Is increasing workers' bargaining power a way of raising real wages?

There is no doubt that the last decade has been a terrible period for average real wages in the UK, with levels still below where they were before the Global Financial Crisis. It is very tempting to related this to the weak baragining power of workers. After all, we were being told before Brexit that the economy was strong, so if the benefits were not going to wages they must have been going somewhere else. Some people go further and say that one of the reasons that the bargaining power of UK workers is weak is because of high levels of immigration, and that therefore immigration must be responsible for lower real wages.

What people often forget is that real wages depend as much on prices as nominal wages. If nominal wages in the economy as a whole rise, firms can just pass additional costs on by raising their prices, leaving real wages unchanged. Equally if nominal wages are depressed because of weak bargaining power or immigration, firms are able to cut prices to become more competitive, rather than keep prices unchanged and raise their profits.

To see what firms have done on average we can look at the chart below, which shows the percentage shares of profits and wages in national income over the last thirty years. (They do not sum to 100 because of factors like self employment income and sales taxes.) The share of wages and profits in national income have been remarkably stable over the last two decades. It is simply not the case that bosses have been expropriating the gains from growth over the last decade.

So what does explain why real wages are still lower than before the Global Financial Crisis (GC), when the size of the economy a whole surpassed its pre-GFC level in 2013?

The first explanation is that GDP is not the right measure to use if you want to know about standards of living, because it can increase just because there are more people producing things in the economy. A much better measure is GDP per capita (GDP divided by the total population), and that only surpassed pre-GFC peaks at the end of 2015. It is one of the great ironies of UK politics (and a big media failure) that the growth the Conservatives like to boast about is in good part due to immigration they want to stop.

Yet GDP per capita is still higher than it was pre-GFC and real wages are not. The main reason for that is the exchange rate. We have had two very large depreciations since the GFC: one that happened as the crisis was unfolding and one as a result of the Brexit vote. This raises the price of imported consumer goods, which reduces real wages relative to GDP per capita. Another way of making the same point is that although each worker is producing a bit more stuff than pre-GFC, that stuff buys less overseas goods than it used to, which means workers are worse off.

The first depreciation probably reflected in part our dependence on a financial sector that was hit by the GFC, but the Brexit depreciation was a completely self-inflicted wound. But that aside, the overall message is that the main reasons for lower UK real wages are stagnant productivity and a decline in sterling.

Does this mean that weak bargaining power has nothing to do with weak UK wages? There are two potential reasons why there could still be some connection. First, there is some evidence that individual firms that have some monopoly power now share less of their surplus profits with workers than they used to, and that might well reflect weaker bargaining power. Perhaps the UK aggregate profit share might have fallen over the last decade if it hadn’t been for these firms passing on less of their surplus to workers.

Second, it might be the case that one reason why productivity is so poor is that nominal wages have remained low. If nominal wages rose because workers had more bargaining power, that might induce some firms to investment in labour saving machinery. This is an argument I examine in a new article in a special edition of Political Quarterly on post-Brext policy.

We have one clear recent piece of evidence on what happens if you raise nominal wages, and that is when minimum wages are increased. If George Osborne’s hike in minimum wages raised labour saving investment and productivity then no one has noticed. More seriously, the near consensus of the empirical literature on minimum wages is that increases generally do not reduce employment, and that appears inconsistent with those increases promoting labour saving investment. Now an increase in the minimum wages is not exactly the same as an increase in the bargaining power of workers, so this piece of evidence is not definitive, but as yet we have no strong evidence that greater bargaining power would spur innovation.

All this suggests that the declining bargaining power of workers is at best only a minor factor behind the decline in average real wages. To increase UK real wages we need to improve productivity, and that means not hitting investment on the head with first austerity and then Brexit. Evidence suggests that the best way to increase productivity is by raising demand so firms need to invest to meet that demand. Raining public investment would be the best way to stimulate aggregate demand.

But that does not mean that we should not increase the bargaining power of workers. There seems little doubt that working conditions in some occupations are pretty bad, and a strong union presence would be an effective way of improving the working conditions of workers. But I also think a strong union presence in a worksplace can have a positive influence on the distribution of real wages.

The average wage measure in the national statistics include some some very high wages at the top of the income distribution. Over the last thirty years the typical or median real wage has fallen by much more than the average, and that is because of rising inequality, a good part of which is due to high pay rises for the top few percent of earners. While some of that is just down to the rise of the financial sector, some is also within a firm. Andy Haldane at the Bank of England has also noted (page 8) that since the 1990s the wage share of older workers has risen, but the wage share of younger workers (below 35) has fallen. Furthermore, as Martin Sandbu points out, it is often inequality in the wage distribution that allows firms to continue to employ workers on low wages to do things a machine could do. Some of this growing inequality may have been a consequence of weaker trade unions.

