. If policymakers and the pundits just pick up economic ideas when its suits them, and when the analysis or facts do not suit them just make stuff up (examples from US and UK), economic analysis just becomes fodder for speech writers. That reduces the discipline to an academic game, and soon those same people will ask: why are we paying people just to play games?

So how do we get macroeconomics back into fiscal policy making? First, we need to sort between politicians and political parties that are quite happy with the current state of affairs, and those who are not. Those who are not need to fight fire with fire, replacing one bit of homespun thinking with another which gets us closer to how policy should be made. One way of doing that is to replace the ‘state as an overextended household’ idea with the ‘state as an innovative firm’.

In terms of the sorting, in many cases that is pretty easy. Let’s take the example of the coalition partners in the current UK government: the Liberal Democrats. Now some might simply use guilt by association, but I prefer to be charitable. Perhaps they were bounced into supporting austerity by events in 2010 and advice they received from certain quarters. As the 2015 election comes nearer, the LibDems are trying to differentiate themselves from the Conservatives on many issues, and they do have a reputation for progressive thinking.

So have a look (pdf, page 37) at the key motion on the economy to be discussed at their September conference. It has Nick Clegg’s name on it, so we can assume it reflects the leadership’s thinking. It starts thus:

“Conference welcomes recent improvements in the UK economy, specifically that: 
I. Faced with the highest budget deficit in post-war history in 2010 as a consequence of the banking crisis and Labour’s mismanagement, the Government has managed to reduce the structural deficit by a third since it came to power.”

Point number two then talks about recent GDP growth figures. So the best thing that has happened to the UK economy recently has been that the deficit has come down. The message seems clear: reduction of the budget deficit is the number one priority and all else has to be subsumed to that.

Now you might in Clegg’s defense say that he has to put it this way, as he has been part of a government which has made deficit reduction the overriding priority. I think that is simply wrong. He could say instead that the focus on deficit reduction was appropriate given all the uncertainty as the Eurozone crisis broke. However now it is clear that this was a crisis specific to the Eurozone, and with interest rates on UK borrowing really low and likely to stay there, the UK can make reducing unemployment the priority, while still of course operating a prudent fiscal policy in the longer term. In other words, he could begin to de-prioritise deficit reduction. The fact that he chooses to do the complete opposite suggests he is content to see fiscal policy as an extension of household financial management. We will see in September whether the Party as a whole is happy to follow its leader in ignoring 80 years of macroeconomic analysis.

So how do politicians that do want to bring macroeconomics back into fiscal policymaking start to change the public debate? Knowing that the intellectual case for austerity is crumbling is reassuring, but it is not enough to make these politicians feel confident in challenging the dominant narrative. They need an alternative narrative, and a good one is the idea of investing when borrowing is cheap. In the UK the argument that there are plenty of useful infrastructure projects for the public sector to undertake has already been conceded by the government, and as Uwe Reinhardt points out here, it is also an easy argument to make in the US. So all that is needed is to see the state like a firm that decides to undertake these investments by borrowing when borrowing is cheap and there is plenty of spare labour to complete them.

As Martin Wolf wrote over a year ago: “Not only the economy, but the government itself is virtually certain to be better off if it undertook such investments and if it were to do its accounting in a rational way. No sane institution analyses its decisions on the basis of cash flows, annual borrowings and its debt stock. Yet government is the longest-lived agent in the economy. This does not even deserve the label primitive. It is simply ridiculous.” I think ‘borrowing to invest when borrowing is cheap’ is a message that can resonate with the public, which is why I suspect David Cameron described those pushing the idea as ‘dangerous voices’.



Sunday, 6 January 2013

Avoiding the B word


As I briefly listened to the radio the other morning, I heard the new head of the TUC (Trades Union Congress) talking about macroeconomic policy. She said the government’s policy of austerity has failed, and we need more investment in jobs. The interviewer asked whether this would mean more borrowing by the government. She avoided answering the question.