There are therefore plenty of good reasons to want to increase the bargaining power of UK workers. Just don't expect that to have much impact on the living standards of workers. To raise real wages we need higher UK productivity, and that will only come from stronger private and public sector investment.

The IPPR Commission’s plan for a new economy

The final report of the IPPR’s Commission on Economic Justice is released today, with the full title of Prosperity and Justice: A Plan for a New Economy. [1] I was lucky enough to get an advance copy, and it is a very impressive document: very well researched and well argued. It is nothing less than a blueprint for a new progressive government. Of course there are some proposals I have doubts about, but it is sufficiently authoritative that in future anyone should ask of any progressive economic programme how does it relate to the recommendations of this report.

As far as my own area of monetary and fiscal policy is concerned, I’m not sure I have seen in one place as clear and comprehensive a summary of the lessons of the recent past and a better set of proposals for the future. I wrote about an early draft of this chapter in April, so I will be brief here. Their proposed fiscal rule separates current and investment spending, but suggests the ONS and OBR look to obtain a measure of spending that helps future generations that is better than the national accounts definition of public investment. They suggest a substantial increase in public investment, while current spending in constrained by a rolling five year target for balance. However they suggest that if interest rates are stuck at their lower bound, the focus of fiscal policy (current spending and taxes as well as investment) should be stimulus. Readers familiar with this blog will know this is very similar to the proposals in Portes and Wren-Lewis, 2015 and the Labour Party’s fiscal credibility rule.

For monetary policy they suggest ending the primacy of inflation, and adding underemployment and nominal income as primary targets. In addition, they suggest that QE involve creating money directly to expand the activities of a National Investment Bank (NIB) when a large macroeconomic stimulus is required. Note that, unlike a fleeting proposal by Corbyn, money creation to expand the NIB remains a call made by the independent Bank of England in a recession rather than by the NIB itself or anyone else. I would go further on the Bank’s mandate, but otherwise the IPPR’s proposals look eminently sensible.

The chapter on industrial policy seems sensible, with some ideas from Mazzucato (e.g. public sector led missions) clearly evident. Beside the NIB already mentioned, there is an emphasis on direct support rather than via the tax system (e.g. patent box) which often have large deadweight losses. They argue an industrial strategy should not just be about helping and adding to innovation clusters based around universities, but also in increasing productivity in what they call the ‘everyday economy’. In my view it is higher productivity and not greater union bargaining power that will raise real wages in a sustainable way, although in other areas a greater union presence can be helpful (see below).

For many one of the most interesting ideas - of course not new - is to end the shareholder model, and replace it with a stakeholders model where workers have an influence on the board and executive pay. It represents a move from a US to a more European model. While I find this argument fairly convincing, the idea under reforming the financial system that the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) of the Bank should target house price inflation is misconceived. What the economy needs is falling house prices, and once you make house prices a target the pressure will be to stop that happening.

The idea of a citizen’s (social) wealth fund is interesting, but I’m not sure a strong case for it is made here. Why should a government hold assets and issue debt, for example? If you want to redistribute wealth from the wealthy old to the poorer young, why not do so directly? On tax the proposal to combine income tax and national insurance seems sensible, as is the idea of a replacing bands with a formula based system (as in Germany). The same goes for a lifetime gifts tax to replace inheritance tax, and a land value tax.

There is so much else in the report, but let me end by talking about one issue: executive pay. There is a cute chart in the report that I reproduce below.

The report starts, quite rightly in my view, by emphasising the dangers of inequality. It also suggests that this cannot just be tackled ‘after the fact’ i.e. by tax and welfare measures. But will the stakeholder measures talked about above, or greater union influence, be enough to reverse runaway corporate pay? The rise of the share of the 1% starts with the advent of a neoliberal US and UK, and it has made the rest of us noticeably poorer. The report involves reversing many aspects of neoliberalism, but an interesting question is whether that is enough to achieve a decline in the 1% share, or whether other measures like higher top taxes are an essential part of doing that?

It is a fascinating report for anyone interested in a progressive economic policy. Do read it.

[1] This is a personal nostalgic footnote, which I am only writing because I could not easily see this information online. New Economy also happened to be the title of the IPPR’s journal in the early 1990s, which is now called Progressive Review. I remember it well because between 1993 and 1995/6 I wrote a number of articles for it based around simulations of the macroeconometric model I had developed with Julia Darby and John Ireland. The idea to do that came from IPPR’s Economic Director Dan Corry, with Gerry Holtham as overall Director at the time. Apart from members of the modelling team, Rebecca Driver helped write a number of the articles. The first article over that period had the title “What’s so Bad about Borrowing?” (plus ça change), and the last “Avoiding Fiscal Fudge” which proposed an independent fiscal institution or fiscal council for the UK. That took 14 years to come to fruition, and I hope many of the proposals in this report do not have to wait so long.

A new mandate for monetary policy

John McDonnell wants to raise UK investment not by cutting corporation tax but by diverting funds from parts of the financial sector away from property to new investment by UK firms. That is a laudable aim. But giving the Bank of England that task with a 3% productivity target is not the best way to do that. However that is not because I think central banks cannot influence productivity.

The kind of toy model many people work with is that monetary policy is all about stabilising the business cycle, but that stabilisation has no impact on the medium term level of  output and productivity. That is because productivity is determined by the ‘supply side’ of the UK economy. And this toy model worked particularly well for the UK economy, which from the early 1950s until before the GFC seemed to always bounce back to an underlying trend rate of growth for GDP per capita of around two and a quarter per cent.

However over none of that period did we experience a recession where nominal interest rates hit their lower bound and fiscal policy turned from stimulus to austerity before the recovery had begun. In other words in none of these periods did we have a persistent period of deficient demand with growth never exceeding its long term average. I have argued that it is wrong to see the UK productivity puzzle as a period of uniform gloom since the recession, but rather there were periods of growth which were set back by uncertainty following two additional major policy shocks: austerity and the EU referendum.

Yet if you ask UK monetary policymakers whether they think they have done a good job over the last 10 years, they will say (in public at least) that they think they have. They do not say they have failed because of shocks they couldn’t control, which would be a reasonable position, but rather they have done reasonably well at controlling the economy. In the context of the slowest recovery for at least a century, with a consequent permanent hit to output (output is over 15% below previous trends), that degree of public self-satisfaction indicates a major problem. And if you ask them how they can possibly be satisfied they will talk to you about inflation.

This is a clear reason to question the inflation target. Although in toy models controlling inflation should also mean controlling output, the real world is much more confusing. By making the bottom line inflation, we are bound to make policymakers worry too much about inflation relative to output. The clearest case for me was 2011, when the ECB and almost the MPC raised rates when the recovery from recession was only just beginning.

For that reason I have long supported a more US style twin mandate. Yet although the US had a better recovery than the UK or Eurozone, the Fed still seems to be giving inflation much more weight than employment. But you cannot ignore inflation completely. The mandate I propose for monetary policy is this:

To maximise output growth subject to maintaining inflation within 1% of its target by the end of a (rolling) 5 year period.

Another thing we have learnt from the Great Recession is that policy has to change once nominal interest rates hit their lower bound. So I would, following Ben Bernanke, add to this mandate a ‘lower bound adaptation’ where the moment interest rates hit their lower bound the inflation target would be converted into an equivalent path for the price level. That would mean that if inflation undershot its target during the recession, it would have to overshoot it before rates could be lifted above their lower bound. I would also require central banks the moment they think rates will hit the lower bound to say publicly that fiscal stimulus is now required to meet its target.

This is a dual mandate, but one that puts the emphasis on output rather than inflation. [1] Why the 1% tolerance? Because it echos current UK arrangements (when the governor has to write letters) but in practice will raise average inflation. This is a feature rather than a bug: another lesson of the last recession is that there is a strong case for a higher inflation target, but in a situation where the Chancellor sets the target it is very difficult to formally raise the target because many people think higher inflation means lower real wages.

Tasking central banks to maximise output subject to an inflation constraint is certainly better than setting a probably unattainable target for productivity growth when we have no idea what the maximum productivity growth rate is. My suggestion is a dual mandate that puts the emphasis on output and makes clear inflation is a medium term concern, making it easier for central banks to see through temporary shocks to inflation like one-off depreciations. The nature of the target recognises that policy has to adapt when nominal interest rates hit their lower bound. Comments very welcome.