Unfortunately I have heard exactly the same from many UK public figures who are critical of austerity. It is as if a memo has gone round with the following instruction: whatever you do, do not say your alternative policy will involve more government borrowing. The writer of this memo presumably thinks that the general public believes additional borrowing is bad, and so it is best to avoid any admission that a policy might require it, even if this borrowing is temporary and at very low interest rates. Following Polly Toynbee, the paradox of thrift is too paradoxical for the public.

As some may have noticed, I have an unhealthy interest in macroeconomic spin. If you are concerned about policy you just cannot avoid it, and while it would be nice to pretend that spin does not matter, I suspect it would be a pretence. So, just on the level of spin, I cannot help feel that this fictional memo is ill conceived. Most people sense that when a public figure avoids answering a question, this is because they have something to hide. So in doing so, the effect is both to suggest that the policy will indeed require more borrowing, and that this is a problem, which is why the interviewee does not want to talk about it.

So here are a few alternatives, in the form of an imaginary interview

Q: Wouldn’t this involve the government borrowing more?

A: Yes, it would involve paying for the investment by borrowing. That is what a company would do if it saw a good investment opportunity, and we are always being told that the public sector should learn from good practice in the private sector.

Q: Wasn’t it excessive borrowing that got us into this mess?

A: Borrowing for a good reason is not a problem, as anyone with a mortgage will tell you. Borrowing becomes a problem when it underestimates the risks involved, and when the borrower may not be able to afford the repayments. The financial crisis was caused in part by excessive borrowing by consumers who thought house prices could never fall, but mainly it was banks over-extending themselves. The recession caused high government borrowing, and not the other way around.

Q: But isn’t pubic sector borrowing at record levels?

A: Yes, but so is the desire of the financial markets to buy public debt. This is why interest rates on public debt are so low. The financial markets desperately want to buy government debt, and so they are prepared to get very little back in return. That is one reason why now is just the right time for the government to borrow to invest.

Q: The government tells us that if it borrows more we will become like Greece.

A: This is nonsense. It is no coincidence that all the major countries experiencing a government debt crisis are in the Eurozone, because Eurozone countries do not have their own central bank. Governments outside the Eurozone have no problem borrowing at the moment – as I said interest rates outside the Eurozone are at record lows. If there was a serious risk that the UK would become like Greece, interest rates would not be so low.

Q: Isn’t it wrong for the government to be borrowing more when consumers are so strapped for cash, and often cannot borrow or are trying to rebuild their savings?

A: Exactly the opposite is true, as any economics student will tell you. If consumers are saving more, there is less spending power in the economy. If the government also spends less, we get a recession. That is the basic mistake the government is making. This is the other reason, besides low interest rates, why now is just the right time for the government to borrow more. In a recession, there is no danger that government spending will crowd out private spending, and it is much more likely to stimulate the economy.

Q: But surely no government can keep on borrowing more forever.

A: Of course not. But the right time to cut government borrowing is when the economy is strong, and the cost of borrowing is high.

Q: All politicians will find an excuse to spend more or tax less, and put off the day that borrowing is brought under control. At least this government has had the courage to deal with the problem, unlike their predecessors.

A: As many countries besides the UK are finding, it is much more difficult to bring down borrowing when the economy is weak. By contrast, many governments have succeeded in reducing borrowing when the economy has been stronger. Before the financial crisis, the ratio of government debt to GDP in the UK was below the level when Labour came into office in 1997. Bill Clinton successfully reduced US government debt during the 1990s, when the US economy was growing strongly.      

Q: But government borrowing more now will inevitably mean higher taxes in the future. We should not burden future generations in this way.

A: Not necessarily. By spending more today, we can reduce the need for the government to spend in the future, so taxes need not rise. As far as future generations are concerned, I suggest you ask some of the nearly one million young people who are currently trying to find a job what they think.