[1] What is the logic of giving inflation zero weight in the short run and total importance in the long run? The answer lies in asking what the costs of inflation are. Modern analysis looks at how when prices are sticky but set at different times, inflation distorts relative prices. But inflation due to changes in flexible prices is costless. Now it is not easy to distinguish between the two types of prices in price indices, but inflationary shocks that impact on flexible prices are likely to be short lived, while those that impact on sticky prices will be more prolonged. It therefore makes sense to ignore temporary changes in inflation (those that die out within five years), but because of the vertical long run Phillips curve have a medium term inflation target.     

The Output Gap is no longer a sufficient statistic for inflationary pressure

One of the features of the latest OBR forecast is that they believe the economy is operating slightly above its sustainable level (a positive output gap), where the sustainable level is the level that would keep inflation constant. To see how startling that hypothesis is, here is the latest version of a chart I have probably posted more than any other since I started writing this blog.

It is UK GDP per head (source), which is a pretty good measure of average prosperity, and a trend line in red for 2.23% growth p.a. So from 1955 to 2007 prosperity grew at an average rate of almost two and a quarter percent each year. Since then it has increased at an annual rate of around 0.35%. And if the OBR are right, none of this is due to unutilised resources and lack of demand.

The shift in trend is just as clear if we look at output per worker. Some people try and rationalise this by saying that 2007 was a boom year, and so trend growth had really been falling long before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). But the evidence does not support more than a slight downward shift in the growth trend before the GFC: the OBR estimate an output gap of 0.7% in 2006/7 and 1.8% in 2007/8.

I find it extraordinary that most economists still talk about the output gap after the GFC in the same way that it was talked about before the crisis: as a limit to how far and fast the economy can expand. To do that is in my view quite wrong. It ignores what I call the innovations gap: the difference between actual output and the level of output that firms could achieve if they started using the best technology available to them. Because there is currently a large innovations gap, firms are likely to meet additional demand not be raising prices but by investing in these more efficient techniques.

Before the GFC, we could ignore the innovation gap because it was relatively small. But since the crisis that gap for the UK and many other countries must have increased, because it is simply not plausible to assume that since the GFC technical progress has come to a virtual halt. Innovations may not have been increasing at the pre-GFC rate, but they cannot have almost stopped, which is the implicit assumption in the OBR’s analysis. Hence we have in the UK, and I suspect in many other countries, a subsrantial innovations gap which will prevent any excess demand leading to significant inflationary pressure. Some supporting evidence for this comes from the growing productivity divergence between leading firms and the rest.

Why have most firms not been investing in the most productive equipment and techniques since the GFC? I think the simple answer is fixed costs and demand. Investment projects almost always involve a large fixed cost element (disruption, retraining), and with static demand those fixed costs may exceed any efficiency gain. But in a normal recovery from a recession, where demand is growing rapidly, firms are happy to incur that fixed cost because they need to expand capacity anyway to meet growing demand. In a weak recovery, on the other hand, many firms may not need to expand capacity, with any modest increases in demand going to leading firms, firms that do invest in the latest technology. Hence the divergence noted above.

Exactly the same argument applies to the NAIRU: the level of unemployment at which inflation is constant. The NAIRU is almost certainly lower than most central banks think for a variety of reasons, but when it is approached I expected to see a pick up in investment and innovation more than a pick up in wage inflation. Investment and productivity growth go together, as a nice chart in the OBR’s latest forecast report shows (page 43).

A large innovation gap in the UK is being enhanced by Brexit. The more uncertain future demand is the more firms are likely to postpone productivity enhancing investment. It may be politically useful to delay creating a new customs union/SM for goods with the EU to try and keep the Conservative party together (as regular readers will know, I think this is inevitable because of the Irish border), but the uncertainty that delay creates just holds back UK growth. Just one more way in which both Brexit and more generally a Conservative government is an economically destructive project.

The existence of a large innovations gap, both in the UK and elsewhere, means that we need two things. First, we need a monetary policy that is very relaxed about raising interest rates. Second we need, in the UK and pretty well everywhere, a large increase in public sector investment. The first needs independent central banks to be less inflation averse and to stop treating the sustainable level of output as something which is independent of what they do. The second requires governments to stop being obsessed about deficits and instead to start investing in the future of all the people they govern.

UK productivity: too soon to get excited

And why the costs of austerity and Brexit may be bigger than we imagined

UK productivity per hour increased by 0.9% in 2017Q3, and is estimated to have risen by 0.8% in 2017Q4. Numbers like that would not have caused much excitement before the financial crisis, but they sound great compare to what has happened since. However, if you put them in a graph you would quickly put the champagne back in the cellar.

         UK output per hour, % change on a year earlier

As I have suggested before, once you allow for the likelihood that productivity improvements depend on expectations of future demand growth (as you should), this graph is very easy to read. Productivity always falls in a demand led recession (2009) because firms are slow to lay off workers. However once output stops falling (2010,11) firms initially continue to lay off workers and then begin to invest in productivity improvements because they anticipate a recovery, which means we see strong productivity growth.

However the UK economy was hit by two big shocks after the financial crisis. First, the economic recovery failed to happen in 2011 or 2012 because of austerity, so firms stopped investing in productivity improvements. That is why there was no productivity growth in 2012 and 2013. However once the recovery of sorts in 2013 looked like it would be sustained, those productivity improvements began to be made, and we saw positive growth in the second half of 2014 and the first half of 2015. But then the second shock happened: the Conservatives won the 2015 election and the possibility of Brexit meant firms put productivity improvements on hold.

Does the recent growth at least suggest the Brexit shock is over? It is too soon to come to that conclusion. You would expect growing external demand and a tight labour market to encourage productivity growth, so maybe this is the first sign of that. But in the last two quarters it is a fall in hours rather than a fall in employment that is giving the growth, which may suggest the productivity improvement is temporary. It really is too soon to tell. 

If my reading of UK productivity growth is correct, and I’m increasingly convinced it is, then the policy implications are dramatic. The austerity mistake did not just give us a temporary hit to demand and incomes, but has led to permanently lower productivity and therefore permanently lower output and incomes. Brexit started reducing productivity, and therefore output and incomes, before the vote even happened (as I suggested it would back in 2013). The costs of governments or voters ignoring what the majority of economists recommend is even greater than we imagined.

Disentangling the UK productivity problem

As it has become clear to the non-FT/Economist media, and as it has been clear to economists for a long time, productivity growth is a far more important problem for the UK than the deficit. However I think discussion can get confused if it fails to distinguish between three aspects to the problem.

First, the UK is not alone in seeing large falls in productivity growth. Now some of that may be related to the global financial crisis, but not all of it is. As this chart taken from the excellent paper by Richard Jones shows, in the G7 productivity appears to have been declining since at least the 1980s.

For simplicity’s sake I will call that the global productivity decline.

The second element in the UK’s productivity performance is a structural weakness relative to other countries. I know of no better way of convincing you this exists than this chart, taken from the latest OECD survey of the UK economy.

The robots may be coming to take our jobs, but at this rate UK manufacturing will be the last place this will happen. As this report and the Jones paper also show, the UK’s R&D expenditure is weak and below the OECD average. Polly Toynbee shows it is no better on the workforce training side. [1] 

I am fairly sure, however, that what we have seen since the Global Financial crisis is an additional third weakness. Here is the annual growth in UK output per hour.

The historic trend, which showed no clear sign of following the global trend and declining after 1980 (a clear UK success), is around 2.25%. Now it is clearly possible to argue that this data shows a decline from this long run trend starting in the mid-2000s based on this aggregate data. If you factor in as well that these aggregate numbers are flattered by unsustainably fast productivity growth in financial services from 2001 to 2006 then you can maybe detect the beginning of a slowdown from the start of the millennium. This would not be surprising, as it would be very hard for the UK to buck the slowdown in global productivity for very long.

Having said all that, what happened after the Great Recession is something quite different. But it is wrong to view this period as just one of constant zero growth gloom. Productivity began to recover in 2010 and 2011, to levels that do not look too bad by international standards, but hit negative territory in the following two years. Another, this time more modest, two year recovery was followed by another collapse in 2016. This does not look like just the global productivity decline plus some additional structural weakness. Achieving negative productivity growth two years running indicates a deeper malaise.

This is why I think there is a third factor behind this terrible performance. To explain it we need to start thinking about productivity growth as not some kind of manna from heaven, churned out by our universities, or even the product of R&D by firms, but also as something akin to an investment. If you are confident of future growth and profitability, you are more likely to invest in productivity improvements (which may or may not involve physical investment) than if you are unusually uncertain or gloomy.

After recessions are over, productivity usually picks up. Firms understand the business cycle, and in UK business cycles over the last 40 odd years recessions are followed by strong growth. So when recessions have levelled out, it makes sense for firms to invest in productivity improvements. That is one reason why productivity growth resumed in 2010 and 2011. The only problem is that something quite unexpected happened. Growth did not return at all. At one stage people were talking about a second UK recession. Firms became both uncertain and gloomy, and productivity growth stopped. That shock, which we can reasonably call austerity, was the first shock that hit the economy after the GFC.

By 2013 it looked like the recovery had finally arrived. Productivity growth could resume, but maybe more cautiously than before. And that caution was justified because in the election of 2015 a new uncertainty arose: the possibility of Brexit. Brexit would be one of the most profound shocks to hit the UK for decades: certainly for firms involved in trading or international supply chains and probably wider than that. Just as the costs of waiting are small for a large investment decision when there is serious uncertainty, so Brexit meant that productivity improvements would once again be put on hold.

Thus we have three aspects to the UK’s productivity slowdown. The first is the global slowdown, which we managed to avoid for two decades but no longer. The second is a long term structural weakness in developing and applying new technology. The third is the impact of two shocks, austerity and Brexit, which has caused UK firms to put productivity improvements on hold and become very gloomy about the UK’s future. I somehow doubt that we can start doing something about the UK’s long term structural weaknesses while we continue to shoot ourselves in the foot with crazy policies like austerity or Brexit.

[1] If you think the budget made a significant difference to all this, read Anna Valero here       

The Brexit interest rate increases and misunderstanding inflation

Last week’s rise in UK rates has been extensively analysed (see for example Tony Yates here) so I will be very selective. First, the justification for the title of this post is provided by an extract from the inflation report:

“The overshoot of inflation throughout the forecast predominantly reflects the effects on import prices of the referendum-related fall in sterling. Uncertainties associated with Brexit are weighing on domestic activity, which has slowed even as global growth has risen significantly. And Brexit-related constraints on investment and labour supply appear to be reinforcing the marked slowdown that has been increasingly evident in recent years in the rate at which the economy can grow without generating inflationary pressures.”

The last sentence is particularly important: in plain language it is saying that Brexit is contributing to lower trend productivity growth, which the Bank now put at 1.5% compared to a pre-recession level of 2.25%. The wording is chosen carefully: they are not talking about uncertainty effects, but permanent effects from a likely deal. So last year worries about the demand side effects of Brexit led the Bank to reduce rates, and now concerns about the supply side effects of Brexit are contributing to higher rates.

Whether these modest increases in interest rates continue, as the Bank are signalling, should largely depend on whether the pickup in earnings growth they anticipate actually happens. As Torsten Bell from the Resolution Foundation argues here, the set of information that might justify the Bank’s expectations of an imminent recovery in earnings growth is not empty, but nevertheless many economists regard it as a brave forecast.

However the labour market is not the only reason the Bank is raising rates. Putting labour market issues aside, they think that because firms are operating with little ‘spare capacity’, any large increases in demand will be met by firms raising prices. Ergo the Bank’s job is to use higher interest rates to stop demand rising too fast. I think this is conceptually wrong, because it underestimates the role that demand and expectations about demand play in determining investment decisions.

A firm can meet rising demand in three ways: by investing in more productive processes, by raising prices or by using more of its spare capacity. In a traditional economic upswing firms first use spare capacity, then invest, and when capacity utilisation is at a peak and there are no profitable investments to make it raises prices. At that point it is right for a central bank to step in to moderate demand growth.

This has not been a typical recovery from a recession. Firms have used up spare capacity, but have not invested in more efficient processes. This is what measures of capacity utilisation suggest (taken from an earlier Bank of England Inflation Report).

If you just take these surveys as measuring the state of the cycle (and if we ignore the Bank Agents) since 2013 the economy has been experiencing an economic boom. Yet from 2013 core inflation has been below target and falling. You can resolve this paradox by thinking about firms acting unusually, by failing to invest and meeting additional demand by utilising capacity as if they are in a boom The result of that is stagnant productivity growth.

The conceptual error is to read these capacity utilisation numbers as indicating that there are no profitable investments to make. We know these profitable investments exist, because leading firms are improving their productivity.* What we have is an innovations gap, where lagging firms are not copying leading firms and are instead holding back on investing. We do not know why they are holding back, but one obvious reason is they have expectations of low future growth and/or high uncertainty about this growth. Empirical evidence shows the strongest determinant of investment is output growth, and the obvious rationalisation for that ‘accelerator effect’ is that current growth influences expectations about future growth.

If this is right, increases in demand will be met by firms finally coming off the fence and investing, rather than raising prices. But if the central bank starts raising interest rates to choke off demand, even when it is growing slowly by historical standards, it will validate the pessimism that has been holding back investment and productivity will continue to stagnate. There is a very real danger that the Bank may be playing its part in a self-fulfilling low growth recovery.

*Postscript (8/11/17) Discussion here by Berlingieri et al shows this growing divergence between leading and lagging firms is a global phenomenon.

Forecast errors compared

And a coda defends experts against Aditya Chakrabortty

A recent conversation got me thinking about different types of macroeconomic forecast error, and what implications they might have for macroeconomics. I’ll take three, from a UK perspective although the implications go well beyond. The errors are the financial crisis, the lack of a downturn immediately after Brexit, and flat UK productivity.

The immediate cause of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) was the US housing market crash, but that alone should have caused some kind of downturn in the US, with limited implications for the rest of the world. What caused the GFC was the lack of resilience of banks around the world to a shock of this kind.

Were there any indications of this lack of resilience? Here is an OECD series for banking sector leverage in the UK: the ratio of bank assets to capital. The higher the number, the more fragile banks are becoming.

UK Banking sector leverage: Source OECD

The first and perhaps most important problem with forecasting the financial crisis was that macro forecasters were not looking at data like this. For most it was not on their radar, because banks, let alone bank leverage, played no role in their models. It was a sin of omission, a big gap in our macro understanding. (Whether, if forecasters had been having to forecast this data, they would have predicted a crisis is improbable, but some would have at least noted it as an issue.)

Moving on to the second mistake, it is often said (correctly) that forecasters are very bad at predicting turning points or dramatic changes. But many did predict such a change immediately following the Brexit vote: a sharp and immediate slowdown in demand caused by the uncertainty of Brexit. It didn’t happen. The main reason was consumption, which held up by more than people were expecting, given the fall in real incomes that was likely to come from the Brexit depreciation. There are two and a half obvious explanations for this. First, because of Leave propaganda half the population thought Brexit would make them at least no worse off. Second, those who did anticipate the rise in import prices may have taken the opportunity to buy consumer durables made overseas to beat the prospective price increase. The half is that the Bank cut interest rates a bit.

None of these effects are very new. They may not have been incorporated into the forecasters’ models, but they could in principle have been incorporated using the forecaster’s judgement, although getting the quantification right would have been very difficult. In the end we got the slowdown, but delayed until the first half of this year, as Leavers began to face reality and the higher import prices came through, so it was an error of timing more than anything else (although it was apparently enough to make MP Liz Truss change her mind and support Brexit!). You could describe it as an unchallenging error, because it could easily be explained using existing ideas. It is the kind of error that forecasters make all the time, and which makes forecasting so inaccurate.

The third error was UK productivity, which I talked about at length here. Until the GFC, macro forecasters in the UK had not had to think about technical progress and how it became embodied in improvements in labour productivity, because the trend seemed remarkably stable. So when UK productivity growth appeared to come to a halt after the GFC, forecasters were largely in the dark. What many like the OBR did, which is to assume that previous trend growth would quickly resume, was not the extreme that some people suggest. It was instead a compromise between continuing no growth and reverting to the previous trend line, the second being what had happened in previous recessions.

My point of writing about this again is that I think this third error is much more like the GFC mistake than the post-Brexit vote mistake. In both cases something important that forecasters were used to taking for granted started behaving in a way that had not happened since WWII. Standard models were used to treating technical progress as an unpredictable random process. Now it is just possible that this is still the case, and the absence of technical progress in the UK and to a lesser extent elsewhere is just one of those things that will never be explained. But for the UK at least the coincidence with the GFC, austerity and now Brexit seems too great. As as I showed in the earlier post growth has not been exactly zero but has oscillated in a way that could be related to macro events.

If there is some connection, both in the UK and elsewhere, between the decline in economic productivity growth and macroeconomic developments, then this suggests an important missing element in macromodels. And like the financial sector, there is an existing body of research that economists can draw on, which is endogenous growth theory. There are examples of that happening already.

But I want to end with a plea. After the financial crisis too many people who should have know better said that failing to predict the financial crisis meant that all existing mainstream macroeconomics was flawed. It was rubbish, but such attitudes did not help when some of us were arguing against austerity on the basis of standard macroeconomic ideas and evidence. Now with UK productivity, we have Aditya Chakrabortty saying that experts at the OBR “are guilty of a similar un-realism and they have proven just as impervious to criticism” as people like Boris Johnson or Liam Fox. Not content with this nonsense, he says “This age of impossibilism is partly their creation”.

This is just wrong. Look at the elements of neoliberal overreach. Economists didn’t start calling for tight immigration controls and using immigrants as a scapegoat for almost everything. Most academic economists did not call for austerity. Almost all economists did not want to get rid of our trade agreements with the EU. Even if economists had warned about the financial crisis they would have been ignored because of the political power of finance. If all economists had thought productivity would continue flat we would have just had more austerity. [1] And in making this basic mistake, it is ironically Aditya Chakrabortty who has joined Michael Gove and other Brexiteers in having had enough of experts.

[1] Less expected productivity growth means lower future output which means lower future tax receipts which means, given the government’s austerity policy, more cuts in public spending.

The OBR, productivity and policy failures

Chris Giles had an article in the FT yesterday about the UK’s continuing dreadful productivity performance, and the implications this might have for forecasts of the public finances. It has the following chart comparing successive OBR forecasts and actual data.

I want to make two points about this. The first is about the OBR’s forecast. [1] It is easy to say looking at this chart that the OBR has for a long time been foolishly optimistic about UK productivity growth. Too often growth was expected to return to its long run trend shortly after the forecast was published but it failed to do so. Expect lots of articles about how hopeless macro forecasts are in general, or perhaps how hopeless OBR forecasts are in particular. It was obvious, these articles might say, that trend productivity growth in the UK has taken a permanent hit following the financial crisis.

Anyone saying this is ignoring the history of the UK economy for the 50 years before the GFC. After each downturn or recession, labour productivity growth has initially fallen, but it has within a few years recovered to return to its underlying trend of around 2.25% per annum. This means not just returning to growth of 2.25%, but initially exceeding it as productivity caught up with the ground lost in the recession. In a boom sometimes growth exceeded this trend line, but it soon fell back towards it.

This made sense. Productivity growth reflects technical progress and innovation, and they tend to continue despite recessions. A firm may not be able to implement innovations during a recession, but once the recession is over experience suggests they make up for lost ground in terms of putting innovations into practice.

Given this experience, OBR forecasts have always been pretty pessimistic. They have assumed a return to trend growth, but no catch up to make up for lost ground. If they had also forecast, in 2014 say, that given recent experience they expected productivity growth to be almost flat for the next five years that would have been regarded as extreme at the time. Why would UK firms continue to ignore productivity enhancing innovations when the macroeconomic outlook looked reasonable?

And of course in 2014 UK productivity growth was positive. This brings me to my second point, which follows from this quote from the FT article:

“In the Budget, both the OBR and Mr Hammond are likely to stress that the downgraded forecasts do not reflect a new assessment of the damage to the UK economy from Brexit, but a reassessment of likely productivity growth after so many recent disappointments.”

Chris may be right that they will say this, but is it remotely plausible? As my recent post tried to suggest, UK productivity growth can be seen as suffering from three large shocks: the recession following the GFC, the absence of a normal recovery as a result of austerity, and then Brexit. The first two of those shocks led to a period of intense uncertainty, causing UK firms to put on hold any plans to innovate. Just as they thought things had returned to a subdued version of normal they were hit by the third, Brexit. During periods of intense uncertainty, productivity stalls or may even decline a little, as firms meet any increase in demand by increasing employment but not investing in new techniques. [2]

This story involving uncertainty seems to fit the data. Once the recovery (of sorts) finally began in 2013, productivity growth picked up. That sustained growth came to a halt when the Conservatives won the 2015 election, and the possibility of Brexit began to be an important factor for firms. [3]

These two points are related in the following way. The experience of the 50 years before the GFC suggested that you could hit the economy with pretty large hammers, but it would eventually bounce back. However that may have been contingent on a belief by firms that if policymakers were wielding the hammer (using high interest rates for example) they would take it away fairly soon, and replace it by stimulus. That belief was shattered in the UK by the GFC and austerity, where policymakers decided to keep using the hammer. What little confidence remained was destroyed by Brexit.

Discoveries are still be being made in universities around the world, and we know innovations are still being implemented by leading UK firms. It seems completely far fetched to imagine the GFC is still having some mysterious impact on the remainder of UK firms such that they refuse to adopt these innovations. A much more plausible story is that we are seeing what happens when most firms lose confidence in the ability of policymakers to manage the economy.

[1] I am on the OBR’s advisory panel, but as our job when we meet once a year is to be critical of OBR assumptions, and as we have no role in producing their forecasts, I think what I say here can be completely objective.

[2] Productivity can initially fall because new employees are not as productive as those who have been working in the firms for some time, for example.
Postscript (7/10/17) For evidence on the impact of Brexit on productivity, see work by Bloom and Mizen here.

[3] An alternative story is that the UK has settled into a new slow growth ‘equilibrium’, where the majority of firms are so pessimistic they hardly innovate at all.